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THE DYNAMIC SELECTION OF COORDINATION
MECHANISMS IN MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS
by Cora Beatriz EXCELENTE TOLEDO
This thesis presents and evaluates a decision making framework that enables au-
tonomous agents to dynamically select the mechanism they employ in order to
coordinate their inter-related activities. Adopting this framework means coordi-
nation mechanisms move from the realm of something that is imposed upon the
system at design time, to something that the agents select at run-time in order
to ¯t their prevailing circumstances and their current coordination needs. Using
this framework, agents make informed choices about when and how to coordinate,
when to respond to requests for coordination and when it is pro¯table to drop
contracts in order to exploit better opportunities. The framework's e±cacy is in-
vestigated in a range of coordination situations; such as scenarios in which agents
have varying dispositions to work cooperatively, in which agents make decisions
based on alternative assumptions about their environment, and in which the task
of predicting other agents' behaviour varies in di±culty. In all of these cases, a
systematic empirical analysis is undertaken to evaluate the e®ect of such situations
on the agent's decision making mechanisms and their e®ectiveness.Contents
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Introduction
An increasing number of computer systems are being designed in terms of au-
tonomous agents (Parunak, 1999; Jennings, 2001; Parunak, 2000; Luck et al.,
2003; Jennings, 1998). This is because agent-based approaches have been shown
to be well suited to analysing, designing and building complex and distributed
systems (Jennings, 2001). More speci¯cally, the features of agents that are most
relevant in this context are: autonomy: an agent can act without human interven-
tion and it has control over its own actions; reactivity: an agent is able to perceive
its environment and respond in a timely manner to changes that occur on it; and
proactivity: an agent takes the initiative in order to satisfy the objectives for which
it was designed (Wooldridge & Jennings, 1995; Wooldridge, 2001).
While these features of agenthood concentrate on the properties of individ-
ual components that can act °exibly in pursuit of their objectives, much of the
power of agent-based computing stems from the fact that agents are also social
(Wooldridge & Jennings, 1995; Wooldridge, 2001). This social ability means that
agents interact with one another to satisfy their own objectives or the objectives
of the wider community. Here, systems in which such interactions take place are
termed multiagent systems (MAS). Examples of such systems include: the design
of an artifact in which the ¯nal outcome is the result of integrating the e®orts of
several designers that produce constituent parts of the whole (Durfee et al., 1989;
Shen & Barthes, 1995; McGuire et al., 1993); auction houses in which the price
of a good is obtained as a result of several agents competing against each other
(Wurman et al., 2001; Sandholm, 1999; He et al., 2003), and a mechanism for
synchronising access to a common source of information in which several agents
negotiate to have the right to access information (Rosenschein & Zlotkin, 1994;
1Chapter 1 Introduction 2
Huhns & Stephens, 1999). In more detail, a MAS system is characterised as a
system in which there are a number of autonomous agents that inhabit a common
environment and that interact with one another for a variety of reasons (see for
example Figure 1.1 where various types of interactions are illustrated 1).
visibility
and
influence
relationship
organizational
Sphere of
interaction
agent
Environment
Figure 1.1: Canonical view of a multiagent system (from (Jennings, 2001)).
In this work, the generic term that will be used to cover all types of social inter-
action is coordination (Bond & Gasser, 1988a; Moulin & Chaib-Draa, 1996; Durfee
et al., 1989). Thus, in the design of the artifact, for example, it is necessary to
coordinate the independent designs into the global one and, moreover, it is desir-
able that these coordinated activities accomplish the ¯nal task with the minimum
time and resources. In the auction example, coordination is needed to indicate
how the o®ers and countero®ers between the agents can take place in order to
have a ¯nal price that is agreed by both parties. Finally, in the synchronisation
example, coordination is required to establish the order and time at which each
agent should consult and access the central source of information.
In all of these cases, successful coordination results in the overall system per-
forming in a coherent manner. If, however, the coordination is not e®ective then
the overall outcome may be incoherent behaviour (i.e. the system does not work
as a unit and the results generated or the communication of those results by the
agents are not well synchronised (Huhns & Stephens, 1999)). For example, in a
MAS system for dealing with scarce resources, miscoordination could cause re-
sources to be wasted, activities to be needlessly duplicated, or no overall solution
to be reached at all. From these and other examples, it can be seen that coor-
1Note that agents are grouped in an organisational relationship (Section 2.1.4).Chapter 1 Introduction 3
dination is usually needed for one of the following reasons (Durfee et al., 1989;
Jennings, 1998; Lesser, 1999; Bond & Gasser, 1988a):
² Agents pursue global or interrelated individual goals. Agents might be mem-
bers of a group with global objectives (cooperative agents) or they might
pursue their own local objectives (competitive agents) in a community that
is composed of several other agents. In the former case, the agent's interest
is to work with others in order to satisfy these global requirements or con-
straints, to facilitate the work of others or to avoid harmful interactions. For
example, in systems in which agents are specialists or experts in particular
¯elds (the tasks are functionally distributed) or they are located in speci¯c
regions or areas (the tasks are spatially distributed) they might all contribute
with speci¯c parts to the global solution (Durfee et al., 1989; Bond & Gasser,
1988a; Jennings, 1998). In the latter case, the agents' interests are to achieve
their own objectives, regardless of the interests of others, but some form of
coordination is needed to resolve con°icting situations. The classical exam-
ple of this type of encounter is when agents play the role of buyer and seller
in a market and they compete against each other to obtain higher bene¯ts
(Wurman et al., 1998).
² Agents have limited viewpoints. Agent systems do not have a centralised
control component and there is no a global view of the problem (as shown in
Figure 1.1, all the agents have a limited sphere of visibility and in°uence).
Given such conditions, agents need to share and coordinate their partial
views in order to obtain a global solution. There are a number of applica-
tions in which the knowledge and expertise might be distributed between
several agents. For example, when it is necessary to interpret or recognise
data in which the sources are distributed in di®erent locations (Lesser &
Corkill, 1983); when it is required to control a set of robots which work
together (Durfee et al., 1989), or when it is needed to integrate the informa-
tion gathered by several agents from the Internet (Decker et al., 1997). In
all of these cases, agents need to work together to produce a consistent and
coherent global solution.
² Agents share the environment and resources. In environments with limited
or scarce resources, agents need to coordinate in terms of the time and/or
the amount of resource they use to either avoid con°icts or to facilitate the
achievement of common activities (Bond & Gasser, 1988b). For example,Chapter 1 Introduction 4
in situations in which agents have distributed computational resources (fast
computation, memory, specialised software, etc.), they need to agree about
the order in which the resources are employed to solve individual or global
problems (Durfee et al., 1989).
Against this background, it can be seen that coordination is a key issue in MAS
research because it provides the mechanisms to ensure that groups of agents act
in a coherent manner. However, coordination, like several other MAS concepts,
has been used to describe a variety of phenomena which means that it does not
have a generally agreed upon de¯nition and its scope varies considerably. For this
reason, the ¯rst step is to clarify the concepts involved as they are used in this
thesis. Regardless of the dimension, level of abstraction, perspective and disci-
pline, most researchers generally agree that: coordination is the act of managing
interdependencies between activities (Decker, 1995; Bond & Gasser, 1988a; Moulin
& Chaib-Draa, 1996; Wooldridge, 2001).
From the above, it is clear that coordination is needed for a variety of reasons
and it encompasses a wide variety of behaviours. Consequently, many methods
and techniques have been proposed for coordinating the behaviour of multiple
agent systems. These include appealing to a higher authority agent in an organi-
sational structure (Fox, 1981; Malone, 1987; Carley & Gasser, 1999), instituting
social laws that avoid harmful interactions (Briggs & Cook, 1995; Shoham & Ten-
nenholtz, 1992), using contracting protocols or bids exchanged in a market place
to allocate tasks (Smith & Davis, 1981; Malone, 1987; Wellman, 1993; Huberman
& Hogg, 1995), iteratively exchanging tentative plans until all constraints are sat-
is¯ed (Durfee & Lesser, 1991) and negotiating to ¯nd agreements (Rosenschein &
Zlotkin, 1994; Sandholm & Lesser, 1995; Huhns & Stephens, 1999).
For the purposes of this work, however, all the methods and techniques for
achieving coordination will be grouped under the generic term of \coordination
mechanisms" (CMs). Thus, for example, contracting, planning, negotiating, ex-
ploiting organisational structures are all CMs. In more detail, a CM determines
the course of action that agents can take in order to manage their interactions to
achieve their goals. In other words, a CM de¯nes how agents should interact, at
what time and with which resources to accomplish their goals.
All of these coordination mechanisms have di®erent properties and characteris-
tics and are suited to di®erent types of tasks and environments. They vary in the
degree to which coordination is prescribed at design time, the amount of time andChapter 1 Introduction 5
e®ort they require to set up a given coordination episode at run-time, and the de-
gree to which they are likely to be successful and produce coordinated behaviour
in a given situation. For example, a CM that involves a signi¯cant amount of
communication to reach agreements is most appropriate when the agents that in-
habit the environment are not only accessible but also few in number. In contrast,
a CM that exploits an organisational structure is better suited to situations in
which the number of agents is very large and conformance with the structure can
be guaranteed in advanced. Generally speaking, however, these dimensions act as
forces in opposing directions; coordination mechanisms that are highly likely to
succeed typically have high set up and maintenance costs, whereas mechanisms
that have lower set up costs are also more likely to fail. Moreover, a coordination
mechanism that works well in a reasonably static environment will often perform
poorly in a dynamic and fast changing one. In short, there is no universally best
coordination mechanism (Galbraith, 1973).
Given this situation, this thesis argues that it is important for the agents to have
a variety of coordination mechanisms, with varying properties, at their disposal
so that they can then select a mechanism that is appropriate to the coordination
episode at hand. Thus, for particularly important tasks, the agents may choose to
adopt a coordination mechanism that is highly likely to succeed, but which will
invariably have a correspondingly large set up cost. Whereas for less important
tasks, a mechanism that is less likely to succeed, but which has lower set up costs,
may be more appropriate. Similarly, when it is di±cult or expensive to set up
a coordination activity (e.g. because there are not many agents available) the
agent is likely to pick a mechanism that is highly likely to succeed (even though
it will have a high set up cost). In contrast, if coordination can be set up easily
or cheaply then it might be more important to choose a mechanism that promises
to achieve the task in the quickest possible way.
To date, however, the choice of which coordination mechanism to use in a given
situation is something that the designer typically imposes upon the system at de-
sign time. Thus, for example, in a given application a particular social law will
be used or it will be decided that all coordination activities will be handled by a
particular negotiation protocol. This means that in many cases the coordination
mechanism that is employed is not well suited to the agents' prevailing circum-
stances. This in°exibility means that the performance of both individual agents
and the overall system may be compromised.Chapter 1 Introduction 6
To achieve the desired degree of °exibility in coordination two key decision
making components need to be present in the agent (Jennings, 1993):
(i) the ability to select a means of coordinating that is appropriate to the pre-
vailing situation; and
(ii) the ability to assess (and re-assess) an agent's commitment to the on-going
coordination activity.
Regarding the ¯rst point, this thesis claims that it is inappropriate to impose a
particular coordination mechanism upon the system at design time because there
is no scope for changing or modifying the mechanism to ensure there is a good
¯t with the prevailing circumstances (Bourne et al., 2000; Excelente-Toledo &
Jennings, 2003a). To circumvent this problem, a decision making framework is
presented that enables agents to dynamically select the coordination mechanism
that is most appropriate to their circumstances. Thus, this work is not concerned
with developing actual coordination mechanisms that exhibit the varying proper-
ties discussed above, nor with classifying existing coordination mechanisms along
such dimensions. Rather, the coordination mechanisms are viewed in the abstract;
representing them in a quantitative way. In particular, CMs are modelled in terms
of the cost involved in the coordination and the bene¯ts of adopting a particular
mechanism (as advocated by (Lesser, 1998, 1999)) (see Section 1.1.2 for a num-
ber of illustrative examples). The framework is then concerned with deciding
whether coordination should be attempted in a given context (given the agent has
a particular set of mechanisms at its disposal) and, if so, which of the available
mechanisms is the most appropriate to employ in the prevailing situation. Once a
particular mechanism has been chosen for a particular coordination episode, the
agents involved are expected to adhere to the rules and procedures speci¯ed in the
mechanism itself. Thus the rules indicate how the coordination should actually
proceed.
Moreover, if the system is open, dynamic and heterogeneous (as is the norm for
Web applications (Hendler, 2003), e-commerce systems (He et al., 2003) and grid
computing application (deRoure et al., 2003)) agents face even greater di±culty
when taking coordinating decisions. This is because in such environments it is
impossible to enumerate in advance the wide variety of contexts in which coordi-
nation is likely to be needed. In fact, agents face a signi¯cant challenge even to
know what agents are present at any given moment; because agents can enter andChapter 1 Introduction 7
leave the system at any time (openness), because the system and its components
are in a continuous state of change (dynamism), or because the agents themselves
exhibit di®erent behaviour, have di®erent capabilities and have their own agenda
(heterogeneity). In these cases, it is especially important to have agents that are
capable of automatically tailoring their coordination decisions to respond to the
prevailing context. Thus, a further motivating hypothesis is that it is important
to have agents that can learn the appropriate activities and interaction patterns in
such challenging environments. Speci¯cally, an agent needs to be able to learn the
right situations in which to attempt to coordinate and which CM to use in such
situations. Given this observation, a natural extension to the basic coordination
framework is to enable the agents to acquire, through run-time adaptation, the
knowledge that is important for their decision making (Excelente-Toledo & Jen-
nings, 2002, 2003b). To this end, the basic framework is extended by giving the
agents the capability to learn to make the right decisions about their coordination
problem.
Regarding the second point, many of the extant coordination mechanism have
no explicit procedures or decision making models that enable agents to drop com-
mitments to coordination tasks if better opportunities present themselves. For
instance, in the basic version of the Contract-Net protocol (Smith & Davis, 1981),
once an agent is awarded a contract, there is simply no mechanism for reneging.
This can be detrimental to an agent's performance if it has to turn away high value
opportunities in order to persist with its existing ones. The notion of commitment
is something that is central to all coordination mechanisms since it provides the
basis of trust on which agents perform their part of the social activity. However
the imposition of unbreakable commitments can lead to irrational and ine±cient
behaviour. For this reason, a number of models have been developed that al-
low commitments to be dropped if speci¯ed contingencies arise (e.g., (Cohen &
Levesque, 1990; Jennings, 1993)). While this certainly represents an improvement,
the drawback is that the speci¯c conditions under which commitments can be bro-
ken must be enumerated in advance. In dynamic and unpredictable environments
this can be extremely di±cult (and sometimes impossible). To provide yet greater
°exibility, levelled commitment contracts were introduced (Sandholm & Lesser,
1995, 1996). In such contracts, either party can decommit, for whatever reason,
as long as they pay the ¯xed decommitment penalty that is speci¯ed in the con-
tract. This type of commitment avoids the problem of having to a priori enumerate
speci¯c environmental or agent states and allows agents to decommit unilaterallyChapter 1 Introduction 8
for whatever reason they deem appropriate. However, levelled commitments do
not explicitly take the ongoing cost of participating in the coordination activity
into account. This is because the decommitment penalty is assumed to be ¯xed,
both for the contractor (manager) and contractee, no matter at what stage of the
coordination process the commitment is broken.
To be more realistic, the research position of this thesis is that the penalty
should vary depending on the costs the agents have sunk into the coordination.
Thus, a coordination that has only recently started, and in which the agents have
invested comparatively little time, should attract a lower penalty than one that has
been ongoing for a signi¯cant period of time and in which the agents have invested
signi¯cant resources. Here, such commitments are called variable penalty contracts,
and it is believed that these are essential for a rational treatment of decommitment
in °exible coordination scenarios. To this end, this thesis incorporates agents that
exhibit varying degrees of commitments and that incorporate di®erent type of
penalties for reneging on contracts. Thus, in line with (Sandholm & Lesser, 1995,
1996), this thesis claims that an agent should be able to decommit (for whatever
reason) by paying an appropriate penalty to the contract holder (Excelente-Toledo
et al., 2001).
In summary, the aim of this research is to develop °exible agents that can reason
about the process of coordination and select mechanisms that are well suited to
their prevailing circumstances. That is, the choice of coordination mechanism is
made at run-time by the agents that need to coordinate. More speci¯cally, the
objectives of the research in this thesis are four-fold:
² To show that it is appropriate and bene¯cial for agents to select coordination
mechanisms at run-time.
² To de¯ne a decision making framework that agents can use in order to select
an appropriate coordination mechanism at run-time.
² To show that having °exibility with respect to commitments and penalties
can improve performance in coordination activities.
² To show when and where adaptivity can improve an agent's decision making
with respect to coordination.Chapter 1 Introduction 9
1.1 Assumptions about the agent context
To clearly articulate the underlying point of departure for this research, this sub-
section clari¯es the main assumptions that are made with respect to agency, coor-
dination mechanisms, and the environment in which agents are situated (in line
with Figure 1.1).
1.1.1 Agents
This thesis assumes that agents satisfy the de¯nition as advocated in (Wooldridge,
2001) and discussed in earlier section. However, it is additionally assumed that
agents are rational when they take decisions; meaning they take those decisions
that enable them to attain more \successful" goals (Weiss, 1999). However, the
problem here is to know whether a particular goal is more likely to be more \suc-
cessful" than another. Thus, in this context, an agent is rational if, given its per-
ception and knowledge, it makes the right choice between di®erent alternatives.
Thus selection typically aims to maximise some measure of performance (Russell
& Norvig, 1995b) and here that measure is captured by a utility function 2.
A ¯nal comment about agency, as it is used in this thesis, is that the work
does not assume any particular type of agent; thus agents can be cooperative
or competitive. As will be clari¯ed in subsequent chapters (3 and 4), agents
pursue their own objectives (without regard to what others are doing) which clearly
shows competitive behaviour. But, on the other hand, the agents may possess
di®erent dispositions to work in cooperative situations as a means to obtain a
better performance.
1.1.2 Coordination Mechanisms
This thesis claims that all coordination mechanisms need to be represented in a
quantitative way in order to enable agents to reason about coordination problems.
2The main di®erence between the proposal as presented in this research (see Chapter 4 for
the details) and the standard decision theory (Russell & Norvig, 1995d) is that the former does
not incorporate a probability distribution of any kind (nor does it reason under uncertainty),
whereas the latter puts together probability and utility theory. This is why in this thesis the
proposed framework is referred to as a decision making framework, rather than a decision-
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This assumption is consistent with Lesser's re°ection on the ¯eld: \in order to de-
sign e±cient and e®ective coordination strategies that will work in a wide variety of
environments they must explicitly account for the bene¯ts and the cost of coordina-
tion in the current situation in a quanti¯able way" (Lesser, 1998, pp. 137),(Lesser,
1999, pp. 8).
To this end, the ¯rst step in characterising coordination mechanisms is to rep-
resent them in a common manner so that agents are able to apply reasoning tech-
niques to discriminate among them. In this work, a characterisation that covers
the following issues is adopted:
² what are the requirements that need to be ful¯lled before the technique can
be applied (requirements)?
² what are the rules that agents follow in order to complete their interactions
(coordinating algorithm)? and,
² what degree of coordination is likely after the coordinating algorithm has
been applied (level of achievement)?
Now, to be able to reason about selecting a particular mechanism in a given
situation, an abstraction is built from this basic description. This abstraction
needs to identify the meta information that enables agents to distinguish between
the alternatives. In this case, the ones considered are the run-time cost to set up
the mechanism (cost to set up) and the likelihood of it being successful (probability
of success) 3. These meta-data attributes are the ones advocated by Lesser and can
be regarded, respectively, as being derived from the description of the requirements
and the level of achievement. Moreover, a way of quantifying these values is also
required and, for illustrative purposes in this section, a simple qualitative scale of
high, medium and low is chosen. Combining this altogether, a generic template of
Table 1.1 is produced for describing and reasoning about coordination mechanisms.
There is, however, a clari¯cation that need to be made regarding the level of
achievement in this table. Generally speaking, it represents an evaluation of the
3Other attributes could undoubtedly be added to this list, but here the focus is on those that
are believed to be necessary (if not su±cient) for the current purposes. In particular, the reason
for not considering the coordinating algorithm as an attribute of the meta-data is because it
is believed that as a ¯rst step the agents do not need to reason about the details of how the
interdependences are managed with each coordinating algorithm. Thus, agents initially decide
whether coordination is worthwhile and, in subsequents steps, deal with the speci¯c details of
the actual steps involved.Chapter 1 Introduction 11
CM: Generic template
COORDINATION TECHNIQUE components.
Requirements. The preconditions that need to be satis¯ed
before the coordinating algorithm can be executed. This cov-
ers things such as whether the protocol requires a set up phase
(e.g. in multiagent planning a goal decomposition is needed
before sub-goals can be assigned to the agents) or whether it
needs a particular piece of information to be available (e.g. the
number of agents in the system). These requirements might be
established at design time and/or during the run-time execution.
Examples of the former case are when the agent knows (because
it has been hard-wired) how to contact the other agents in the
system, what are their corresponding capabilities and so on.
Examples of the latter case are when agents acquire the same
information, but, as a result of their interaction with others.
Coordinating algorithm. The detailed plan of actions that
have to be followed to achieve coordination once the require-
ments have been ful¯lled.
Level of achievement. The degree of coordination that is
likely from following the steps speci¯ed in the coordinating al-
gorithm.
META-DATA attributes.
Cost to set-up: A value measuring the run-time costs associ-
ated with the requirements noted above.
Probability of success: The likelihood in a given environment
that following the steps in the coordinating algorithm will result
in a successful coordination.
Table 1.1: Generic template of a CM.Chapter 1 Introduction 12
quality of the outcome. Now, measuring the quality of coordination is a di±cult
task in most circumstances because it is highly in°uenced by the perspective from
which it is evaluated and who actually performs the analysis. For example, for
one agent it may be a success to accomplish a common task, no matter what time
is spent on it; whereas another might require some minimum amount of time to
be spent before it considers the coordination successfully. Thus, this evaluation is
normally associated with a particular value judgment of whether coordination is
attained or not (Durfee, 1999b; Jennings, 1996). Here, in contrast, it is not the
purpose that each agent performs those judgments, neither is it about producing
a common agreement about the extent to which coordination was accomplished.
Rather, what is meant is that it is possible to measure and obtain a level of
achievement that can be associated with features of each coordinating algorithm
and the complexity of how it manages and deals with the agents' interactions.
Thus, this degree of achievement is not related to a certain level of agent satisfac-
tion, but it represents a level of the expected e®ectiveness given that agents ful¯ll
the requirements and follow the coordinating algorithm 4.
In order to illustrate the use of this generic template, probably the most com-
mon coordination mechanism, the Contract-Net protocol (Smith & Davis, 1981)
is represented using this nomenclature (see Table 1.2 (characterisations of several
other coordination mechanisms are given in Section 2.1)). In this mechanism,
a contractor agent (the task manager) is responsible for achieving a given goal.
It has to decompose this goal into subtasks and indicate to other agents that it
requires assistance with some of these subtasks 5. The task manager broadcasts
a task announcement to all the other agents in the system (along with any spe-
cial criteria that the bidders must ful¯ll). Each recipient then decides whether
it is interested in taking on the task and, if so, it returns a bid indicating the
conditions under which it is willing to undertake the task. Finally, following the
expiration of the task announcement, the task manager evaluates the bids (task
deliberation) and awards the task to the most appropriate agent. Thus, a contract
is established (task allocation) between the manager and the contractors with the
winning proposals.
4This does not mean that agents have to share their opinions about this level of achievement.
On the contrary, each of them might have its own particular representation of these concepts.
5In this protocol, the problems of dividing the problem into subtasks (task descomposition)
and how the results from the various subtasks are merged into an overall solution (task synthesis)
are not considered a part of the coordination activity. However, in coordination mechanisms such
as multiagent planning, task descomposition might well be part of the requirements phase.Chapter 1 Introduction 13
CM: Contract-Net protocol.
COORDINATION TECHNIQUE components.
Requirements. To apply the protocol the agents need to have information
about how to contact one another (the identi¯cation of the possible receivers
of the o®er) and how to rank incoming bids from potential contractors (the
selecting criteria). The information about contractors can be given at design
time (in static environments) or determined at run-time (in more dynamic
cases).
Coordinating algorithm. The protocol consists of three phases: identifying
potential contractors, making a decision about which contractor to select and
actually enacting the agreed task. These phases are based on the message
interchanges associated with the sending out of a request by the task man-
ager, the handling of the bids from the potential contractees and the contract
assignment respectively.
Level of achievement. There are several reasons why, once selected, the
protocol may fail to result in a successful coordination. For example, the
manager may receive no bids from potential contractees (because they are too
busy and unavailable or because they are not interested in the task at hand)
or the bids received may not satisfy the manager's requirements.
META-DATA attributes.
Cost to set-up: The main set up cost is associated with awarding the con-
tract. This is dependent on how much time is required to determine the set
of potential contractors to send the request to (if this is inbuilt the cost is
low, if it needs to be determined at run-time it will be more time consuming
because it may involve interacting with a broker (Decker et al., 1997)) and the
time the agent has to wait for responses before it can make choices (the task
announcement expiration-period).
Probability of success: Because of the many eventualities that might occur,
the mechanism has a medium likelihood of succeeding in the coordination
tasks in the general case. If further information if available about the speci¯cs
of the environment (e.g. many agents can provide various subtasks or the
agents are generally cooperative and will o®er help whenever possible) then
this quali¯cation can be re¯ned.
Table 1.2: Contract-Net Protocol CM.Chapter 1 Introduction 14
This generic representation of coordination mechanisms, while not being the
main contribution of this thesis, is nevertheless an important advance in the area
because:
² It provides a means of standardising, evaluating and, consequently, compar-
ing under the same premises the coordination mechanisms that have been
generated in the MAS ¯eld 6. Thus, the existing coordination mechanisms
from the literature represent the instances of the possible set of coordina-
tion mechanisms that each agent could have at its disposition. From this
the agent can discover from the variety of techniques the one it can employ
given a coordination problem and the particular circumstances.
² It provides a means of encapsulating the coordination mechanism and the
details of how it achieves coordination. It does this by only presenting the
abstract consequences of its performance, releasing the agent from details of
how coordination is attained.
² It provides a starting point for determining the meta-data that need to be
present to enable an agent to reason about coordination decisions. Being
more precise, this work asserts that the cost to set-up and the probability of
the success are the minimum constituent factors that should be taken into
consideration when reasoning about coordination mechanisms.
1.1.3 Environment
An important element in any multiagent system is the environment that the agents
inhabit (see Figure 1.1). Speci¯cally, this research assumes the environment is
open, dynamic and heterogeneous (as previously de¯ned). In terms of this research
context, Chapter 3 describes how these characteristics are modelled in the speci¯c
testbed domain that is used to evaluate this research.
6This assumption does not mean that all other attempts to compare or analyse the di®erent
coordination techniques are invalid. On the contrary, any detailed analysis performed with the
aim of distinguishing between coordination techniques, no matter what the perspective, helps
to corroborate the value assignments introduced here (see (Jennings, 1993; Fox, 1981; Malone,
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1.2 Contributions of the research
By accomplishing the objectives set out by this research, this thesis advances the
state of the art in the following ways.
Firstly, the very idea of letting the agents dynamically select their coordination
mechanism has not been explicitly addressed within the ¯eld of multiagent systems
to date. This assertion does not imply that coordination has not been investigated;
on the contrary, a signi¯cant amount of research has been performed in this area.
However, the study of coordination has been tackled from a di®erent perspective.
In particular, the aim of most approaches is not to reason in terms of agents taking
decisions about coordinating a®airs (as it is in this thesis), but rather to solve
particular cases of coordination problems. There are, however, a small number
of studies that follow a similar perspective to that of this thesis in dealing with
the coordination problem (see Section 2.2 for more details). Nevertheless, in their
work, the main drawback is that the real bene¯ts of using these approaches has
not been fully demonstrated.
Secondly, this thesis presents a formal framework for capturing the reasoning
processes the agents undertake in order to select the coordination mechanism in a
°exible manner. Adopting this framework means coordination mechanisms move
from the realm of being imposed upon the system at design time, to something that
the agents select at run-time in order to ¯t their prevailing circumstances and their
current coordination needs. By abstracting the coordination problem, agents with
this framework take coordinating decisions by considering collaboration issues and
the context and timing in which those decisions are taken. These components are
represented as utility-based functions that agents take into account when taking
decisions. No other work in the literature presents decision making procedures
that considers these aspects in this way. In the few cases where the problem is
attacked from a broadly similar perspective, the problem has been postulated on
alternative solutions (Boutilier, 1999), at a di®erent level of abstraction (Decker,
1995) or by considering di®erent components in the agent's rationale (Barber et al.,
2000) (see Section 2.2 for more details).
Thirdly, this research extends the basic decision making framework by incor-
porating the ability to reason about commitment levels and sanctions for decom-
mitment. Being more precise, this thesis considers the decisions involved in de-
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opportunities and what level of decommitment penalty to set. While, several
authors have regarded commitments to be the foundations of all coordination ac-
tivities, the approaches followed do not normally integrate commitments into a
broader decision making framework (see Chapter 8 for more details). Speci¯cally,
this work introduces the notion of variable penalty contracts, as an extension to
levelled commitment contracts, that incorporate the ongoing cost of participating
in the coordination process in the decommitment penalty.
Fourthly, this thesis shows how learning about coordination can be incorporated
into the agent's reasoning model and identi¯es the circumstances in which such
adaptation is useful. Thus the model enables agents to learn which CMs to select
in speci¯c situations and how such agents can construct simple models of their
collaboration context. The existing literature on multiagent learning has not been
explored in either of these directions before. In general terms, the e®orts of most
researchers have been directed towards the use of learning techniques (basically
reinforcement learning) to improve coordination as a whole. However, though it
can be argued that improving coordination is the ¯nal outcome to achieve, this
work indicates that learning and adaptation have to focus on the agent's decision
making problem ¯rst and, more precisely, on the decisions regarding coordina-
tion. Thus, the aim is here to consider pre-existing coordination mechanisms and
evaluate whether to select them or not.
1.3 Thesis structure and overview
This thesis outlined is organised into ten chapters, each of which is summarised
below.
Chapter 2. Related Work. This discusses related literature by focusing on
existing research in the areas of coordination, °exible reasoning about coordination
and multiagent learning.
Chapter 3. The Coordination Scenario. This introduces the scenario that
is used to evaluate the e®ectiveness of the coordination decision making model and
its various extensions. The scenario is an abstract one and it is based on a grid
world like environment. Speci¯cally, this chapter describes how agents behave in
this grid-world scenario, the characteristics of the environment and when and how
coordination might arise between the agents in this environment. The main be-
haviour of the agent is to pursue individual and common goals. By accomplishingChapter 1 Introduction 17
common goals agents need to make decisions regarding the abstraction of a set of
CMs they have at their disposal. Thus, those common goals are achieved through
coordinating agents' activities.
Chapter 4. The Agent's Decision Making Procedures. This presents
the basic framework that enables autonomous agents to dynamically select the
coordination mechanism they employ in order to coordinate their inter-related
activities. This framework formalises the agents' decision making processes; cov-
ering, in particular, the decisions that are involved in determining when and how
to coordinate and when to respond to requests for coordination.
Chapter 5. Applications of the Coordination Scenario. To help demon-
strate the applicability of the agent's decision framework, the main components
of the framework and the abstract scenario are used to model coordination in
two more concrete application domains: transportation problems and coordinated
information retrieval.
Chapter 6. Evaluation Methodology. Whereas Chapter 5 seeks to demon-
strate the applicability of the agent's decision making framework, it is even more
important to show whether agents do indeed obtain some bene¯t from using this
framework. To this end, this chapter introduces the experimental methodology
that is used to perform a systematic empirical evaluation of the framework and
the main questions formulated during this research work. Broadly speaking, this
methodology consists of de¯ning the hypothetical questions (based on experimen-
tal variables), making observations of those variables, testing (using statistical pro-
cedures) the signi¯cance of the observations and then making conclusions based on
whether the hypotheses are accepted or rejected. By following such a methodology
this research is able to draw conclusions with statistically signi¯cance con¯dence
levels.
Chapter 7. Decision Making Evaluation. This evaluates the e®ectiveness
of the decision making framework introduced in Chapter 4 on both the individual
agents and on the overall system. In particular, the focus is on evaluating whether
agents do select di®erent CMs given di®erent circumstances and the corresponding
e®ect of those decisions.
Chapter 8. Flexible Commitments and Penalties. This develops and
evaluates an extended decision making framework in which agents can drop con-
tracts in order to exploit better opportunities. In particular, the extensions cover
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to its partners and the sanctions for decommitment according to their prevailing
circumstances.
Chapter 9. Learning Extensions. This introduces learning extensions into
the agent's decision making and examines their impact on the process of making
run-time choices about the selection of coordination mechanisms. Speci¯cally, two
cases are considered. Firstly, when an agent learns to make decisions of when
and how to coordinate. Secondly, when agents learn about the key factors that
in°uence their decisions about when to attempt coordination or not.
Chapter 10. Conclusions and Future Work. This summaries and dis-
cusses the major ¯ndings of this research and presents the key open questions that
have arisen from this research.
Appendix A. Coordination in Heterogeneous Settings. This presents a
range of additional experiments about the e®ectiveness of reasoning about coor-
dination in heterogeneous contexts.Chapter 2
Related Work
This thesis is primarily concerned with °exible reasoning about coordination in
dynamic environments. Given this, there are a number of sub¯elds that are related
to this broad endeavour and these are discussed in the subsections of this chapter.
Speci¯cally, the related work is divided into the following topics:
² work on techniques for coordinating multiple agents (Section 2.1);
² work on °exible reasoning about coordination (Section 2.2);
² work on multiagent learning (Section 2.3).
Each of these will now be dealt with in turn.
2.1 Coordinating multiple agents
Coordination has been widely studied by MAS researchers and a number of tech-
niques now exist for coordinating agents' interactions. However, the purpose here
is not to analyse the whole range of techniques produced in the ¯eld so far, nor
is it to provide a deep discussion about their relative advantages and disadvan-
tages since there is already a signi¯cant literature addressing such issues (Weiss,
1999; Huhns & Singh, 1997; O'Hare & Jennings, 1996; Bond & Gasser, 1988b).
Rather, the objective here is to show how some of the most representative coor-
dination mechanisms can be described using the generic template introduced in
Section 1.1.2. In particular, the aim is to demonstrate that each technique can be
described using the proposed meta-data of CMs.
19Chapter 2 Related Work 20
2.1.1 Social Laws
Social laws are a means of coordinating systems in which there are a large number
of interactions between agents (Shoham & Tennenholtz, 1992, 1995; Briggs &
Cook, 1995; Barbuceanu et al., 1998). The general idea is that agents are designed
to follow local rules of behaviour that lead to their acting in coordinated ways.
For example, robots could follow the rule (social law or convention) of keeping to
the right side of a path when navigating in a two-lane road. By doing this (or,
more properly, by obeying the law), the robots avoid collisions. Thus, agents in
this type of environment pursue their goals by constraining their actions by the
use of social rules.
In the particular case of Shoham and Tennenholtz's work (1992, 1995), they
present a formal model of a social law system based on logic. In this system,
agents have a logical representation of their actions, their states and the social
laws. Agents plan their actions but, their decisions about which goals to pursue
at which time are ruled by the social law conventions. In particular, the agents'
behaviour is constrained in the following way: given a particular state, an action,
and the social laws there is a transition function that indicates the next action an
agent can execute. So, in any given situation, agents identify their current state
and only a subset of the possible actions that the agents could follow are designated
as legal according to the social law in force. The authors show that following the
convention will guarantee that the corresponding actions of the agents will avoid
harmful interactions.
Briggs and Cook (1995) follow the same intuition of having agents with a be-
haviour prescribed by conventions. However, they claim that social laws might
result in having agents that are too restricted. They therefore propose the con-
cept of °exible laws which are a special case of social laws. Flexible laws also
constrain the possible actions agents are able to perform, but the change is that
they associate degrees of strictness to the laws. The more restrictive the law, the
fewer actions that are possible. Thus, agents would ¯rst apply the strictest ones
when constructing their plans and if the resulting plan is not successful then they
select the next strictness level and so on. In this research, coordination is also
achieved by following conventions, but the choices about the rules to apply had
varying degrees and so o®ered varying degrees of rigidity in the planning process.
While Briggs and Cook use social laws to reduce the possible actions agents
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general concept but view social laws in terms of obligations and interdictions.
They represent the roles played by agents in an organization through the use of
these obligations 1. For example, the system administrator role in an organization
has obligations associated with it (e.g. to update the software installed with new
releases) and with its interactions with the other roles in the organization (pro-
grammers, developers and so on). Here, again, the social laws dictate the agents'
behaviour but, more importantly, they describe how the interactions between roles
to coordinate the agents' actions are solved.
In terms of the dimensions of evaluation (Section 1.1.2), the fundamental as-
pects underlying this approach are the speci¯cation of the convention laws. In
the examples illustrated, it is assumed that these laws are established by a sys-
tem designer. Thus, all the possible rules that govern the agents' interactions are
pre-de¯ned before the agents plan their actions. This means that the speci¯cation
process is performed at design time. Once this has been achieved, there are no
other requirements on the agents; they simply apply the process of selecting the
actions to be executed given particular states. By adhering to the rules, the agents'
actions are guaranteed to be free of violation assuming that no unanticipated sit-
uations arise. Following the CM generic template of Table 1.1, a coordination
mechanism that follows the social laws approach is given in Table 2.1.
2.1.2 Market Protocols
A more general approach for coordinating multiple agents is to view the multiagent
system as an economic market (Malone, 1987; Wellman, 1993; Huberman & Hogg,
1995). The basic idea here is that agents play the roles of sellers and buyers in a
market fashion to agree about the price of a service or a task 2. There are basically
two elements in this kind of system: the role of the agents that take part in the
process and the market structure itself. The former consists of the agents that
buy or sell goods by responding to the changes in the price (the actual response
is directed by their particular preferences). The latter is the interaction protocol
(the coordinating algorithm) that establishes the rules of how the participants
agree about the price of the good. In general, the market structure is prede¯ned
1This research can also be seen as an example of organisational structures (see Section 2.1.4),
however, the authors focus on the establishment of an agent's constraints rather than in the
de¯nition of the elements of the organization itself.
2In the literature, the terms consumers and producers are also used to refer to the activities
of generating products (producers) that the consumers want to acquire (Wellman, 1993).Chapter 2 Related Work 22
CM: Social laws.
COORDINATION TECHNIQUE components
Requirements. The prerequisites (i.e. the social laws, the
conventions, the obligations) are hand-crafted into the system
and this process is performed by a system designer.
Coordinating algorithm. In the case of Shoham and Tennen-
holtz it consists of the algorithm that indicates how the agents
select their next action to perform. This algorithm establishes
how agents adhere to the social rule and, by so doing, it con-
strains the possible actions the agents perform.
Level of achievement. This type of convention guarantees
the successful coexistence of multiple agents (assuming no un-
expected situation arise).
METADATA attributes
Cost to set-up: The pre-requisites are established at design
time and this is a very expensive process. The reason for this
is because the designer has to fully understand the system to
produce a consistent set of laws, so that the complete set of
possible interactions that might take place can be addressed. In
particular, this needs to determine the harmful ones so they can
be avoided (by the use of the conventions) and the bene¯cial ones
that can be carried out. However, at run-time, agents do not
require any additional prerequisites to apply the coordinating
algorithm (low cost to set-up).
Probability of success: Agents in this type of system are
designed to follow the conventions and, consequently, this dic-
tates that coordinated action should ensue. Thus, the level of
achievement of this coordination mechanism is ensured (high
probability of success).
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and well established (leaving no space for interactions not explicitly de¯ned). To
this end, the most well known market structures take the form of auction houses
(Wurman et al., 2001; Sandholm, 1999; He et al., 2003) in which the type of auction
indicates a prescribed guide of how the bids are treated. For example, the bids
could be open and known to all the participants or they could be sealed and none
of the bidders know about the others' proposals. Alternative types of auction are
when the bidders must follow a de¯ned pattern; i.e. bids should raise the current
price until one bid is the winner (when dealing with ascending price auctions)
or when bidders are only allowed to decrease because the process starts with a
high price (descending price auction) (Sandholm, 1999; Wurman et al., 2001).
These protocols specify the rules the agents have to follow in order to propose,
to deliver and to take decisions about the proposals 3. However, although the
protocol speci¯es the rules of how agents can bid, it is clear that agents still have
to take their preferences into account to decide how to actually bid. Moreover, if
an agent is aware of the o®ers of the other agents it might use a di®erent strategy
than if it does not know about their bids.
In more detail, Huberman and Hogg (1995) model the problem of managing
distributed computation using a market-like protocol. The problem here is how to
distribute computational resources to di®erent computer programs in a network of
computers. For example, a program that basically performs a numerical computa-
tion will prefer a computer with numerical hardware. However, a database search
task might be assigned to a less specialised computer. The interesting aspect of
this proposal is that the use of a particular resource or computer is assigned to
the program which o®ers the best price for its use. In other words, the objective
is to distribute the load between machines in the most balanced way to obtain
a reasonable allocation of the computer network resources. In this example, the
programs are the agents which propose bids given the resources they need and
the market structure is de¯ned by the use of prices which model the demand of
resources.
In contrast to the previous example that clearly adopts a market-oriented ap-
proach to coordination, the Contract-Net protocol (as introduced in Section 1.1.2)
is often considered as being market-oriented. However, in its basic assumptions it
does not explicitly include an economic component in its bidding process, though
Sandholm and Lesser extended the protocol to rectify this (1995). In the basic
Contract-Net protocol, coordination is achieved through message interchange as
3The full range of these protocols is explored in (Wurman et al., 2001).Chapter 2 Related Work 24
CM: Market protocol.
COORDINATION TECHNIQUE components
Requirements. The main requirement, which is normally pro-
vided by the system designer, is how agents take decisions about
the strategy to play in order to maximise their particular util-
ities. Another run-time requirement which, in general, is not
discussed in such protocols, corresponds to the run-time identi-
¯cation of the agents with which communication might be es-
tablished.
Coordinating algorithm. This consists of the phases to man-
age the bids in the particular market structure. It indicates the
rules about how the o®ers and countero®ers should be exchanged
between the participants (Wurman et al., 2001).
Level of achievement. A market protocol cannot always guar-
antee to achieve success in the allocation because the buyers and
the sellers might fail to agree about the price of the good.
METADATA attributes
Cost to set-up: The agents' cost for the run-time identi¯cation
and the strategy to play is relatively low because this is normally
speci¯ed by the designer given the particular auction rules in
which the agent participates.
Probability of success: The level of achievement of this coor-
dination mechanisms is less likely to succeed (medium probabil-
ity of success) than the social laws' coordinating algorithm.
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long as the manager ¯nds a suitable bid that satis¯es the allocation criteria. In the
extension proposed by Sandholm and Lesser, the idea is that in order to reach deals
between the manager and the contratees, agents receive an income by performing
contracted tasks and pay for the resources involved in handling these tasks (the
income received minus the cost de¯nes the agent's payo®). The system's objective
is two-fold; on the one hand, an agent's aim is to maximise its payo®s, while on
the other hand, the market-like structure (the coordinating algorithm) allocates
tasks with global bene¯ts.
When comparing market protocols and social laws, it can be seen that in the
former case the requirements that are needed to coordinate agents' activities are
mostly performed at run-time, whereas in the latter case the interactions are de-
¯ned by a system designer. Considering their corresponding coordinating algo-
rithms, the level of achievement also di®ers. With social laws, the coordination
can almost be guaranteed, whereas in most of the market-like protocols the process
of reaching agreements between buyers and sellers is not always possible. Given
this observation, market protocols can be characterised by the description given
in Table 2.2.
2.1.3 Multiagent Planning
Planning as a means of coordination for multiple agents was ¯rst introduced by
Corkill (1979). The intuitive concept of multiagent planning involves the agents
agreeing about the order in which their actions are executed in order to obtain a
coordinated global plan (joint plan). Such planning involves two phases: building
the plan (design phase) and executing it (execution phase). The design phase's
objective consists of trying to obtain a joint plan where the actions of all the
agents are scheduled and the con°icts that might cause harmful interactions have
been removed. The challenge of this stage is to reconcile the various choices raised
to ¯nd the best sequence of actions about which all the participants agree. This
agreement not only covers the order and time at which the actions take place,
but also the resources assigned to each action. The aim of the latter phase is to
execute the actions of the joint plan. However, at execution time, the conditions
taken into account when the plan was designed might have changed (for example,
unexpected changes might occur in the environment). Thus, agents should be able
to resolve any discrepancies that might occur as result of these changes.
In the multiagent planning literature there are two main approaches to con-Chapter 2 Related Work 26
structing and/or executing a plan, the centralised and the distributed solution.
The di®erences between them relate to whether the responsibility for constructing
and managing the execution of the plan lies with a single agent or with multiple
agents. This responsibility involves things like maintaining the coherency of the
plan, solving problems as they arise, and giving priorities to the various actions. In
the centralised case, one agent has the global vision or knowledge of the problem
and is capable of solving any discrepancies that might appear when constructing
or executing the plan. In the distributed case, however, several agents participate
in coordinating and deciding upon their actions, about avoiding con°icts when
executing the plan, and helping each other to achieve the plan 4.
Following the distributed planning approach, Ephrati and Rosenschein (1994)
propose dividing the planning problem into smaller parts (each part has a corre-
sponding sub-plan solution) and then merging the resulting sub-plans 5. Thus,
agents are assigned a sub-goal that they need to satisfy. Having done this, each
agent then designs a set of possible solutions (sub-plans) that are combined to
obtain an \optimal global plan" 6. The most challenging aspect in this approach
is naturally the merging process because it is here where the con°icting situations
emerge. To this end, two key factors underlie the solution of this approach; the use
of a heuristic value associated with the cost of constructing the global plan and an
iterative synchronisation process in which agents build the global plan by solving
their sub-plans in parallel. In this work, the heuristics constrain and direct the
search between the possible solutions. At each iteration of the merging process,
the heuristic value is re-calculated with a cost of the current state of the formed
plan and with the cost of the sub-plans (which are also constantly updated given
the new state of the global plan). Agents then communicate, in the form of bids,
their associated plan cost. When more than one agent can supply a sub-plan for
the same solution, the one with the least cost is chosen to be part of the global
plan. The merging process ends when all the subgoals of the global plan have
been satis¯ed. In this solution, the coordination mainly takes place in the merg-
ing process; namely by participating in the construction of the global plan and in
the way the individual sub-plan solutions are put together.
4It is also possible to have all the combinations between those two approaches. Thus a plan
can be constructed in a centralised fashion and then executed in a distributed or centralised
fashion or the plan may be constructed in a distributed way and then executed it in a centralised
or distributed fashion (Durfee, 1999a). However, the interesting cases for the multiagent research
community is when distribution plays a role in either phase.
5Note that task decomposition and synthesis is assumed valid in this approach as it was in
the case of the Contract-Net protocol (see Section 1.1.2).
6Optimal joint plan in this context means the one with the least cost.Chapter 2 Related Work 27
CM: Multiagent planning (PGP).
COORDINATION TECHNIQUE components
Requirements. The requirements in PGP are that the orga-
nisational structure (developed at design time) provides the in-
formation about the channels of communication with the other
nodes. Thus, the prerequisites needed at run-time to apply PGP
are hard-wired into the agents.
Coordinating algorithm. In PGP each node ¯rst plans its
actions given its goals and then it continually takes decisions
about how to coordinate with the rest. This process is continu-
ally performed by the agents and it is here where coordination
is attained.
Level of achievement. PGP endows agents with sophisticated
methods to evaluate plans, execute actions and solve con°icts by
revising a node's local plans in such a way that the global plan
is constantly updated given the independent node interactions.
Its coordinating algorithm takes into account the interactions
that might emerge and provides mechanisms to deal with them.
METADATA attributes
Cost to set-up: Following the requirements, it can seen that
unless the organisational structure is acquired at run-time (in
which case this cost is high), the cost to set-up the coordinating
algorithm is medium. This is because it is necessary to know
the role each agent plays during the design of the plan and its
execution and how each of them might contribute to the global
solution.
Probability of success: Because most of the existing interac-
tions between the individual planners are being considered by
the coordinating algorithm, the probability of success is high.
Table 2.3: Multiagent Planning CM.Chapter 2 Related Work 28
An alternative and more general solution to deal with distributed planning was
undertaken in the development of the Partial Global Planning (PGP) framework
(Durfee & Lesser, 1991). PGP consists of a set of nodes (agents) that are physically
distributed by region and which have to coordinate their activities to produce a
coherent global plan of their actions. Each node has a partial view of the global
problem (since each node covers only one region) and some regions are shared
between nodes (intersected regions). PGP uses an organisational structure (see
Section 2.1.4) to provide the node with the information to guide its communication,
as well as how the control °ows between nodes. To clarify the problem, assume
that each node is a ¯xed videocam pointed to a speci¯c place in a room. Each
videocam does not have a total view of the room and some videocams might
have intersecting viewpoints. The problem consists of constructing a global image
where each videocam provides part of this total view. Now, instead of static and
simple nodes, PGP assumes that each node is an agent-planner, and the partial
views are local partial plans. PGP is thus a framework where the knowledge
(information of each local plan) of each node is shared with the other agents in
order to construct a valid and consistent global plan. This global plan refers to
the collective activity of the nodes and covers their joint problem solving activity.
The information each node shares with the others does not necessarily need to be
correct or decisive, but can often represent the tentative local plans each node has.
In this model, the nodes are constantly revising their plans to take decisions about
when to coordinate with the rest. In short, in PGP coordination takes the form of
a negotiation (see Section 2.1.5) in which agents agree about inconsistent partial
views and of an organisational structure that guides the agents' planning process
to decide when, how and where to form and exchange PGPs. This characterisation
of PGP is captured in the CM template of Table 2.3.
2.1.4 Organisational structures
The aim of this research area is to design a multiagent system by making analo-
gies with human organisations (Fox, 1981; Malone, 1987; Carley & Gasser, 1999).
Coordination is achieved as a result of modelling agents with a ¯xed set of respon-
sibilities in a particular organisational structure. The distribution of agents' tasks
is carried out through a functional or spatial distribution, through the special-
ization of tasks, the division of labour and so on. The organisational structure's
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ture, authority relationships (useful for resolving discrepancies and redundancies),
channels of communication between members and even the amount of knowledge
that agents might interchange or communicate 7. In short, the structure exploits
the control and communication aspects between the members of the organization 8.
However, the main problem with the organisational approach is that it requires
a high degree of understanding of the problem to detect how the tasks might be
decomposed and how the tasks can be coupled together to ¯nd a more suitable
structure. But, more than this, the decision of which coordination structure to
select is taken at design time and it is assumed that the interactions do not change
over time.
One of the ¯rst attempts to introduce organisational concepts in a multiagent
system was undertaken by Lesser and Corkill (1983) with their work on the Dis-
tributed Vehicle Monitoring Testbed (DVMT). DVMT was built to test and eval-
uate the bene¯ts of several types of solving networks (being precise, alternative
con¯gurations of networks of nodes). DVMT simulates a network of nodes that
perform distributed interpretation of tracking data corresponding to vehicles mov-
ing among them. The objective is to produce a coherent path for the vehicles
from the independent views of the nodes. In other words, a network is a structure
in which several cooperative processing nodes work together to accomplish the
global goal by exchanging their partial solutions. Here, the organisational struc-
ture represents the relationships between the nodes based on spatial (location of
the nodes) and functional (tasks they pursue) requirements. The network con¯g-
uration also establishes which channels of communication are allowed between the
nodes and the control relationships that exist between them. For example, some
con¯gurations explore hierarchical organizations in which authority relationships
are exploited, while others test a lateral organization in which such relationships
are not possible. Another type of evaluation involves the functional distribution
in which some nodes perform speci¯c tasks (e.g. some nodes only integrate the
results). In summary, this testbed explores a set of possible network con¯gurations
and evaluates the bene¯ts for the system as a whole of the various options. The
corresponding CM representation is given in Table 2.4.
7An important advantage of an organisational structure is that it has a broad applicability and
it can be used as an additional source of information when dealing with complex coordinating
scenarios. For example, in PGP, information exploiting this structure is used as part of the
meta-knowledge that agents use in their problem solving (see Section 2.1.3).
8In this sense, Malone (1987) sees a market as a special case of this type of structure in which
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CM: Organisational structure (DVMT).
COORDINATION TECHNIQUE components
Requirements. The more relevant aspects needed to coordinate ac-
tivities are provided in the organisational structure. Whether this in-
formation is provided, acquired or learnt by agents, constitutes the
essential conditions to model coordination under this perspective. In
DVMT the structure is speci¯ed at design time.
Coordinating algorithm. Agents reason and take decisions in terms
of the relationship speci¯ed in the structure.
Level of achievement. In the DVMT several measures at both the
node and system levels were implemented under several points of view
including the type of communication allowed, error in the data, com-
munication channels characteristics and so on. Their aim was to ex-
plore the behaviour of organisational structures given several factors.
Because of this, the level of achievement in DVMT is based on the par-
ticular organisational structures exploited and the factors taken into
consideration. Thus, in more general terms, the central problem with
this technique is that in general everything is sustained in the orga-
nisational structure selected. Thus, the success or failure in solving
interactions is based on how this is sorted out in the selected organiza-
tion.
METADATA attributes
Cost to set-up: When the organisational structure is de¯ned at design
time and agents know the role they play and the relationships between
other members, the run-time cost to set-up this type of coordination
mechanism is relatively low. If, however, this information is acquired
during execution, this cost can become very high.
Probability of success: The degree of coordination achieved with
this technique is e®ective as far as it models correctly the interactions
that might emerge during the execution. Once again, if the structure
makes a good conceptualisation of the interactions in the system their
e®ectiveness is guaranteed. (medium cost of probability of success).
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In a somewhat di®erent vein, Durfee et al. (1989) exploit the Contract-Net
protocol as a means of automatically generating network organisations at run-
time. In their view, nodes in a contracting relationship can organise themselves
into a supply chain every time they allocate a sub-task to another agent. For
example, once a task has been awarded to an agent and it becomes a contractee,
it might decide to become a manager of a sub-task of this task may therefore
initiates a new announcement phase. One reason for doing this could be to ¯nd
a sub-contractee that can perform the task (or a component of it) in less time or
with a lower cost than itself. The °exibility achieved by sub-contracting nodes
therefore generates a dynamic organisational of manager-contratee relationships.
2.1.5 Negotiation
Negotiation is a well studied approach for coordination in MAS and consequently
a signi¯cant amount of research work has been undertaken in this area (see (Jen-
nings et al., 2001) for an overview). In its broadest sense, negotiation is the process
that agents follow in order to look for agreements. These agreements are often pur-
sued by agents by making o®ers and countero®ers in a search for a consensus. In
this context, coordination is accomplished by the process of reaching agreements
through con°ict resolution. Given the amount of research in this area and the
di±culties in drawing a ¯rm boundary around it, MÄ uller (1996) proposes a cat-
egorization that seeks to clearly identify its range of operation as a coordination
mechanism. This classi¯cation covers the following aspects:
² Negotiation Language. This category involves the communication issues
related to negotiation. In particular, this research deals with the primitives
used in the message interchange when agents make o®ers and countero®ers.
It also covers the syntax, semantics and structure of the objects the agents
communicate about.
² Negotiation Decision. This is concerned with modelling the reasoning of
the agents involved in the negotiation. Thus, it covers the decision making
aspects, the de¯nition of the agent's preferences, their utility functions and
the di®erent strategies they can play (conciliatory, competitive, cooperative,
etc.).
² Negotiation Process. This category deals with the negotiation process from a
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negotiation model and the system behaviour. The former establishes the
general procedure (the steps) agents follow to reach agreements, it de¯nes
the behaviour of an agent in the negotiation process. The latter covers more
abstract concepts such as the quality, the fairness and the stability of the
negotiation process from the participants point of view and the system as a
whole.
In general terms, from MÄ uller's characterisation, it can be seen that there are a
large range of possibilities involved in negotiation protocols and, consequently, a
wide variety of likelihoods for reaching agreements. For example, the more complex
the terms allowed in the communication language, the more di±cult it is for agents
to determine the exact meaning of the communicated utterances. Moreover, any
negotiation protocol indicates how the agents interact with one another and takes
into consideration most of the possible situations which could be present during
its execution. However, the less restrained the agents' interactions, the higher the
likelihood of a con°ict situation appearing during negotiation, and hence the more
di±cult it is to ¯nd a deal between agents.
While negotiation is clearly related to several of the aforementioned coordina-
tion mechanisms (especially the market based ones) there are a number of char-
acteristics that distinguish it from them. First, in a negotiation protocol agents
can typically produce more complex communicative utterances than those that
are possible in market protocols. In general, in a market protocol, the structure of
the messages used to establish communication is very simple and the number of
primitives is limited. In a negotiation protocol, however, the negotiation language
provides more complex primitives to generate more sophisticated communicative
utterances. For example, in a market protocol, an agent can propose a bid indi-
cating the price it expects to pay for a good and the manager's reply (following
the Contract-Net terminology) can be an acceptance or a refusal. In a negotiation
protocol, however, the bid might establish not only the price the agent expects
to pay, but the reasons and justi¯cation why the agent assumes the price of the
bid is reasonable (see (Kraus et al., 1993; Jennings et al., 2001) for more details).
Moreover, the negotiation might be over multi-attributes (such as price, quality
and delivery date), whereas auctions tend to focus on price. Second, despite the
fact that both methods have common elements in the negotiation decision aspects
(i.e. both protocols, in general use utility functions and preferences to guide their
decisions when searching for agreements) the roles the agents play in reaching
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generally play competing strategies because each actor is interested in maximising
its own pro¯ts. In negotiation, in contrast, agents may not only compete, they
could also follow di®erent strategies based on how the situation is developing (e.g.
an agent might react and alter its behaviour if it receives a threat rather than a
counterproposal). Also, price is inherent to almost all market protocols but it is
not fundamental in negotiation. Thus, agents might negotiate for many other rea-
sons. In PGP, for example, agents negotiate to solve inconsistencies and to agree
to have a common or consistent point of view (this is obviously not a competitive
attitude and price is not an element of the negotiation). Third, in the negotiation
process category, agents tend to use a more sophisticated language that allows
them to generate complex interactions protocols between agents (Labrou et al.,
1999). Thus, it can be seen that market protocols and, more speci¯cally, auction
protocols, look for deals under a precisely-de¯ned protocol, whereas in negotiation
protocols, agents have more freedom to argue, to convince or to give arguments
about their decisions which inherently generate a more complex interaction me-
chanism 9.
One of the seminal pieces of works on negotiating protocols is that of Rosen-
schein and Zlotkin (1994). In their work, they illustrate a well studied set of ne-
gotiation protocols and, at the same time, they identify the particular situations
in which those protocols can be successfully applied 10. In this set of protocols,
agents are mainly competitive and participate in a negotiation by de¯ning the el-
ements of the negotiation decisions, such as preferences, utility functions and the
strategy to play. The negotiation protocol indicates the rules of the game that the
agents follow in order to establish agreements. To this end, agents know which
move to take during the agreement process.
One particular example of their negotiation protocols is the Monotonic Conces-
sion protocol. In this mechanism, the agents' objectives are to reach agreements
through the interchange of o®ers and countero®ers. A deal is reached if one of
the agents proposes something that corresponds to, or is higher than, what the
other agent expects. The protocol is split into rounds and, in each one, an agent
might propose a higher o®er than its previous one or maintain it at the same
9Naturally, there is the possibility of taking a less rigorous position in this comparison and a
market protocol could be seen as the simplest version of a negotiation protocol in which agents
negotiate for the price of a good. However, this is not the position taken here.
10It is important to notice that the main assumptions of this work are consistent with those
in this thesis in the sense that they identify the importance of identifying and distinguishing
the protocols with which agents deal with their interactions and with the strategy to solve the
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CM: Negotiation protocol (Monotonic Concession).
COORDINATION TECHNIQUE components.
Requirements. The main agent requirements are the strategy to play
(the purpose of the negotiation), their preferences and to know how to
contact the other agents. In other words, the negotiation decision in
terms of MÄ uller's characterisation.
Coordinating algorithm. This refers to the steps agents follow to
reach agreements. This algorithm establishes how the interaction takes
place and, in the case of the monotonic concession protocol, this process
is done by rounds and some actions are not permitted (e.g. decreasing
the o®er.
Level of achievement. The fundamental aspect to measure the prob-
ability of success is to look at how the agents' behaviour is constrained.
In other words, if the negotiation protocol constrains agent's actions,
and in particular their responses, based on the other's preferences the
range of possibilities are reduced. However, if these phases are not
indicated, more con°icting situations are likely to emerge during the
negotiation process. In the monotonic concession protocol the harmful
and the bene¯cial interactions are clearly identi¯ed. Thus, the possible
actions of the agents are constrained by phases, and, more importantly,
the possible actions about how much to bid are considered in the pro-
tocol itself. If agents negotiate using this protocol, a deal cannot be
guaranteed, but at least it has higher expectation of occurring than
using more unconstrained protocols. Thus, it can be said that the
more constrained the agent's behaviour is, the higher the probability
of success of the negotiation.
META-DATA attributes.
Cost to set-up: The requirements broadly correspond to the ones of
the Contract-Net protocol. Thus, the same cost can be associated.
Probability of success: Given the above description, it can be said
that the monotonic concession is a highly constrained protocol which
for the purposes of this analysis is associated with a high probability
of success.
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level. To ensure the protocol terminates and that agents do not deadlock, agents
in subsequents rounds are not allowed to o®er less than they proposed previously.
The outcome of the protocol can then be one of two options, if none of the agents
concedes in a particular round then a con°ict is reached and the protocol ends.
Otherwise a successful agreement between agents is guaranteed. Table 2.5 presents
this negotiation protocol using the generic abstraction of coordination mechanisms.
2.1.6 Discussion
This analysis of existing coordination techniques has added detail to some of the
claims made in Chapter 1. Speci¯cally, none of the techniques are concerned with
how they may be reasoned about at run-time in order to select the method that
is best suited to the prevailing situation, none of the methods clearly distinguish
between the agent's reasoning about coordinating aspects and the strategy that is
actually used to manage the agents' interactions and all these coordination tech-
niques can be modeled using the generic representation developed in Section 1.1.2.
Regarding the ¯rst point, the analysis performed here showed that most of
the extant coordination mechanisms are concerned with how interactions between
the agents should be dealt with at design-time. Thus, their basic assumption is
that the designer analyses the system's coordination needs, selects an approach to
satisfy these needs, and then imposes this choice upon the individual agents and
the overall system. Therefore, agents, do not undertake run-time reasoning about
the selection of particular coordination protocols.
Regarding the second point (and related to the ¯rst point), agents generally
incorporate in their reasoning the characteristics of the application domain and
those of the coordinating strategy. Moreover, the line of separation between these
aspects depends on the particular coordination mechanism. For example, in ne-
gotiation, one element clearly identi¯ed is that agents need to possess a way to
reason about which agreements are more bene¯cial than others (the negotiation
decisions following MÄ uller's characterisation) and, the other aspect, relates to the
rules which govern the agents' interactions (MÄ uller's negotiation process). How-
ever, this is not the case with the planning mechanism in which the agent has
to determine both what actions should be performed, as well as how it should
interact with others.
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coordination mechanisms can be represented in the common template of Table 1.1.
While this is not conclusive proof that all coordination mechanisms could be rep-
resented in this way, it is at least indicative that a highly variable set of methods
can be.
2.2 Flexible reasoning about coordination
As stated previously, this thesis is concerned with ensuring there is °exibility in
reasoning about coordinating agents, rather than developing new mechanisms to
coordinate agents or enhancing existing ones. Flexibility, in this context, means
agents make more decisions about their coordination activities at run-time so that
their choices can better re°ect their prevailing circumstances. Thus, this work
deals mainly with °exible deliberation. However, °exibility in multiagent systems
with respect to coordination can have a broader scope than this (Lesser, 1999).
Speci¯cally, it can cover:
² Flexibility in particular protocols such as multiagent planning or market-like
protocols (Section 2.2.1).
² Flexibility in reasoning between alternative coordination mechanisms (Sec-
tion 2.2.2).
Each of these will now be dealt with in turn.
2.2.1 Flexibility in particular protocols
Durfee and colleagues have been concerned with dynamically deciding on a variety
of coordination parameters in the context of multiagent planning (Durfee & Lesser,
1991; Durfee & Montgomery, 1991). In particular, they have studied two di®erent
problems:
i) deciding the level of detail to reason about in multiagent planning (Clement
& Durfee, 1999a, 1999b) and
ii) selecting at run-time plans that have the highest expected quality (Pap-
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In the former case, the key issue is determining the right level of abstraction
that agents should exchange about their plans. Being precise, the problem is
the following: if agents coordinate their plans at the highest level of abstraction
(the higher the abstraction level, the shorter the plan) possible con°icts could
emerge in the lower levels, and, on the contrary, if the coordination is done at
very low levels then the cost involved in solving the con°ict of longer plans may
be very high. Thus, in this work, the agents use di®erent levels of detail of plan
representation and each agent can work at di®erent levels in di®erent coordination
contexts. This means that agents dynamically choose what to represent (what to
coordinate over) using planning as the mechanism for achieving this. The authors
facilitate this °exibility by deriving summary information about the representation
of the plans. This covers preconditions (which must hold at the beginning of
execution) and postconditions (which are the e®ects that must hold at the end of
execution). The idea is to use this information to analyse all possible interactions
(this process is done o®-line) between the plans (and their corresponding sub-
plans) and then obtain a summary of those interactions. The kind of information
this process aims to detect is the conditions related to the plan execution (for
example, which conditions must always hold when a plan is executed or may be
executed depending on the path a plan follows and so on). Thus, during the run-
time execution, this information can be used to coordinate the plans by exchanging
this information 11. From this description, it can be seen that their contribution
is more concerned with dynamic reasoning over one mechanism (planning), rather
than reasoning over a set of coordination mechanisms. Nevertheless, it is believed
that the importance of the information used in their summaries can also be used
when reasoning about any coordination mechanism. Speci¯cally, in this context,
it can be used to populate the coordination template for the planning coordination
mechanism (see Section 2.1.3).
In the latter case, Pappachan and Durfee (2000) associate a variety of measures
to plans in order to take decisions about the coordination of joint activities. To
be more speci¯c, they propose a heuristic to select the plan to execute based on
performance metrics of the plan's quality. This heuristic takes three components
into account: the plan reward (the reward gained after the plan execution), the
plan cost (the total cost of all the actions performed) and the plan reliability (the
likelihood of successfully completing the plan). The coordination process is ruled
11The coordination is perform using a merging algorithm as per Ephrati and Rosenschein in
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by a central coordinator that takes decisions about the plan to execute based on
the heuristic. The interesting aspect in this solution is that the authors see the
multiagent planning problem as a multi-criteria problem in which to generate the
heuristic the three components are weighted (based on which attributes are more
important than others) and taken into consideration each time a con°ict in the plan
coordination occurs. Because in some situations one component might be more
important or desirable than others, several strategies are evaluated by assigning
di®erent weights to each criteria. Thus, this work has a number of similarities
to the research of this thesis; including the necessity of taking decisions at run-
time, the existence of a metric to measure the quality of a coordination outcome
and criteria to trade-o® the alternatives. However, once again, the reasoning is
performed over only one coordination strategy (planning).
2.2.2 Flexibility in reasoning between alternative CMs
This section discusses research whose aim is to introduce °exibility into an agent's
deliberation process with respect to choosing between coordinating techniques.
One of the ¯rst attempts to discriminate coordinating techniques in the area
of distributed scheduling problems was the work of Ramamritham and co-workers
(1989). They proposed a mechanism that would deliberate about the selection of
various task assignment algorithms. In particular, they assign tasks to nodes by
taking into account timing and resource requirements (for example, they would
prefer to assign a task to a node with enough resources to deal with it rather than
to one with no resources at all). The objective of the scheduling is to maximise
the number of completed tasks before their deadline (compared to the number
of invoked tasks). During the scheduling process, nodes receive tasks and decide
whether they can complete the task with their own resources; if not, then all nodes
cooperate to locate the node which can guarantee the completion of the task.
The authors propose and evaluate four algorithms for selecting the nodes: (i)
random, (ii) focused addressing, (iii) bidding and (iv) °exible. The random algo-
rithm involves randomly selecting the node (note that in this algorithm there is
no cooperation between nodes). The di®erence between the last three algorithms
is how the nodes cooperate with one another to select the one that carries out
the task. Focused addressing uses an estimation of the surplus of the nodes and
assigns the task to the node with most surplus (this \node surplus" is periodically
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assigned one another tasks in such a way that the most updated information is
communicated to the nodes that had most recently assigned tasks to one another).
The bidding algorithm is a version of the Contract-Net protocol where a subset
of nodes are asked to propose bids specifying their resources and timings. Then,
once the proposals have been received the node with the best bid is the one that
is selected. Finally, the °exible algorithm consists of deciding whether to use the
bidding, the focused addressing or both of them in an opportunistic manner. The
appropriate algorithm is selected based on criteria which are estimated on a per
tasks basis with the number of nodes that might complete the task (based on the
node surplus information) and the system's parameters (for example the maxi-
mum surplus the systems can deal with). For example, it might select one node
using the focused addressing and, in addition, perform the bidding indicating to
the bidders that the o®ers should be sent to the selected node. This responds to
the fact that the node might not have the most updated information (at the mo-
ment of the decision making) and the selected node might not guarantee the task
assignment. The main underlying aspect of which algorithm to select is based on
the number of possible nodes (this subset of nodes is constantly calculated) and
the surplus they might o®er. However, most of the information needed to make
a decision is constantly communicated between the members of the network or
between the most inter-related subset of the members (to avoid communication
overhead). Hence, the most important aspect of this proposal is that the °exible
algorithm reasons in a °exible manner about when to select a particular protocol
given the particular circumstances in which the decision is taken. The most inter-
esting result of this work is the fact that the °exible algorithm outperforms the
others in most cases. This, in turn, provides some insight into the potential bene-
¯ts of run-time selection of algorithms by considering the system's circumstances
and by taking decisions at the time the choice is made.
From the perspective of this thesis, the main drawback of this solution is that
agents are assumed to be truly cooperative and to constantly communicate accu-
rate information. Thus, although the decision making might be performed with
imprecise information (for example, the focused algorithms might not select the
best node), there is always an alternative way to correct a wrong selection. Ad-
ditionally, only a very small number of metrics a®ect the decision-making process
(just the node surplus) and general parameters of the system that can be tuned.
In short, the underlying approach is similar to this research in that the factors
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in their research all nodes work together to obtain highly consistent information
about the factors that are taken into consideration in the reasoning model.
There has also been a large body of work concerned with °exible reasoning
that analyses the coordination problem from a more general perspective. For
example, Jennings (1993) introduced a level of °exibility in his cooperative prob-
lem solving framework. The main hypothesis of his work is that all coordination
mechanisms can ultimately be reduced to (joint) commitments and their associ-
ated (social) conventions. In arguing for this hypothesis, he showed that most
of the possible interactions and the °exibility needed to deal with changing en-
vironments can be covered by considering commitments (pledges to undertake a
speci¯ed course of action) and conventions (means of monitoring commitments
in changing circumstances). This analysis is important in two senses. Firstly, it
supports this thesis's claim in the sense that if all coordination mechanisms can
be reduced to commitments and conventions, then it is possible to make a uni¯ed
evaluation of them. That is, it is possible for all mechanisms to be analysed, mea-
sured and evaluated under similar terms. Secondly, however, the problem with his
work is that the system designer is responsible for determining which conventions
are present in the system, which kinds of interactions particular conventions might
be used for and when to use them. This is likely to be an extremely di±cult (if
not impossible) task in complex and dynamic environments which is why the work
described in this thesis is concerned with automating this activity.
In a similar line of discussion about °exibility, the work of Generalised Par-
tial Global Planning framework (GPGP) (Decker, 1995; Decker & Lesser, 1997;
Lesser et al., 2002) sought to design and evaluate a family of coordination algo-
rithms. This work is a generalisation of PGP (Section 2.1.3) in the sense that PGP
was tied to the particular domain of distributed interpretation of vehicle tracks,
whereas GPGP can be applied to any cooperative domain. GPGP allows a group
of agents to coordinate their complex interactions through a set of coordination
algorithms. In particular, it focuses on two key factors: i) the representation and
reasoning about the features of the task environment (TAEMS) and ii) the coor-
dination mechanisms that can respond to those task environment structures. In
this framework, agents ¯rst solve their own local scheduling problem (by assigning
time and resources to local tasks) and then, due to the CM activation, the task
interactions are discovered and consequently handled. Here, the global problem
consists of solving the interactions constrained by the activities of the other agents.
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optimization solutions are combined (because of task relationships) into a global
problem constrained by quality, time or resource constraints.
In more detail, a coordination mechanism in GPGP consists of a protocol that
detects and activates actions (communication, information gathering or proposal
of commitments) in response to inter-agent task activities. The most important of
these activities are the ones that facilitate the scheduling process (i.e. those that
generate commitments). These commitments are at the core of the problem solv-
ing process because they solve the task constraints related to time and resources
(agents commit to tasks by specifying the time by which the task will be satis¯ed
and the quality with which the action will be done). To this end, GPGP uses
TEAMS to represent the task structure and the aspects taken into consideration
when solving the global constraint problem are modelled in TEAMS.
Thus, the set of protocols in GPGP are one-shot mechanisms that discover
where commitments can be applied (or can be broken) when the agents' task
structures are revised (because the coordination mechanisms indicate the time at
which the structures are revised). For example, one agent might discover that it
can bene¯t another task by satisfying its task by a speci¯c time. Thus, it commits
to do the task in the time determined and this information is then communicated
to the agents involved. Hence, the CMs are triggered to generate or update those
commitments which represent the central feature of solving a coordination problem
(as argued by Jennings above). And, as can be seen, the representation of the tasks
are fundamental to the CMs for dealing with coordinating activities.
Although the authors foresaw the necessity of having alternative mechanisms
to deal with commitments, they assumed that the application of the CM is only
carried out at speci¯c moments in the coordinating process. For example, when
a new relationship between tasks is detected, then the CM \updating non-local
viewpoints" is triggered and, as a consequence, it might exchange information of
the task structure with other agents 12. However, this is the only moment at which
this communicative action is activated. This point of view is di®erent from assum-
ing that two or more CMs might generate the same action (the communication of
the task structures) and then the question to answer is which of them should be
selected in which circumstances (which is the approach used in this thesis). This
point is where the main di®erence lies with the research of this thesis. In this
12Another example is the contracting protocol (introduced into GPGP in recent times to deal
with resource consumption (Lesser et al., 2002)) which might be used only when more than one
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research, the agent's take decisions about when to use a particular CM based on
the particular circumstances when the decision is taken. In contrast, in GPGP
the CMs are activated at pre-de¯ned situations which might occur during execu-
tion (no more than one CM can be activated in a given situation which is why
GPGP does not provide a reasoning mechanism to discriminate between CMs).
In summary, GPGP sees the CMs as exclusive protocols whose execution gener-
ates alternative outcomes, and consequently, di®erent bene¯ts to the scheduling.
Whereas in the research of this thesis, the CMs may produce the same outcome
and then the problem is how to decide which one is more appropriate.
Thus far, two aspects have been identi¯ed as permitting °exibility in the coor-
dination of problem solving. On the one hand, there is the necessity of introducing
various \mechanisms" to solve the coordination problem, and, on the other, the
incorporation of a mechanism to reason over the selection of such mechanisms.
As previously discussed, some research has investigated the former (the GPGP
framework and Jennings's conventions) and some the latter (Ramamritham's re-
search). However, there is one piece of work that studies both aspects and this
is (Barber et al., 2000). The aim of Barber et al.'s work is to dynamically se-
lect the most appropriate coordination mechanism in a given situation. To this
end, they present a software engineering framework that enables agents to vary
their coordination mechanisms according to the prevailing circumstances. They
also identify criteria for determining when particular mechanisms are appropriate
and the decision procedures for actually trading-o® these criteria. They analyse
the following coordination mechanisms: negotiation (Section 2.1.5), voting (agents
obey the decisions of the majority of the participants), arbitration (a central coor-
dinator evaluates and decides on solutions for other agents) and self-modi¯cation
(agents prefer to change their behaviour rather than request changes from others
when a con°ict is present). For each mechanism, a classi¯cation along the follow-
ing dimensions is undertaken: a) constraints associated with the mechanism 13, b)
cost of communication and execution and c) quality of solution. For example, for
them, a negotiation mechanism has as constraints the fact that communication
is required and that all the agents have the authority to take decisions, the cost
associated depends on the number of agents involved in the negotiation and, ¯-
nally, regarding the quality of the solution, this mechanism cannot guarantee that
a solution will be found, however if a solution is reached, its quality will be high.
13This involves the particular mechanism's requirements; for example, whether communication
is fundamental, whether some speci¯c roles need to be played, whether any authority hierarchy
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Agents then associate a weight to each of these characteristics and calculate the
cost of each strategy by adding the cost of all the above mentioned features. The
strategy that is then selected is the one with the minimum cost. The formulation
used to calculate this cost is:
Costi
strategyk =
Pm
j=1(wj £ Coststrategyk(yj))
where yi is the attribute under consideration (in this case, constraints, cost or
quality), wj is the weight associated to the feature j and Coststrategyk(yj) is the
cost value of strategy k for feature j.
An obvious drawback of their formulation is that calculating the weights for
the features is not straightforward. Moreover, it is di±cult to assess whether a
given weight is good for an individual or for the overall performance. Further, they
do not demonstrate whether agents do indeed perform any better by having the
capability of selecting CMs (as opposed to not being able to do it). Furthermore,
their agents do not reason in terms of the other agents in the environment, nor the
environment itself and, therefore, the decisions about when to select a strategy are
somewhat arbitrary. For example nothing is mentioned about the other agents'
disposition during interaction and during the decision making process. This means
it is assumed that all the agents agree about the strategy selected even though
they are never asked about it. Finally, even though the authors have analysed
each of the exemplar strategies, more work is needed to provide a more systematic
decision procedure for actually trading o® these criteria.
The ¯nal approach considered here of reasoning between di®erent strategies
is that of (Boutilier, 1999). He presents a decision making framework, based on
multiagent Markov decision processes (MMDP), that reasons about the state of
a coordination mechanism. He proposes the use of coordination mechanisms as
protocols and introduces the concept of states of coordination to incorporate them
in the MMDP. Each state summarises some aspect of the agent's previous expe-
riences. For example, assume that two robots aim to move boxes (independently
from any other actions) from one position to another in a common grid-world
scenario. Agents could be happily moving their boxes, however, a problem arises
when they need to coordinate their actions to avoid being together in a \danger-
ous" zone in the scenario (for which they are penalized). Thus, the idea is that
when robots face the coordination problem they should endeavor to take a decision
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To this end, the protocols are represented as a ¯nite state machine which models
the coordination mechanism with states and with possible coordination interac-
tions (decision rules). The decision rules allow agents to constrain their selection
of actions. The key insight in this proposal is to allow agents to reason not only
in terms of optimal joint actions, but with the state space of coordination in such
a way that agents decide the possible next action based upon the particular state
of coordination. Continuing with the running example, in a corner of the grid
(a speci¯c state), the robots calculate the expected utility of each possible action
in that state considering whether they had previously coordinated or not in the
that state (recall that the MMDP is expanded to incorporate these states). The
coordination mechanism detailed was called \Randomization" and it consists of
selecting the actions based on pro¯table past actions and on their chances of re-
occurrence. Hence, given the decision rules of Randomization, the action with the
best expected reward is selected. However, agents with this framework do not
reason in terms of their local states; rather, they observe and take decisions based
on the global state that they are always assumed to have access to. Furthermore,
his work is concerned with optimal reasoning within the context of a given coor-
dination mechanism, rather than actually reasoning about which mechanism to
employ in a particular situation.
2.2.3 Flexible commitments
Until now, the review undertaken in this chapter has focused on two aspects: the
approaches to coordinate agents' interactions and the introduction of °exibility
into coordination problems. Nevertheless, most of these techniques exploit com-
mitments to de¯ne the agent's behaviour (i.e. agents establish their course of ac-
tion by using commitments). Being more precise, by making commitments agents
decide what to do to pursue their goals (through creating agreements to perform
certain tasks). Thus, another perspective on the problem is that agents achieve
°exible deliberation with the use of commitment. In the work that is discussed
in the remainder of this section, the role that commitments play in contributing
toward °exible deliberation is analysed.
Several studies have been undertaken to understand the role of commitments
in multiagent environments. One of the earliest and most commonly cited strands
of research in this area was that concerned with the study of the philosophical as-
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Levesque's main contribution is the de¯nition of a logical theory in which the rela-
tionship between intentions, beliefs, goals and commitments is clearly established.
While this work concentrates on the individual point of view, Jennings's research
(1993) is an example of how these concepts can be used in a social setting (see
Section 2.2.2). Following the same concerns of improving °exibility in complex
multiagent systems, more recent studies have analysed the introduction of rights
(actions that agents can legally perform 14) as an important component of agents'
interactions (Norman & Jennings, 1998; Norman et al., 1998). In particular, Nor-
man et al. argue that existing theories (such as the one of Cohen and Levesque)
must be extended to include agreements as a combination of rights and actions
to de¯ne additional properties such as capabilities, delegation and morality. They
claim that such extensions are needed to provide greater °exibility in ever more
demanding cooperative settings.
The aforementioned research investigates an important and complementary as-
pect of commitments as they relate to the broad area of multiagent systems. Here,
however, commitments play a more speci¯c role: to de¯ne the agent's course of
actions (Jennings, 1993) and to establish situations in which this course might be
modi¯ed. Concretely, these concerns can be rephrased as dealing with particular
courses of actions through the establishment of contracts between agents (Rosen-
schein & Zlotkin, 1994; Sandholm & Lesser, 1996; Kraus, 1993; Sen & Durfee,
1994) 15 and the situations in which these contracts can be relinquished. Hence,
°exible deliberation can be accomplished with the use of commitment to specify
an agent's agreement of performing a task at certain time 16 and a concomitant
indication of when this agreement can be broken (by decommiting). Since the
former aspect is dealt with in Chapter 8 the rest of this subsection concentrates
on the work of decommitment.
The standpoint of this thesis is that agents should have the ability to decide at
run-time to relinquish existing commitments in order to participate in more prof-
14Under this perspective, an agent might have the capability to perform an action but not
necessarily the right to execute it.
15While commitments might be the result of other mechanisms (e.g. though a planning ap-
proach in which agents agree about the action to perform (Section 2.1.3)), here, the attention is
on them as the result of an explicit agreement or contract about a task to undertake.
16Although this interpretation does not take into account the whole theory of commitment
(Cohen & Levesque, 1990; Jennings, 1993; Rai®a, 1982), it does integrate the use of commitments
and penalties into an agent's decision making framework. In other words, they do not address the
question of what and when to commit. This does not mean that these theories are inapplicable
here, but rather that further work is needed to incorporate them into the apparatus that agents
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itable activities 17. To this end, a signi¯cant amount of work has been concerned
with identifying the particular situations in which commitments should be recon-
sidered (Sandholm & Lesser, 1995; Sen & Durfee, 1994; Jennings, 1993; Kinny &
George®, 1991; Cohen & Levesque, 1990). However, generally speaking, this work
does not deal with decision procedures that agents can use at run-time in order
to reconsider their current commitments. Thus, for example, the formalisation of
Cohen and Levesque builds upon the de¯nition of a persistent goal which repre-
sents a level of commitment to construct more complex propositions. A persistent
goal is one that will not be dropped unless it is no longer achievable, it has been
already satis¯ed or the agent's motivation to achieve it changes. However, this de-
scription is not connected to a reasoning model that is able to determine whether
any of these situation has occurred. In contrast, Kinny and George® (1991) do
evaluate an agent's decision making with respect to commitments 18 based on the
changes that occur in the environment. In this evaluation, agents range from never
reconsidering their plans (bold agents) to ones which reconsider them every plan
step (cautious agents). They de¯ne the term rational commitment to allow agents
to react and to reconsider their current plan given environmental factors. They
detect and assess speci¯c situations (reaction strategies) in which an agent has to
deliberate about what is occurring in the environment. In general, their commit-
ments are all related to an individual and an agent's internal aims and they do
not provide a model for determining in which situations such reaction strategies
are e®ective.
Closer to the aims of this thesis is the work of Sen and Durfee (1994) in the
domain of distributed scheduling. They focus on the use of two strategies: com-
mitted and non-committed to carry out contracts 19. They evaluate the impact of
various environmental factors on the strategies' e®ectiveness. Their results show
that unequivocal commitment to a task leads to poor performance and that having
the ability to re-assess commitments is important in improving the agent's e®ec-
tiveness. However, though they developed a matrix of choices and discover the
rules about when each commitment and non commitment should be applied (given
a particular set of qualitative values of the environmental factors considered), their
analysis was performed o®-line. This, in turn, limits the run-time °exibility of the
agents.
17This contrasts with many coordination protocols in which commitments are taken to be
unbreakable (e.g., (Rosenschein & Zlotkin, 1994; Kraus, 1993)).
18Here commitment refers to the fact that once an agent has adopted a plan, it does not
consider re-planning.
19In this research, an agent commits when it blocks its calendar so that no other meeting can
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The ¯nal strand of work in this area is that of Sandholm and Lesser who pro-
pose a novel mechanism, based on the Contract-Net protocol, in which agents
can reconsider and drop their existing contracts by paying a pre-agreed penalty
(Chapter 1). In particular, this work develops the concept of levelled commit-
ment contracts that builds upon the basic intuition that agents should be able
to unilaterally decommit from a contract, for whatever reason, as long as they
pay some penalty. Given the dynamic and unpredictable nature of the environ-
ment considered in this thesis and the self motivated nature of the coordination
participants this appears to be the most suitable approach. However, Sandholm
and Lesser's model has a number of shortcomings that need to be recti¯ed to be
applicable to this context. Firstly, their aim is not to investigate general aspects
of coordination nor dynamic selection of coordination mechanisms. Thus, their
model only allows agents to reason about commitments and decommitments. Sec-
ondly, levelled commitment contracts assume a ¯xed penalty for decommitment
that ignores the current costs of the ongoing coordination activity. Thirdly, Sand-
holm's original proposal contained no algorithms (decision procedures) for agents
to compute when they should decommit from a given contract. This was recti¯ed
in (Sandholm et al., 1999; Sandholm, 2001), however only in a limited manner.
In particular, his algorithm for computing the Nash equilibrium decommitment
threshold relies on the fact that agents have information about the actual and
likely alternative options (as well as their probability distribution functions) that
may be presented to the agents with which they are coordinating.
In order to clarify the analysis of commitments carried out in this section, it
is pertinent to remark on some points which are the underlying justi¯cation for
dealing with commitments in this research. Firstly, commitments are important
because they allow agents to model the expected future actions of others and
reason under those terms. Thus they are an essential form of reasoning about
coordination. However, it was also discussed that unbreakable commitments limit
°exibility to respond to new situations and, hence, decommitments need to be
dealt with. Secondly, from the above, it is clear that a signi¯cant amount of re-
search considers the fact that some level of °exibility can be achieved by having the
ability to relinquish current contracts in order to engage on other more e®ective
ones. However, the mechanisms to deal with such decommitments are varied. For
example from Kinny and George®'s perspective, decommitments are important
in order to have more reactive planning agents (with di®erent degrees of commit-
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do not have a mechanism to deliberate when a particular strategy must be applied.
Sen and Durfee undertook a close study of the environmental factors that should
be taken into consideration in order to commit to a schedule or not. However, the
shortcoming in this analysis is that agents do not have degrees of commitments as
suggested in (Kinny & George®, 1991; Sandholm & Lesser, 1995). Thirdly, turning
to the penalty for decommitment, except for (Sandholm & Lesser, 1995), none of
the previous studies use a °exible penalty mechanism that can be associated with
the contract. Furthermore, neither (Kinny & George®, 1991) nor (Sen & Durfee,
1994) consider compensation for decommiting, agents do so because others wanted
to decommit and cancel the contract. To this end, it is believed that sanctions
must be a fundamental element when dealing with competitive agents so a new
model of commitment needs to be developed (see Chapter 8).
2.2.4 Discussion
The research community in the area broadly agrees about the need of °exibility as
a key element when reasoning about coordination. Thus, a variety of research po-
sitions have investigated how °exibility can be introduced in di®erent aspects and
at di®erent levels of coordination. However, from the perspective of this research,
these can be classi¯ed as introducing °exibility into particular cases of coordina-
tion mechanisms (Section 2.2.1), in a restricted manner (Section 2.2.2) or by only
dealing with a limited portion of the problem (Section 2.2.3). Thus, although the
research of this thesis agrees about the fundamental use of °exible deliberation re-
lated to coordination mechanisms, it argues that an integrated framework covering
the aforementioned components needs to be developed.
2.3 Multiagent learning
Thus far, it has been assumed that °exibility is achieved by incorporating more
information in the agent's deliberation, by delaying as far as possible the choices
about coordination or by reconsidering when to decommit from established con-
tracts (Section 2.2). However, in most of these examples, the agent's behaviour
remains constant throughout the whole decision making process. More speci¯cally,
agents do not change the way they reason even if things change in the environment
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the case of a manager that announces a request to coordinate a task using the
Contract-Net protocol. If, most of the time, it does not receive answers (bids) to
its request for coordination, it would be better o® if it avoids selecting this means
of coordinating in the future. Similarly, in the situation in which the participat-
ing agents often request reasonable bids and receive replies to their requests to
coordinate, this protocol should become the dominant means of achieving coordi-
nation. Thus, another means of incorporating °exibility into agents' coordinating
behaviour is to allow them to observe the environment and use this perception
to take adequate coordination decisions. In the previous example, agents could
take advantage of their experience and detect in which of the two cases it is worth
applying the Contract-Net protocol and when it is not pro¯table to do so. Thus,
generally speaking, in open and dynamic environments agents need the ability to
react, adapt, model and learn from what is occurring in their environment in order
to know what to do in face of unexpected situations. In short, agents can also
achieve °exible deliberation by learning.
The ¯eld that deals with learning from experience in a multiple agent setting is
known as multiagent learning 20. There are many strategies that can be employed
by the agents to achieve such learning; including learning from examples, rote
learning and learning by analogy (Sen & Weiss, 1999). However, most of the
MAS work in this area has used Reinforcement Learning (RL) (see (Kaelbling
et al., 1996; Sutton & Barto, 1998; Mitchel, 1997b; Russell & Norvig, 1995e) for a
general overview and characterisation of reinforcement learning techniques). RL
is a technique in which agents improve their behaviour by relying upon their past
experience. Speci¯cally, this strategy uses some form of feedback to indicate the
level of e±cacy acquired during learning process. A RL technique is appropriate
in this context because this thesis is concerned with agents pursuing goals and
obtaining rewards according to how e®ectively those goals are accomplished.
To give an idea of the procedure the agents follow when learning by reinforce-
ment, consider the cycle of actions that an agent performs (see Figure 2.1). The
basic problems to be addressed in modeling a RL technique are: to recognise the
possible and di®erent situations that the agents might experience (step [1]); to
identify the group of actions that each agent can perform in each situation and
select one (using an action-selection procedure (step [2])); and to decide when it
20The sub¯eld of Arti¯cial Intelligence (AI) that focuses on learning from an individual point
of view (i.e. agents do not possess social awareness) is called Machine Learning (ML) (Russell &
Norvig, 1995c; Mitchel, 1997a; Weiss & Dillenbourg, 1999; Sen & Weiss, 1999; Stone & Veloso,
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the steps shown in Figure 2.1, but that di®er in how each step is performed.
For example, some methods give an indication of whether agents always perform
the same action given the same situation, or whether agents have a guide (e.g. a
probability matrix) to discriminate some situations from others, or whether agents
have and use a model to represent their environment (an algorithm which does
not use a model is called an online algorithm), or whether they should take the
future into account in their decisions (Kaelbling et al., 1996). Moreover, these
methods are also concerned with how frequently the reinforcement is received and
how the actions and states are represented. The formulation used to represent and
calculate the expected utility is indeed related to each choice selected.
A signi¯cant literature on multiagent learning has been produced in recent
years concerning the use of RL techniques and, in particular Q-learning (Watkins
& Dayan, 1992) (see Section 9.2 for details of this particular technique). As it
relates to this thesis, this research can be viewed as concentrating mainly on
three aspects. In the ¯rst case, Q-learning has been applied to learn how agents
can coordinate or cooperate to achieve common goals by using speci¯c strategies
(Section 2.3.1). In the second case, an agent's goal is to learn about the other
agents or their environment in order to predict their behaviour or to produce a
model of them (Section 2.3.2). And, in the third one, the agent's aim is to learn
how to discriminating between the appropriate coordination mechanism to speci¯c
situations (Section 2.3.3).
2.3.1 Learning to cooperate
Generally speaking, the aim of this line of research is to improve the cooperation
or coordination between the agents in the environment. The most representative
research concerning coordination between agents is brie°y discussed through the
analysis of communicating and non-communicating agents (Tan, 1993; Sen et al.,
1994). The e±cacy of cooperation in this research is measured by learning the
tasks to achieve cooperative actions.
As an early example of improving cooperation by using communication, Tan's
work (1993) uses a Q-learning algorithm to evaluate the e®ect of sharing perception
information between independent learning agents. In this work, cooperative agents
exchange di®erent levels of information: instantaneous information (actions and
reinforcements), episodic experiences (sequences of actions and their respective
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the actions are performed) in order to perform joint tasks. Tan shows in a simu-
lated prey/hunter environment that agents do learn to cooperate by sharing some
information about themselves. However, there can be a drawback in the agents'
behaviour. In some cases, communicating extra information can interfere with the
agents' learning process because of the large number of states agents have to deal
with as well as the communication cost. In contrast, Sen et al. (1994) explored
an agent's capacity to coordinate without performing any communication action.
That is, agents do not share any kind of information, but only use environmental
feedback. Using such an approach, they were able to show that two robots could
jointly push a block by only sensing the block position.
The research of this thesis assumes that independent agents learn to cooperate
by taking decisions about their coordination mechanisms. In particular, each
agent starts its own learning process independently of what the others do, and,
consequently, they do not share any kind of information. To this end, the line of
research advocated by Tan cannot be applied in this context (at least not as a ¯rst
point to explore learning in the highest level of the decision making). However, the
research carried out in this thesis builds on Sen et al.'s approach in the sense that
agents do not explicitly communicate information to bene¯t the learning process
and it is through external factors that agents retrieve information of the actions
taken.
2.3.2 Modelling others
The easiest way to address the problem of how an agent can model another is to as-
sume the actions performed by other agents alter the environment that the agent is
perceiving and sensing (this is the approach followed with the non-communicative
agents in Section 2.3.1). In such cases, agents do not model explicitly the behaviour
of others. These agents are usually called 0-level agents (using the terminology
of Vidal and Durfee (1997)). To be precise, the approximation function of a 0-
level agent is not a®ected by other agents' actions. The next level is called 1-level
agents. These agents represent the others as 0-level agents. In such cases, agents
analyse the others' past actions and try to predict their preferences in one of two
ways. Firstly, explicitly representing their actions in their formulations (by doing
so, they represent the fact that the others' actions a®ect the feedback the agent
receives). Secondly, updating the knowledge that 1-level agents have of the others
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tions (with no alteration of the formulation). The most complex kind of modeling
is done by representing the other agents as 1-level agents. These kind of agents
are called 2-level agents. This is especially complicated because here agents have
knowledge of how the others select their actions. Thus 2-level agents represent
the others, not only by the actions they perform, but by their policies (i.e. the
actions they perform given a particular state).
Given this nomenclature, the rest of this section considers how learning tech-
niques can be applied to develop such agents. To this end, Nagayuki et al. (2000)
propose a Q-learning algorithm where agents approximate the actions of the oth-
ers by using a function that estimates the other agents' actions. In this work, the
approximation function is represented not only in terms of the particular agent's
actions, but also in terms of the actions of the others. This work is an example of
modelling others as 1-level agents and it is also interesting because communica-
tion is not allowed between agents. Another example in modeling other agents, in
market domains in this case, is the work of Hu and Wellman (1998). In particular,
they analyse the e±cacy of the di®erent levels of modelling in this kind of appli-
cation domain. Their results show that 0-level agents perform better most of the
time because they make minimal assumptions about the others. However, their
most important conclusion is that agents which use certain information about the
others always perform better than those which have to operate with uncertain
information. Finally, the work of Claus and Boutilier (1998) compares learning
agents which represent the other agents as part of the environment (0-level agents)
against learning agents which associate the value of the other agents' actions as
part of their modeling (1-level agents). This enables them to compare the advan-
tages of the two levels of modeling the others. However, in contrast with previous
work, they associate others' actions with probabilistic distributions. This work
also analyses in detail one of the fundamental aspects in RL algorithms; namely,
the exploitation-exploration problem by considering di®erent strategies to select
the actions. They focus on analysing the convergence properties in these two kinds
of scenarios. In particular, their results emphasise the complex properties of mod-
eling agents in MASs and suggest that exploration-exploitation techniques have a
great in°uence on the results of learning agents.
Generally speaking, the work discussed in this subsection deals with creating
an explicit representation of other agents in order to predict their actions so that
an agent can take more informed decisions in the future. However, this body of
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amount and certainty of the information shared by the agents and the particulars
of the learning algorithm employed. Against this background, in the research of
this thesis, modelling others plays a particular role because it seems practicable
to have agents that can reason as a result of their interactions with others. In
particular, it is believed that agents could improve their decision making if they
explicitly represent the e®ect of their interactions. Thus, for example, if an agent
has previously received positive answers to a past request for cooperation, it could
produce a model of the other's attitudes as perhaps \cooperative". Hence, when
the agent faces a situation about which acquaintances to interact with this in-
formation could be incorporated into its decision making. Thus, as a point of
departure, agents in this research model the elements on which they base their de-
cision making regarding coordination problems (see Section 9.3 for more detail).
2.3.3 Learning to select a CM
To date there has been comparatively little work concerned with learning which
CM to select in a given context. However, there are two systems in which such lear-
ning is exploited; namely, COLLAGE (Prasad & Lesser, 1996, 1999) and LODES
(Sugawara & Lesser, 1998). The objective in both systems is to improve coor-
dination by learning to select a coordination strategy in appropriate situations.
However the aspects each system addresses are di®erent and their ¯ndings are
complementary.
LODES is more interested in having agents that are capable of learning the key
information that is necessary to improve coordination in speci¯c situations. In
COLLAGE agents learn how to choose the most appropriate coordination strat-
egy given a particular situation. Thus, LODES focuses on \what information
to learn" and COLLAGE on \learning the situation where to use a coordination
strategy". It is important to notice that both systems are concerned with the de-
tailed activities of coordination as part of the learning process. For agents to solve
a particular coordination problem, they have to solve all the interrelations and
dependencies between their actions. Thus agents ¯rst plan the actions to perform
and then execute them. To solve this, both systems have to handle explicit knowl-
edge about the domain in the case of LODES and about coordination strategies
in the case of COLLAGE.
In the case of this thesis, however, the research aim is broadly similar, but the
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solutions. In this thesis's framework, agents are endowed with a set of decision
making procedures to select adequate coordination mechanisms. By dealing with
an abstract set of such mechanisms, it is considered more important to have agents
that have the capacity to take decisions about coordination, rather than dealing
with all the interactions between them. The latter (the coordinating algorithm in
the generic description of a CM) is left to the details of the subsequent tasks of
the associated protocol. Furthermore, as agents are increasingly being required
to deal with more dynamic environments then online learning methods (such as
Q-learning) will become more important. COLLAGE, by contrast, uses instance
based learning techniques in which there is a phase of recovery of examples and
one of training. Consequently, the system has well de¯ned moments in which these
phases are performed which gives the additional problem of determining when each
phase should ¯nish.
2.4 Discussion
This section has further elaborated upon the basic idea that building complex sys-
tems requires the coordination aspects to be °exible and dealt with at an abstract
level. In particular, it was argued that °exible deliberation is a key character-
istic when dealing with agents' interactions in dynamic, open and unpredictable
environments.
To this end, this chapter investigated a range of research in which some form of
°exibility was introduced. Such work basically employed sophisticated techniques
to deal with a variety of the problems associated with attaining °exible coordi-
nation. In particular, this analysis highlighted the fact that to embody °exible
deliberation about coordination into the agent's decision making requires work in
the following directions:
² Take an abstract view of the coordination problem and separate out the rea-
soning about the coordination problem from the techniques that are actually
used to achieve coordination.
² Provide agents with °exible reasoning about coordination at the particular
time at which they face the coordination problem (at run-time).
² Incorporate °exible reasoning about commitments and penalties into the
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² Endow agents with learning abilities so they can improve their decision ma-
king about coordination.
Regarding the ¯rst point, some classical work was presented to illustrate how
particular coordination mechanisms deal with agents' interactions. It was also
shown that each of these mechanisms has its own particular characteristics and
advantages. Furthermore, it was shown how they could be represented using the
generic template developed in Chapter 1.
Regarding the second point, this thesis builds on the fact that agents should
reason about coordination at the highest level of abstraction of the coordination
problem. Moreover, in order to obtain the desired °exibility in this reasoning,
agents need to constantly update their appreciation about the elements involved
in the coordination. Thus, agents need to take into consideration what is occurring
in the environment and with the others agents, and their decision making should
be performed at point at which coordination is needed.
Turning to the third point, this thesis builds on the work of (Sandholm & Lesser,
1996) and introduces commitments through contracts as an integral part of the
agents' reasoning about coordination at run-time. In particular, this work amends
the shortcoming of levelled variable commitments by considering di®erent degrees
of commitments. Moreover, it is also believe that Sandholm and Lesser make
somewhat unrealistic assumptions about having probability distribution available
of agents' choices. Finally, it is believed that it is necessary to introduce variable
penalty contracts as a more realistic model for assessing the cost of reneging. Thus,
putting all this together, the research of this thesis claims that it is necessary to
manage variable degrees of commitment and variable penalty contracts to better
model coordination activity.
Finally, regarding the fourth point, learning and adaptation are important fea-
tures when dealing with dynamic systems and reinforcement learning is an ap-
propriate technique to apply in this context. Its main areas of application in the
context of this work should be to allow agents to choose the coordination strategy
which has previously been e®ective in similar circumstances (Section 2.3.3) and to
adapt the factors on which an agent bases its reasoning to have a stronger degree
of certainty about its values in the prevailing environmental in order to reduce
the degree of uncertainty in its decision making (Section 2.3.2). In particular,
one of the key determining factors in this reasoning relates to the likely actions
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these actions from previous encounters and build a model of the likely actions of
the others. Thus, as a ¯rst step of learning to model others, this research explores
how to endow agents with the capacity to learn about the others as 1-level agents.Chapter 3
The Coordination Scenario
This chapter presents the characteristics of the scenario in which the agents
coordinate their activities. It is organized into two sections; Section 3.1 introduces
the particulars of the testbed domain and presents the protocol the agents follow
to interact with each other and Section 3.2 justi¯es and discusses some of the
design decisions of this scenario.
3.1 Scenario Description
The testbed domain takes the form of a grid world in which a number of au-
tonomous agents (Ai) perform tasks for which they receive units of reward (Ri).
Each agent has a speci¯c task (STi) which only it can perform; there are other
tasks which require several agents to perform them, called cooperative tasks (CTs).
Each task has a reward associated with it, the rewards for the CTs are higher than
those for STs since they must be divided among the m coordinating agents.
The agents move around the grid one step at a time, up, down, left or right,
or stay still. At any one time, each agent has a single goal, either its ST or a CT
over which coordination needs to be achieved. On arrival at a square containing
its goal, the agent receives the associated reward. In the case of STs, a new
one appears, randomly, somewhere in the grid, visible only to the appropriate
agent. In the case of CTs, a new one appears, randomly, somewhere in the grid,
but this is only visible to an agent who subsequently arrives at that square. If
an agent encounters a CT, while pursuing its current goal (i.e., its ST), it takes
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charge of the CT 1 and must decide on both whether to initiate coordination with
other agents over this task, and which coordination mechanism (CM) it should
use. In this context, each agent has a prede¯ned range of CMs at its disposal.
Each CM is parameterised by the two key attributes of the meta-data (discussed
in Section 1.1): set up cost (in terms of time-steps) and chance of success. For
example, a CM may take t time-steps to set up (modelled by the agent waiting
that number of time-steps before requesting bids from other agents) and have a
probability, p, of success (thus when the other agent(s) arrive at the CT square,
the reward will be allocated with probability p, with zero reward otherwise). An
agent may well decide that attempting to coordinate is not a viable option, in
which case it adopts the null CM (i.e. the agent rejects adopting the CT as its
goal).
The Agent-in-Charge (AiC) of the coordination selects a CM and, after waiting
for the set up period, broadcasts a request for other agents to engage in coordi-
nation. The other agents respond with bids composed of the amount of reward
they would require in order to participate in the CT and how many time-steps
away from the CT square they are situated. If an agent's bid is successful, then
it is termed Agent-in-Cooperation (AiCoop) to denote the fact that it is a partic-
ipant (not AiC) for a CT task. The role Agent-in-ST (AiS) is used to denote the
situation where an agent is working towards a ST. Within this broad framework,
Figure 3.1 highlights the speci¯c decisions which have to be made (see Chapter 4
for more details) and gives the protocol the agents follow at each time-step.
Agents might receive more than one proposal at the same time step, in which
case they reply with as many bids as the proposals they receive. However, they will
only accept one CT contract at a time. Agreements between AiCs and AiCoops to
achieve a particular CT are established via a contracting protocol. This Contract-
Net-like protocol consists of three steps. In the ¯rst step, AiC broadcasts a pro-
posal to all agents. It then waits for the bids. The second step involves selecting
the bids and contracts from AiCs and AiSs respectively (evaluation phase). Fi-
nally, the third step consists of the commitment about the terms of the contract
and the time step at which AiCoops will arrive at the CT square. Figures 3.2
and 3.3 describe in detail the reasoning each agent performs during the protocol
in the evaluation step.
1If several agents arrive at a CT square at the same time, one of them is arbitrarily deemed
to be in charge and, if an agent ¯nds more than one CT in a given cell, it randomly selects one
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[1] Agents arrive at a square. If AiS arrives at its ST cell, its goal is attained, it
receives the reward and updates its goal. If AiCoop arrives at the CT cell,
it noti¯es the AiC that it has arrived. The CT is achieved and the rewards
are paid to AiCoops.
[2] If AiS ¯nds a CT it must decide if it wants to become AiC and, if so,
which CM= (t;p) it should use. If t > 0 it must wait t time-steps before
broadcasting a request for coordination. If AiC ¯nds a new CT, it ignores
it.
[3] If AiS receives a request for coordination, it decides whether and what to
bid to participate in the CT. The AiC then evaluates all bids. If AiS's bid is
accepted, it adopts CT as its new goal. AiC does not respond to requests
for coordination.
[4] Each agent decides on its next move according to its current goal and all
agents move simultaneously.
Figure 3.1: Basic protocol followed by agents.
[1] The AiC receives and evaluates agents' bids indicating the task reward and
the number of time steps they would take to arrive to the CT cell.
[2] If AiC does not receive the number of bids needed to achieve a CT or no
one answers its request for coordination, it recovers the ST as its goal.
[3] From the bids received, the AiC selects the number of bids needed to
achieve its CT and awards contracts to those agents and waits for the
corresponding agreements.
[4] If the AiC receives the number of agreements required, the AiCoops and
the AiC commit to pursue the associated CT as their current goal. If the
chosen contratees do not accept the contract, the AiC will try to award the
contract to the remaining potential AiCoops (from the set of unselected
bids).
[5] If the AiC does not ¯nd enough bids available from the unselected bids or
the bids do not generate a surplus, it recovers its previous ST as its goal.
Figure 3.2: Steps followed by AiC in the evaluation phase.
[1] AiS submit a bid when it receives a request for coordination from AiCs (the
AiS replies to as many requests for coordination as it receives from the
AiCs).
[2] If more than one bid is awarded with a contract, the AiS has to choose which
one to agree upon. It commits to pursue a CT of the selected contract
with an agreement message to the corresponding AiC and it noti¯es the
other AiCs that it does not accept their o®ers.
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To clarify the protocols associated to each role and the previous description of
the scenario, Figure 3.4 shows a [10 £ 10] grid size at a speci¯c time step with 5
agents in the grid and three CTs. The CT in position (1,9) requires 3 agents to be
achieved, the one at (2,6) needs 4 agents and the one at (9,8) requires 2 agents. In
the speci¯c moment shown, the AiC-A1 (at (1,9)) negotiated and is in agreement
with two AiCoops (A4 at (4,6) and A3 at (4,8)) to achieve its CT at (1,9). A0
and A2 are AiSs (at (4,4) and (6,5) respectively) that are working towards their
respective speci¯c tasks at (2,2) and (6,5). No agents have found the CTs at (2,6)
and (9,8).
Figure 3.4: Scenario with agent roles.
3.2 Discussion
This initial presentation involves several simplifying assumptions; in particular
common knowledge, a deterministic environment and straightforward coordination
mechanisms. However, the framework is also intended to be °exible so that these
and other assumptions will be relaxed in future work (see Chapters 8, 9 and 10).
To model dynamism, unpredictability and open features (as per Section 1.1.3) in
this grid world, the elements in the environment change their values at execution
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STs and CTs); the frequency with which tasks appear and disappear in the grid;
the changing number of agents in the environment; and the number of agents
needed to achieve a CT. The main consequence of these variations is that they
generate an environment in which agents face di±culty in estimating the decisions
of other agents. Thus, agents have to take decisions based on factors that cannot
be predetermined.
In choosing a scenario in which to evaluate the model this work faces one
of the perennial problems of empirical research (see (Cohen, 1995) for a fuller
discussion): should this research use a concrete real world domain or should it
work in an abstract environment? Choosing the former means concerns are raised
about the generality of the results. Choosing the latter means there are concerns
about the applicability of the developed models or the simplicity of the scenario
(see (Hanks et al., 1993) for a discussion of the relative merits of such a choice).
The choice made here, a grid world scenario, obviously falls into the abstract
environment category. This decision was made because the primary objective is
to focus on the essential aspects of an agent's decision making about coordination
and it was felt that this is best achieved without the extraneous constraints of a
real-world application. Nevertheless, it is believed that the scenario models the
key features related to making coordination decisions that are present in many real
world scenarios and that it incorporates the necessary degree of dynamism and
uncertainty to fully evaluate the coordination model. To this end, the scenario
has been deliberately set up to concentrate on the decision making involved in
coordination. Thus the remainder of the agent's decision making capabilities were
minimised so that di®erences in performance are solely attributable to decisions
about coordination and not anything else. For example, an agent can only pursue
one goal at a time (meaning the results are not in°uenced by how e®ectively
an agent can interleave execution of multiple concurrent goals) and that agents
cannot renege on commitments (meaning the model does not have to reason about
commitment strategies and types of sanctions; however, see Chapter 8 where this
is relaxed). While adding such functionality would inevitably improve the agents'
performance, and increase the degree of realism, it may also make the e®ect of the
coordination decisions more di±cult to determine.
Moreover, the parameterised behaviour of the environment means that the ex-
perimental conditions can be fully reproduced in order to allow meaningful com-
parison between the di®erent coordination techniques. However, to help show that
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in realistic settings, Section 4.5 discusses additional situations (to those introduced
here) that agents might encounter as a result of possible interactions and Chap-
ter 5 provides a mapping into the domains of transportation management and
coordinated information retrieval.Chapter 4
The Agent's Decision Making
Procedures
This chapter formalises the basic decision procedures of the agents; extensions of
this model to deal with decommiting from agreements and learning about the most
suitable CM to coordinate with are dealt with in Chapters 8 and 9 respectively. To
study the average impact of coordination mechanisms, an in¯nite horizon model
of decision making (Filar, 1997) was adopted because this work is concerned with
the long-term performance of agents; a ¯nite horizon model may lead to erratic
behaviour as the last time-step approaches (Axelrod, 1985). However, there are
still two ways to model the agents' decisions: by using average reward per unit time
or by discounting future rewards. Here, the former was chosen, since it simpli¯es
the decision analysis.
The agents' aims are to maximise their reward; in particular their average
reward per unit time. Each agent keeps track of its own average reward, termed
its reward rate, and it uses this rate to decide how much to charge for its own
services and, occasionally to approximate the expected rates of other agents (when
it is not able to build up a picture of them (see Section 9.3)). Speci¯cally, each
agent uses its reward rate to evaluate and compare the di®erent actions available
to it; if it can maintain or improve this rate, it chooses to do so.
Agents may have various dispositions with respect to cooperation and the char-
acterisation of sociality used here is captured by an agent's willingness to cooperate
(WtC) factor (based on (Hogg & Jennings, 2001)). This factor, !, represents the
weight an agent puts on opting to cooperate, relative to collecting its usual re-
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ward. When reward units, e®ectively the agent's utility, are of equal currency, a
Neutral agent (! = 1) only needs to receive the same reward from a CT as it would
from its ST. Thus, if ! > 1 it can be described as Greedy, asking for more reward
than it would normally expect to receive and if ! < 1 it can be described as sel°ess
or Altruistic, asking for less than it would normally expect to receive. The decision
procedures described in this section will typically assume that agents are neutral,
but will include ! to indicate where this factor comes into the calculations.
In the model there are four types of decisions that agents are required to make:
(i) the direction to move in; (ii) which CM to adopt, if any; (iii) how much to bid
when a request for coordination is received; and, (iv) how to determine which bid
to accept, if any. Each of these is now dealt with in turn.
4.1 Deciding the direction to move
An agent always has a target square in which its current goal is located. The
agent decides to move towards its goal by selecting the direction, up, down, left,
or right, probabilistically according to the ratio of up/down to left/right squares
away from the goal it is. Formally, if the agent is at square [x1;y1] and its goal
is at [x2;y2], the probabilities (pmove) that it will move in any given direction
(up/down, left/right) are given by:
pmove(up/down) =
jy1 ¡ y2j
jx1 ¡ x2j + jy1 ¡ y2j
(up if y2 < y1, down otherwise)
pmove(left/right) =
jx1 ¡ x2j
jx1 ¡ x2j + jy1 ¡ y2j
(left if x2 < x1, right otherwise)
4.2 Deciding which CM to select
An agent which, while pursuing its current goal, encounters a CT must decide
whether to initiate coordination with other agents in order to perform it. To
do this, the agent must determine whether there is any advantage in so doing.
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available, as well as on various environmental factors which e®ect the expected
demands of the potential coordinating agents.
To model the expected demands of the other agents, the AiC assumes they
are randomly distributed throughout the grid, and that their current goals are
similarly distributed. Thus some agents may be near the CT while others may
be far away; likewise, for some agents there would be a signi¯cant deviation from
their ST to reach the CT, while others may be able to coordinate over the CT en
route to their own goals. The agent then assesses the possible CMs on the basis
of how long before the task can be performed and how much reward it is likely to
obtain after deducting the expected reward requirement of the other agents. In
the former case, it considers both the set up time and the average distance away
each agent is situated, whereas the latter value is based on the amount of time
agents must spend deviating from their path and the CM's probability of success.
This assessment determines the amount of surplus reward the agent can expect,
over and above what it expects to obtain during its normal course of operation
(i.e., its own average reward per time-step, r). The agent then selects the CM
that maximises this surplus 1.
To formalise this decision procedure, consider an [M £ N] grid with reward
size S for STs, and R for CTs, a coordination mechanism, CM=(t;p), which costs
t time-steps to set up and has a probability of success p. In this grid world of
known size, the agent can calculate the expected average distance (ave dist) away
of any randomly situated agent from the CT square as well as the likely average
deviation (ave dev) such agents would have to make to get there.
First, the average distance in each direction of a random square from a point
[x;y] is given by:
x distance(x) =
2x(x ¡ 1) + M(M + 1 ¡ 2x)
2M
y distance(y) =
2y(y ¡ 1) + N(N + 1 ¡ 2y)
2N
Hence the ave dist of any given agent from [x;y] is:
1Though this may not be a globally optimal criterion for deciding which CM to use, it makes
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ave dist(x;y) = x distance(x) + y distance(y)
The average distance, ave dist, of an agent from its ST is the average distance
between two random points on the grid. This is given by averaging ave dist(x;y),
over all x and y:
ave dist =
PM
x=1
PN
y=1 ave dist(x;y)
M £ N
Finally, the average deviation of an agent to assist in a CT at square [x;y] and
then go on to its ST, as compared with going straight to its ST, is given by:
ave dev(x;y) = 2 £ ave dist(x;y) ¡ ave dist
Based on these ¯gures, the agent can assess the average surplus reward from
coordinating over the CT at (x,y) using CMj = (tj;pj). First, it must estimate its
own cost in terms of how long the CM will take to set up and how long it expects
to wait for the other agents to arrive. Since the AiC would expect to receive S
reward units per ST, the average reward per time step would be (see Appendix A
for alternative ways of calculating this rate):
r =
S
ave dist
(4.1)
The cost of CMj is then given by:
costj(x;y) = r £ (tj + ave dist(x;y)) (4.2)
Second, the AiC must estimate the average amount of reward the other m
agents will require. To distinguish an agent's own average reward (r) from that of
the others, r AiCoop is used to refer to the average reward of all the other agents
in the environment. When AiC does not have any knowledge of r AiCoop it uses
its own average reward as an approximation (see Chapter 9 for details of how
this can be learnt from past encounters and Appendix A to evaluate the e®ect of
various ways of calculating this factor):Chapter 4 The Agent's Decision Making Procedures 68
ave bidj(x;y) =
r AiCoop £ ! £ ave dev(x;y)
pj
(4.3)
Third, the AiC estimates the expected surplus (ave payo®) of CMj from adopt-
ing the CT by taking into account the probability of success of the task:
ave payo®j(x;y) = pj £ R (4.4)
Using these estimates, the AiC can evaluate the expected surplus reward of
adopting CMj
2:
ave surplusj(x;y) = ave payo®j(x;y)¡
(costj(x;y) + (m £ ave bidj(x;y))) (4.5)
When deciding which of its CMs to adopt, the agent computes its expected
surplus reward from each of them and selects the one that maximises this value.
If the surplus associated with all CMs is negative, the agent adopts the option of
the null CM (which is de¯ned to have zero surplus).
y #
1 AiS2
2 CT
3 AiS1
4 ST1
5 ST2
x ! 1 2 3 4 5
Figure 4.1: Example of a coordination world grid.
To exemplify this decision procedure, consider the simple scenario of Figure 4.1
at one instant in time with two agents (AiS1 and AiS2), two STs, one CT and two
CMs: CM1(3;0:9) and CM2(6;1:0). AiS2 occupies a [5 £ 5] grid and ¯nds a CT
2Note that in order to estimate ave surplus it is assumed that m is determined in advance
or is part of the agent's knowledge. However, this assumption may not always be valid for
cases in which the number of cooperative agents depends on the particulars of the coordination's
objective. In such cases, the agents will need to predict this number based on previous experiences
or some how estimate this information (e.g., the straightforward solution is that agents maintain
an average of the number of helpers each time they accomplish coordination; more complex
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requiring one other agent with R = 6 at square [3;2]. Assume all agents have a
WtC factor of ! = 1. The average distance of other agents from [3;2] is 2:6. Since
the average distance between two random squares is 3:2, the average deviation of
any agent from [3;2] is 2. Assume that each ST has a reward S = 2, then the
average reward per time-step of all agents is 2
3:2 = 0:625. The expected surplus
reward of adopting each CM is given by:
cost1(3;2) = (0:625 £ (3 + 2:6)) = 3:5
ave bid1(3;2) =
(0:625 £ 1 £ 2))
0:9
= 1:389
ave payo®1(3;2) = (0:9 £ 6) = 5:4
ave surplus1(3;2) = 0:511
cost2(3;2) = (0:625 £ (6 + 2:6)) = 5:375
ave bid2(3;2) =
(0:625 £ 1 £ 2))
1:0
= 1:25
ave payo®2(3;2) = (1:0 £ 6) = 6
ave surplus2(3;2) = ¡0:625
Under these circumstances, AiS2 decides to attempt coordination with CM1 (be-
coming AiC) because it expects to obtain a pro¯t. Note this is not the case with
CM2, where the negative result indicates there is not likely to be a surplus. Thus,
in this case, if AiS2 only had CM2 at its disposal it would choose the null CM
(expected surplus zero) and it would continue towards its ST.
4.3 Deciding what to bid to become an AiCoop
When agents receive a request to participate in a CT they submit a bid based on
the amount of reward that they would require to compensate them for deviating
from their current goal. Thus, an agent's required reward is determined by the
amount of time spent in deviating from the CT square, its average reward per
time-step and the probability of success of the CM being proposed 3.
To formalise this, consider an agent, Ai, with !i and average reward per time-
step ri. The agent calculates its deviation (i.e., the number of extra time-steps it
3Note that the AiSs use the actual values of the concepts discussed, whereas the AiC's task
is to make a good approximation of these components through equation (4.3).Chapter 4 The Agent's Decision Making Procedures 70
requires to reach its ST if it goes via the CT square). Note that if, for example,
the CT square lies directly on a path to the ST, the agent's deviation would be
zero. Clearly, such an agent will be in a position to submit a very attractive bid,
since the cost of coordinating is e®ectively zero.
Again by means of illustration consider the agents depicted in Figure 4.1. AiS1
at [5;3] would take 4 time-steps to reach ST1 at [2;4] directly, but 6 steps going
via the CT at [3;2], a deviation of 2 time-steps. However, AiS2 at [1;1] would take
7 time-steps to reach ST2 at [4;5] directly, and also 7 steps going via the CT at
[3;2]; AiS2 therefore has a deviation of 0.
To compute the reward AiSi requires from engaging in coordination over the
CT, it takes into account the compensation both for its deviation and for the
possibility that the CM might fail; it also takes into account its willingness to
cooperate. Thus, the estimation of bid is given by:
bidij =
ri £ !i £ deviationi
pj
(4.6)
The agent submits its bid to coordinate and its distance from the CT square.
If an agent is selected to coordinate, it adopts the CT as its current goal. Its ST
is only re-adopted after the CT has been accomplished.
4.4 Deciding which AiS bids to accept
Once the AiC has received bids from all agents, it selects the set that maximises
its surplus reward, given the new (de¯nite) information it has received (cf. the
approximation in section 4.2). For each agent, Ai, the AiC knows the amount of
reward it will require (bidij) and the time it will take to arrive (Ti).
The AiC's selection bid process is based on the calculation of the cost of each
bid received. However, when more than two agents are required to achieve a CT,
it is necessary to deal with the fact that an AiCoop may have to wait in the CT
cell while the remaining AiCoops arrive (because agents have to travel di®erent
distances). There are many ways of dealing with this situation (see discussion
below). However to simplify the estimates of expected reward undertaken by the
various agents, it is assumed the AiC pays an additional reward for the time
elapsed. Thus, AiC knows the number of time steps that each AiCoop is likely toChapter 4 The Agent's Decision Making Procedures 71
have to wait (speci¯ed in the bid) and the amount it will pay for waiting time at
a speci¯c prede¯ned waiting rate (q). The CT is achieved only when the AiC has
received the con¯rmation of all m agents involved in the cooperation. When an
AiCoop noti¯es the AiC of its arrival at the CT cell, it either receives its share of
the CT reward or the waiting rate followed by its share of the CT reward.
Thus, to decide which bids to accept, the general idea is that AiC selects the
m proposals with least cost (from the total bids received B). It does this by
considering the reward requested in the bid and the waiting time cost (cost bid)
and then it estimates its expected reward given this cost and its investment. For-
mally, AiC calculates the cost of each subset b of B with m elements of the form
(bidij;Ti). From b, AiC selects the agent that will take the longest time to arrive
(i.e., maxTb = max(bidij;Ti)2b[Ti]), then it can determine the maximum time that
each agent will spend in the cell. Finally, it approximates the cost of each bid
based on the reward and the waiting time an AiC has to pay:
cost bidb =
X
(bidij;Ti)2b
(bidij + (maxTb ¡ Ti) £ q) (4.7)
Bringing all this together, AiC estimates the surplus it expects to obtain by
taking into account the cost of the selected bids and its own investment to wait
for the last AiCoop to arrive. The bids selected belong to the subset b of B that
maximises the surplus given by:
surplusj = pj £ R ¡ cost bidb ¡ r £ (tj + maxTb) (4.8)
Now, it may be the case that no bids are received which give a positive surplus.
Even though the chosen CM had an expected surplus, by chance it may be that
no agents are su±ciently near to provide reasonable bids. In such a situation, the
AiC abandons the CT and returns to its ST.
4.5 Discussion
The decision making framework covers the progression of the participants from
being independent agents that seek to maximise their individual gain (competi-
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to achieve a common task (cooperative behaviour). Moreover, the degree of com-
petition/collaboration in the various stages of the protocol can be varied through
the willingness-to-cooperate factor (!) (see Sections 7.4 and A.2 for experiments
involving this parameter).
Turning now to the applicability of the decision making framework (as per
the discussion in Section 3.2). It is important to emphasise the fact that the
protocol speci¯ed in Figure 3.1 indicates only the general steps agents follow in
this scenario. In order to formulate the agent's decision making procedures, some
speci¯c design choices had to be taken. For example, the agent's decision of which
bids to select (as described in Section 4.4) models the situation in which the AiC
pays compensation for the AiCoops's waiting time because all AiCoops have to
be in the cell to attain the CT. However, there are other ways of dealing with
the fact that various cooperative agents are required to achieve a CT (step [1]
of the protocol). For instance, in some circumstances, only two agents might be
needed to accomplish a CT or the cooperative agents may not need to wait for
the others in order to attain the CT. In both of these cases, the AiC would not
need to pay compensation for the AiCoops's waiting time. Additional situations
might occur if the agents are allowed to negotiate the waiting rate. However,
many of these alternatives can be modelled using the components and constituent
factors introduced in this section. To demonstrate this, in what follows, alternative
formulations to calculate surplus are illustrated.
In the situation in which only one more agent is needed to achieve a CT (the
simplest case), the bid selected is the one with the cost (cost bidb) that maximises
the surplus reward estimated by equation (4.8). This time, therefore, it does not
make sense to use maxTb and Ti is used instead, and the cost of the bid is:
cost bidb = bidij (4.9)
If, however, more agents (to be precise m agents) are required to achieve a CT
and AiCoops do not need to wait for the rest to achieve the cooperative task, the
cost bidb must re°ect the fact that the bids are not a®ected by the waiting time.
In this case, the cost of each subset b of m elements is approximated by:
cost bidb =
X
(bidij;Ti)2b
bidij (4.10)Chapter 4 The Agent's Decision Making Procedures 73
Note that for the calculation of surplus, although AiC does not pay compen-
sation for the waiting time, it still has to wait for the furthest AiCoop to arrive
(maxTb). Once again, with this new cost calculation, the surplus equation consid-
ers the changes needed and the formulation is used transparently.
In short, the alternative formulations presented for calculating surplus illustrate
that although there are many situations that agents might encounter as a result
of possible interactions, the main components and constituent factors taken into
consideration in the agent's decision making are still valid. Moreover, the same
concepts can be used to formulate the particulars of alternative applications do-
mains. In particular, the modi¯cations mainly occur in the calculation of cost bidb
rather than a change in the whole evaluation of surplus. To illustrate this point
further, the next chapter takes two di®erent applications domains (transportation
and information retrieval) and shows how the decision making framework outlined
in this chapter can be used to model variations in the way that the domain speci¯c
components of the framework are calculated.Chapter 5
Applications of the Coordination
Scenario
To help demonstrate the applicability of the coordination scenario and the de-
cision making framework presented in Chapters 3 and 4, this chapter shows how
two commonly used examples in the MAS literature can be described in these
terms. The scenarios relate to transportation and coordinated information re-
trieval. Speci¯cally, the purpose here is to show how the constituent factors of the
agent's decision making framework can be grounded in these application domains.
In what follows, a general description of the problem is ¯rst given and then the
relevant features are instantiated in the agent's decision procedures.
5.1 The Transportation Problem
The domain of transportation has been used by a number of researchers in the
multiagent system community to demonstrate their ideas. A common form of this
problem involves agents moving in an interconnected network from one place to
another; modelling the rescue of evacuees to safe points (Durfee, 2001), modelling
shipping companies (Fisher et al., 1996) and the package delivery problem (Rosen-
schein & Zlotkin, 1994). Here the focus is on the ¯nal example. In this case, the
truck's goal is to deliver a number of parcels to speci¯c locations (post o±ces or
delivery o±ces). The more parcels delivered by a truck, the more pro¯t it receives.
There are special packages (a package being a group of parcels) that have to be
delivered by more than one truck (because of their size).
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Now mapping this into the abstract scenario of Chapter 3. Trucks are the agents
that move around the grid (mail vans in Figure 5.1) and the ¯nal destinations for
their parcels correspond to the agents' speci¯c tasks (post o±ces in Figure 5.1).
Agents start moving around the grid with a package to deliver and with a post
o±ce to reach (target square). If they ¯nd more parcels to dispatch en route
(which increases their bene¯t) they will try to incorporate them into their plan.
As soon as they arrive at their target square, all the carried packages are deemed
delivered and another destination is speci¯ed and new parcels are requested to
be delivered. There are intermediate points (additional distributed outlets) where
an agent can pick up packages to be dispatched to the ¯nal destination. These
correspond to the CT locations and are represented as post boxes in Figure 5.1.
At these points, agents are asked if they wish to carry the additional parcels (from
now on to distinguish the original parcel to the possible additional ones, the latter
are referred to as packages). If they have su±cient space in their truck (and if it
is pro¯table) they accept the proposal and deliver the packages by themselves. If,
however, they can only carry out part of the delivery, they have to decide whether
to accept the whole package (and enlist the help of others) or to refuse the delivery.
In this context, the number of packages to be delivered in a coordinated action
corresponds to the CT's reward (R) and the parcels requested in the destination
point to start a new journey represent the ST reward (S) 1.
In this application domain, the main decision an agent faces is whether it should
accept the challenge of being responsible for the whole package (i.e. becoming the
AiC). Before doing this, however, the agent would expect to ¯nd other possible
trucks (AiSs) with su±cient space to help it carry the delivery. An AiS receives
a request to assist in this group delivery process; evaluates its own capacity and
proposes the number of parcels it is able to carry. This information corresponds
to the bid the AiC will evaluate. Thus, if the AiC identi¯es an appropriate group
(with su±cient capacity) from the AiSs' bids, these become AiCoops for this pack-
age. If, however, the AiC cannot ¯nd su±cient trucks to carry out the delivery, it
simply informs the intermediate distribution outlet of this fact and returns to its
original task of getting to its delivery target.
Having mapped the delivery problem into the coordination testbed, it can be
seen that the trucks take decisions in terms of how pro¯table their actions will be
by trying to deliver as many parcels as possible. However, the main di±culty in
1To match better with the abstract scenario, it is assumed that each truck starts with a
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Figure 5.1: Transportation map example.
making these decisions is that they have to be based not only on the information
of the individual trucks themselves, but also on the agents' beliefs about the other
trucks in the environment. In what follows the main components of the agent's
decision making framework (as outlined in Sections 4.1 to 4.4) are instantiated for
this application domain.
To begin with, however, there are a number of aspects in which this example
di®ers from the coordination testbed :
1. The number of agents required to achieve the CTs cannot be determined in
advance. This is because this information is based on the amount of space
available in the various trucks and this is not known until the AiC receives
the AiSs' proposals.
2. An AiS's bid in the transportation domain incorporates the truck's space.
When an AiS receives a proposal for coordination, it responds with a bid
(bidij) that represents the cost for its services and the time to arrive (Ti) to
the CT location. Here, in addition, the agent indicates the space available
in its truck (Si).
3. The AiC does not consider the potential AiCoops' waiting time. This is
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cooperative task. Rather, each AiCoop reaches the CT destination, picks up
their set of parcels from the package and continues its travels onto the target
location. The possibility of this situation was discussed in Section 4.5.
Having said this, in what follows, the agent's decision procedures discussed are:
which CM to select?, how much to bid? and which bids to accept?.
5.1.1 Which CM to select?
This decision procedure is estimated with equation (4.5). The general constituent
factors of this procedure are: ave dist, ave dev and r. The ¯rst two factors can be
modelled with the same principles as in the abstract scenario because the intercon-
nected transportation network can be mapped transparently into the coordination
grid. The remaining factor r is calculated with the ST reward (S) and the ave dist.
As before, the agents base their decisions on this average and they are inclined
toward those decisions that maximise it. Because the agents' ST destinations are
their ¯nal delivery point, they would expect at least to deliver the original par-
cel from one destination to the ¯nal one. Thus, equation (4.1) to approximate
r is employed. Given that, all elements of the CM selection procedure (equa-
tion (4.5)) can be estimated: cost (equation (4.2)), ave bid (equation (4.3)) and
ave payo® (equation (4.4)). There is, however, one aspect that needs further dis-
cussion. This is, how do agents estimate the number of acquaintances needed (m)
to achieve a CT since this information cannot be determined in advance? In this
transportation example, m can take values in the range from two to the total num-
ber of agents in the environment (when m = 1 the AiC does not need to evaluate
the ave surplus because no-one else is needed to complete the CT and it attends to
the whole package by itself). The straightforward solution to estimate m is that
agents maintain an average of the number of helpers each time they accomplish
coordination and use this average as m. The advantage of this simple solution is
that it is based on what has actually occurred in the environment. However, in
highly dynamic situations, this average might vary considerably. More complex so-
lutions would involve building a model for each agent each time they interact (see
Chapter 9 for a discussion of this approach). Thus, when the AiC needs other
agents to carry the package, it evaluates the ave surplus using the formulation de-
tailed in equation (4.5). With this equation, the trucks are able to make the most
important decision: whether it is worth accepting the whole package and which
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5.1.2 How much to bid?
This corresponds to how much the agents should bid to participate in a coordinated
action (equation (4.6)). Again, it is assumed that r is updated at each step and
this is used by the AiSs when they receive proposals for cooperation. So, the
formulation to evaluate bid is not modi¯ed. Rather, as discussed before, AiSs now
propose to the AiC the triple: bid, time to arrive and space available (bidij;Ti;Si).
5.1.3 Which bids to accept?
This corresponds to the AiC's selection of which bids should be used to make agree-
ments. The AiC makes this decision by calculating the surplus (equation (4.8)).
Here, however, the AiC's reasoning needs to incorporate the following two ad-
ditional considerations: the space in the AiS's trucks and the omission of the
payment for the AiCoops' waiting time. To do this, a new surplus formulation
is needed. This follows the same broad intuition as that of the general scenario.
Formally speaking, let P be the AiC's space available in its truck, B be the set
of bids received of the form (bidij;Ti;Si), b be a subset of B (excluding the empty
set) and maxTb be the furthest agent from b (maxTb = max(bidij;Ti;Si)2b[Ti]). The
idea is then to estimate the cost of a subset b:
cost bidb =
X
(bidij;Ti;Si)2b
bidij
The subset that maximises the surplus are the bids that become agreements.
In this case, however, it is required, in addition, to satisfy the constraint that the
space o®ered by the bids of b:
P +
X
(bidij;Ti;Si)2b
Si >= R
Thus, AiC has to calculate whether it expects to receive a pro¯t given this
distribution. It does so based on the surplus formulation of equation (4.8), but
this time using the calculation of cost bidb detailed above. However there is still
the possibility of not having su±cient bids to assign the packages to or that the
cost asked by the AiCoops might be too high to expect a pro¯t. In such cases, the
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any proposals and, as previously mentioned, it abandons the CT.
Note that the only di®erence between the calculation of cost bidb discussed here
and the ones discussed in Chapter 4 is that in this domain, AiC is simply trying
to accept an unspeci¯ed number of bids (the cardinality of the set b). In contrast,
in the examples of Chapter 4, this number was known in advance by the agents.
As can be seen, the majority of the decision procedures work as speci¯ed in
Chapter 4. The alterations that are needed are relatively minor in nature and
they are a natural consequence of the particulars of the transportation domain in
which the number of trucks is not determined in advance and the truck's space
needs to become part of the decision making process.
Turning now to the run-time selection of the CM. This thesis claims that agents
need to have a set of CMs to solve their coordination problems in an e®ective man-
ner. Thus, the emphasis is on how the AiC decides whether it is worth accepting
the whole package and which coordination strategy should be used to coordinate
with other agents. However, it is not always obvious exactly what a selection of
a CM implies. In Chapter 2 a number of examples of di®erent strategies to solve
coordination problems were introduced. These coordination strategies represent
the CM instances the agents reason about. By means of illustration, assume that
in this domain agents use multiagent planning as CM1 and the Contract-Net pro-
tocol as CM2. Thus, when an agent faces the problem of deciding whether to
deliver the parcel with others, it has to select between doing so using planning or
through the Contract-Net protocol. Using CM1 would mainly involve the agents
having to agree about the order in which the related agents' actions need to be
performed. In other words, by making an analogy with PGP (Section 2.1.3), each
agent maintains its partial plan and helps to build the global one in which all
the waiting times are solved. The subset of AiSs that reply to the request for
coordination represent the group of agents that work together to agree about the
actions each one has to perform to satisfy the time and cost constraints. Thus,
CM1 involves a complex mechanism to solve the interactions that guarantee a suc-
cessful global plan. However, the price to pay is the time to set up the plans of the
agents involved. Regarding CM2 (as described in Table 1.2), the requirements to
establish the protocol are less complex than for CM1, but the outcome is also less
likely to be achieved. This is because agents do not negotiate about the cost of
their bids. Thus, the AiC receives the bids, selects the ones it considers convenient
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not counterpropose a new o®er, even though it could perhaps reduce its cost to
get its bid accepted. On the basis of the previous discussion, it is clear that the
characteristics of these two examples of CMs vary in how likely success is going
to be and how much e®ort needs to be invested. What is more, the particulars
of each CM change from situation to situation. In this transportation example,
agents would probably prefer to coordinate through the Contract-Net in some
circumstances and use the planning approach in others. For example, when the
frequency with which agents ¯nd post boxes is high and losing some opportunities
for cooperation might not be too expensive, the Contract-Net would seem to be
more appropriate; whereas PGP would be more suitable ¯nding post boxes are
seldom found and agents might prefer to invest more time and ensure they do not
loose the opportunity to deliver the additional parcels.
5.2 Coordinated Information Retrieval
This problem consists of having a number of agents with the task of downloading
documents from speci¯c locations in the Internet (Huhns & Stephens, 1999). The
action of downloading has an associated cost that represents the price paid for the
use of the server 2. The agent's objective is to reduce, as far as possible, the cost of
downloading. Each time an agent has a document to retrieve, it might download
it by itself or it could minimise the cost by coordinating its activities with those
of other agents that are also interested in the same document.
The Internet downloading domain has a number of characteristics that can be
found in many other multiagent application domains. To mention some: loaning
a book from a library or querying a database (Rosenschein & Zlotkin, 1994). In
the former case, an agent's aim is to reduce the cost of loaning the book between
the interested agents. In the latter case, each agent has a set of SQL queries to
perform in a database. Executing a query means having access to the database
and spending time performing the query. Agents would prefer to ¯nd which others
are interested in performing the same query in order to avoid the cost of doing it
by themselves.
Thus, returning to the problem of coordinated retrieval in the abstract scenario,
there are two kinds of document to retrieve: private and public. The former are
2Actually this cost might also involve paying for the copyright of the document or perhaps
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AiC decides to attempt coordination. To this end, the AiC waits until the time
to set-up the CM selected has elapsed and it then communicates to the others its
intention of downloading a document and the coordination process starts (as per
Figures 3.2, 3.3).
To better model the fact that an agent's objective is to minimise costs, rather
than maximise rewards, the decision making formulation is mainly rede¯ned in its
meaning (not in its components). Thus, for example, ave surplus (equation 4.5)
represents the average reward agents expect to obtain with a particular CM, while
in this domain, it becomes ave cost which corresponds to the average cost an agent
expects to pay for downloading a document. Similar actions are taken with the
remainder of the agent's decision procedures. Each of these will now be discussed
in turn.
5.2.1 Which CM to select?
In the abstract scenario, agents employ the concept of distance between grid cells
to model the average distance and deviation (ave dist and ave dev). In this domain,
an agent has to \travel" from one point to another on the Internet (to be precise
from one server or node to another) because it has to be at the server location
to download the documents. On this basis, the concept of distance is modelled
using the notion of Internet routing cost (Baccala, 1997). This simply consists of
calculating the number of servers an agent has to pass through in order to make the
connection between nodes 3 to move from one source destination to the ¯nal one.
Regarding the average reward per time step r, here, it is necessary to model the
average cost per time step spent by the agents. Therefore, with the new semantics
for S (the cost of downloading a private document) this average is estimated with
equation (4.1).
Building on previous factors, the three main components to select a CM (equa-
tion (4.5)) cost, ave bid and ave payo® are now analysed. Once again, the objec-
tive is to minimise cost. In this context, the calculation of the expected surplus
of achieving a CT (ave payo®) requires a change in its meaning to re°ect the ex-
pected cost (exp cost) agents have to pay for downloading the document given the
3In the Internet domain there are many solutions to calculate the routing cost (Baccala,
1997). This cost involves building on and assigning costs to network paths and then the routing
protocols select the path to the destination using some speci¯c criteria. This criteria, in most
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speci¯c CM being used. The remaining components including the cost the AiC has
to invest in setting up the CM (cost) and the average bid (ave bid) it recovers from
others' help are estimated using the standard equations of (4.2) and (4.3) respec-
tively 4. Thus, the average cost an agent expects to pay (instead of ave surplus)
for downloading a document taking into account exp cost is given by:
exp costj(x;y) = pj £ R
ave costj(x;y) = exp costj(x;y) + costj(x;y) ¡ (m £ ave bidj(x;y)))
Note that the main alteration in this new formulation is that some components
change their role in terms of reducing or increasing the total cost. Being more pre-
cise, cost increases the total cost rather than decreasing the gain and ave bid de-
creases the total expected payment rather than reducing the expected reward
obtained by achieving the CT. In summary, an agent calculates the ave cost of
each of the CMs at its disposal and then selects the one that minimises the cost.
5.2.2 How much to bid?
When an AiS receives a coordination proposal, it replies with the amount it can
contribute (bidij) and the time it would take to attend the request (Ti). In other
words, bid is based on its own average cost per time step (equation (4.6)) and Ti
represents the fact that an agent that is connected to one server downloading a
document cannot attend to the coordination request until it ¯nishes and closes on
the present server 5.
5.2.3 Which bids to accept?
This decision procedure corresponds to the AiC's selection of bids (equation (4.8))
from the total set of bids received (B). In the formulation presented below, the
4Once again, the AiC cannot estimate in advance the number of helpers. This is because it
does not have a way of knowing the number of agents that are interested in the same document
or how many of them will agree to share the cost of downloading. However, it is possible to
follow the same solution discussed in the transportation domain.
5It is important to notice that in the abstract scenario only AiSs answer coordination re-
quests. However, in this domain it is clear that AiCoops or AiCs might also respond. The
importance of having agents that reconsider their commitments to their current tasks to attend
to more pro¯table ones (in this domain, that which might reduce the costs) is discussed further
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surplus (surplus) becomes the total cost of downloading (def cost) a given docu-
ment. It is interesting to notice that in this domain, in principle, the more bids an
agent receives, the better o® it is likely to be. This is because all bids contribute to
reducing the total cost of downloading. However, consider the situation in which
the AiC waits for the furthest agent. This waiting time is likely to increase its
total cost rather than reduce it. Consequently, the AiC has to balance the waiting
time of the AiCoop and the amount it gains with the bid. Thus, it calculates the
reward of the subset of bids (reward bid instead of cost bid) so that it minimises
the cost spent in waiting time.
In more detail, let b be the subset of B (excluding the empty set). From this,
AiC approximates the reward from a subset of B: reward bidb =
P
(bidij;Ti)2b bidij.
Then it ¯nds the furthest bid from that subset: maxTb = max(bidij;Ti)2b[Ti]. Finally,
it estimates the de¯nitive cost to be paid based on the furthest bid to arrive and
its own investment. The subset of bids selected is the one that minimises def cost:
def costij = pj £ R ¡ reward bidb + r £ (tj + maxTb)
Note that the estimation of reward bid is similar to the formulation described
by equation (4.10), in which cost bid is the sum of the m bids needed, but in this
case, it is based on the cardinality of the set b. An additional observation is that
def cost increases with the waiting time and decreases with the reward of the set
of bids.
5.3 Discussion
This chapter described two di®erent application domains to show that the concepts
of the decision making framework of Chapter 4 are not speci¯c to the grid world
scenario outlined in Chapter 3. With minor changes, it was shown how the key
constituent factors of the framework were mapped into the application domains of
transportation and coordinated information retrieval (this helps address some of
the concerns in Section 3.2).
Furthermore, this endeavour highlights the fact that the scenario and frame-
work introduced in Chapters 3 and 4 portrays and describes the key coordinating
processes that can be found in concrete applications domains (as well as the more
generic testbed). The agent interactions described in this chapter clearly show theChapter 5 Applications of the Coordination Scenario 85
need for a degree of °exibility in the decision making with respect to coordina-
tion. To this end, however, it is also evident that the basic model has a number
of limitations. For example, the necessity of dropping commitments and paying
sanctions were present in both domains and yet these are not considered in the
initial version of the framework. This is because it was felt that that it is initially
important to highlight the fact that the framework's basic assumptions were main-
tained, and, more importantly, that all the framework's constituent factors found
a correspondence in the more realistic domains. To this end, having incorporated
the main factors into the formulations of Sections 5.1 and 5.2 means that the
framework does indeed have a broader applicability. Most probably, depending on
the domain, some additional concepts (the truck space for example in the trans-
portation domain) will need to be incorporated or modelled more precisely (in the
coordinated retrieval information domain, the use of real time could have been
employed instead of the routing connection). However, those that have already
introduced represent the major ones in which many examples can be mapped and
tested.
Another important observation from both exemplar applications is that agents
need to base their decisions about coordination on predicted information about
the environment and about the other agents. For example, in both application
domains, the number of possible agents expected to participate in the coordination
activity is not speci¯ed in advance. Hence, the prediction of the expected reward
to gain from others is imprecise. In general, the use of de¯nitive information
when agents take the decision of engagement or not in coordination activities
is indispensable; the more precise the predictions, the better the decision about
coordination. However, in open scenarios, for example, where agents can enter and
leave at di®erent times, the estimation of these factors is extremely challenging
or when the cost of making a good prediction is expensive it is sometimes better
to have a reasonable approximation. This issue is examined in more depth in
Chapter 9.Chapter 6
Evaluation Methodology
In order to employ a formal and systematic evaluation of the work in this the-
sis, a set of experiments has been designed to evaluate and measure the agent's
performance. In particular, statistical inference methods are used to generalise
conclusions from samples of data. The underlying idea consists of assessing a sys-
tem by verifying hypotheses over the data. There are several statistical procedures
to perform this task (including analysis of variance (ANOVA), regression and path
analysis) each of which represents an alternative method for analysing the sam-
ple. For purposes of this work, however, ANOVA is used because it is a general
and a robust technique: \analysis of variance is very robust against violations
of the normality and equal variance assumptions, especially if the group sizes are
equal." (Cohen, 1995, pp. 194).
In concrete terms, designing an experiment in this thesis consists of identifying
the variables of interest (hypothesis formation), making observations of those vari-
ables after the application of a particular process, testing the signi¯cance of the
observations and revising, accepting or rejecting the hypothesis. Additionally, it is
necessary to establish the periodicity with which the data will be collected and the
frequency with which the experiments will run. Thus, designing an experiment is
categorised by the following items that will be dealt in turn.
1. Experimental procedure,
2. Simulation or dependent variables,
3. Experimental or independent variables and
4. Hypothesis formation
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Experimental procedure. This describes in detail the procedure for per-
forming and analysing the experiments. In the context of this thesis, the exper-
imental procedure captures the agent's reasoning which varies from modelling a
new feature (e.g., whether an agent possesses learning abilities or not), changing
a particular process (e.g., when agents use alternative decision making processes
for bidding) or introducing a new variable or parameter (e.g., when the decision
making procedures incorporate a new factor in their formulation). In particular,
the main interest in this case is the observation of the procedures that model the
agent's decision making about the dynamic selection of coordination mechanisms.
Simulation variables. These summarise the attributes and properties of the
environment in which the experimental procedure is tested. The simulation vari-
ables are given speci¯c values to de¯ne a particular instantiation of a scenario.
Thus, it could be said that the domain in which the simulation's variables take
their values generates all possible scenarios. Additionally, these variables can be
thought of as the static (because once the value is set, it remains unchanged in
a particular experiment) and dependent variables. In this context, there are two
kinds of simulation variables, those related with the scenario itself and those re-
lated to the agent reasoning. Examples of the former are the total number of time
steps (duration time) the experiment is going to run, the grid size and the reward
associated to the CT. Examples of the latter include the speci¯c characteristics of
the CM, the alternative ways in which the decision making procedures are used
and the elements taken into consideration in such decisions.
In general terms, there are two main classes of experiments used in this thesis
to validate hypotheses. The ¯rst class corresponds to those experiments that
provide evidence of how a particular procedure behaves in a variety of situations
and is achieved by ¯xing the experimental procedure of interest and changing the
scenarios (a combination of simulation variables). The second class are those that
indicate the bene¯ts of alternative agent behaviours and these are accomplished by
having a scenario with ¯xed features and varying the experimental procedure. For
instance, testing whether an agent that dynamically selects its CM performs the
best in all situations is an example of the former class of experiment (the agent's
behaviour is ¯xed and the grid sizes and CT reward are explored). In contrast,
probing whether a learning agent performs better than a non-learning one in a
speci¯c scenario is an example of the latter (here the agent's behaviour corresponds
to a learning and a non-learning agent and there is one set environment).Chapter 6 Evaluation Methodology 88
In more detail, Table 6.1 presents the simulation variables and their assigned
values for most of the experiments used in this thesis. Unless otherwise speci¯ed,
these values are used in all the hypothesis tested in this thesis.
Simulation Variable Value
Number of simulation runs over which the data is
collected.
10
Duration of time. Number of time steps in a given
simulation run (horizon)
10,000
Size of Grid [N £ M] [10 £ 10]
Number of agents in the environment 5
Number of Cooperative Tasks in the grid at any
one time
1
Maximum number of agents needed to achieve a
CT (m)
3
Reward of a single CT instance (R) 20
Reward of single ST instance (S) 1
Number of CMs an agent knows about 5
Probability of success and number of time steps
to set up in a given CM=(t;p)
CM1=(0,0.6)
CM2=(15,0.7)
CM3=(30,0.8)
CM4=(45,0.9)
CM5=(60,1.0)
Willingness factor for a single agent (!) 1.0
Table 6.1: Simulation Variables
On the basis of these variables, it is important to note that the main conclusions
regarding the e±cacy of the dynamic selection of CMs (see Chapter 7) test the
whole range of possible settings for the key simulation variables. The values intro-
duced here simply indicate the situation in which the experimental procedures are
tested in a ¯xed environment. In such cases, some assignments need additional
explanation. For instance, to set the duration variable, a utility rate (the agents'
total reward divided by the horizon) was calculated for the experiment where the
duration was varied from 10,000 to 100,000 time units. The statistical measures of
the utility rate in this case had a standard deviation of 2.10E-02 and a variance of
8.11E-04. Given this result, it was concluded that the duration of the experiment
in this range does not have a signi¯cant e®ect on the rate of utility since regardless
of the horizon, the utility rate is maintained. Therefore the lower level was used
since this meant the experiments could be conducted more quickly. The same
result was obtained with ANOVA; in this test, the hypothesis of equal means of
the utility rate given alternative duration times was accepted. Although most ofChapter 6 Evaluation Methodology 89
the fundamental exploration regarding the variable setting was performed using
the methodology described here, those results are not reported because this thesis
only describes the experiments and hypothesis used to make relevant conclusions.
With respect to the CMs, these were chosen to be consistent with the observations
that there is no best CM and the CMs more likely to succeed take longer to set
up (see Chapter 1).
Experimental Variables. These describe the data of interest; that is, the
data that should be examined and measured from the scenario. In the context
of this thesis, this means focusing on the speci¯c variables that show the agent's
performance. These are generally concerned with measuring how much an agent's
individual utility is improved by an enhancement of the model 1. To this end,
the main experimental variables are speci¯ed in Table 6.2 and, as can be seen,
these measure how much the agents' performance improves depending on a speci¯c
environment or a re¯ned ability. All experimental variables are calculated by
averaging the totals obtained by all simulations and by all agents in the system.
Thus, for example, the TCT achieved is the average number of CT tasks achieved
by the agents in the system.
Experimental Variable
Variable Description
AU Total Agent Reward obtained from the
accomplishment of its ST and CT tasks
(termed Agent Utility).
TCT Total number of CTs accomplished by an
agent.
AiS Total agent reward obtained by agents in
the Agent-in-ST role.
AiC Total agent reward obtained by agents in
the Agent-in-Charge role.
AiCoop Total agent reward obtained by agents in
the Agent-in-Cooperation role.
Table 6.2: Experimental Variables
Hypothesis formation. This consists of identifying a claim to direct the
experimentation. Hypotheses are formulated based on the experimental variables
to test the execution of a particular experimental procedure under a particular
1Notice that some experimental variables are only used in some of the experimental pro-
cedures. For instance, in the case of °exible commitment varying penalties (Chapter 8) it is
necessary to introduce new simulation variables and, correspondingly, new experimental vari-
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environment. Recalling the examples of the two classes of experiments, the ¯rst one
could test the hypothesis of whether the TCT (experimental variable) is constant
when agents dynamically select the CMs in all possible scenarios (varying the
simulation variables of grid sizes (simulation variable [N £M], CT reward, etc.)).
On the other hand, the example of the second class of experiments could verify
whether the AU (experimental variable) obtained by learning agents is the same
as that obtained by non-learning ones (alternative experimental procedures) in a
¯xed environment (¯xed setting of simulation variables).
6.1 Evaluating hypotheses
Given the above, designing an experiment consists of formulating and testing hy-
potheses taking into account data collected (from experimental variables) as the
result of the application of the experimental procedures to particular scenarios
(combination of values of simulation variables). In other words, the execution of
an experimental procedure in a speci¯c scenario generates a set of values for the
experimental variables that can be analysed under the same circumstances and
situations in order to probe hypotheses.
The basic idea of testing a hypothesis consists of comparing the means (from
the experimental variables of the sample) and supporting a hypothesis by a certain
con¯dence level. Formally speaking, the procedure is the following (Cohen, 1995;
Ott & Mendenhall, 1995; Lane, 2001):
1. Formulate a hypothesis (termed the null hypothesis and represented by H0)
2. Show that the probability (p) of obtaining a given result given H0 is above a
certain threshold (this threshold is known as the signi¯cance level and 0.05
is the standard measure associated to it 2)
3. Conclude H0 (with a percentage of con¯dence level)
By means of an example, assume that the hypothesis to test that the AU ob-
tained by procedures A and B are the same (to clarify the description think of
2The signi¯cance level is used to compute the con¯dence level. This con¯dence level equals
100*(1-signi¯cance level), or in other words, a signi¯cance level of 0.05 indicates a 95 percent of
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A as the procedure that represents a learning agent and B a non learning one).
Thus, testing the hypothesis consists of the following steps:
1. H0: AUA=AUB
3.
2. Assume that the result of the statistical test applied is p = 0.980 (using a
signi¯cance level of 0.05)
3. Hypothesis H0 is then accepted and it can be concluded that H0 is certain
with a 95% of con¯dence level. Being more precise, it can be said that
learning and non learning agents perfom the same with a 95% con¯dence
level.
Following the above example, the null hypothesis is de¯ned (step 1) and tested
with ANOVA (step 2). If it reveals that the di®erences among means are signi¯cant
(the value of p is less than 0.05) then the hypothesis of equal means is rejected
or, in the contrary case, the hypothesis is accepted. That is, if the hypothesis is
accepted (step 3), it means that there is no evidence to accept the proposition that
the experimental procedure (A or B) has any e®ect on the independent variables
(AU).
ANOVA explains the relationships between groups by analysing all possible
interactions among them. However, though it provides an answer to the hypo-
thetical questions by indicating if the mean of the groups are equal or not, it does
not indicate which groups are better (for example, if AUA > AUB). Thus, in most
cases, it is necessary to go a step further (post-analysis) to determine where the
exact di®erences among the means occur between groups. This procedure consists
of running a post-test to explore the data collected on a case by case basis (this
is termed pairwise analysis) because it tests the di®erence between each pair of
means 4. This pairwise analysis is particularly important in those cases where
more than two procedures are being tested (or one procedure is tested in more
than two scenarios). For example, to test whether A, B, C and D perform the
same, H0 is rejected if the equality of means is not maintained. However, this
says nothing about how A compares with B, C and D, nor B with A, C and D,
3Throughout this thesis the convention of using the element of comparison as the subindex
is followed. In this example, A and B represent the experimental procedures.
4Several statistical tests exist to perform this analysis. The one used here is called Tukey's
honestly signi¯cant di®erence (HSD). This was chosen because it lies in the middle of the spec-
trum of alternatives; between LSD (which stands for least signi¯cant di®erences) and Sche®¶ e
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and so on. In concrete terms, the post-test makes a comparison between the data
collected and builds groups (as many as necessary) that have statistically homoge-
neous values. Each group is generated with an associated value (the p value) that
indicates the degree of con¯dence from which each group was built (the higher the
number (in a range of 0.0 to 1.0), the greater the con¯dence in the grouping). For
example, Table 6.4 shows the result of this cluster analysis. Here, three groups
were generated (labelled 1,2 and 3) and the respective p values were 1.000, 0.8728
and 0.9959.
6.2 Example: Testing hypotheses
To clarify the methodology, assume there are ¯ve agents (A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5),
each of which has at its disposal di®erent CMs (i.e. A1 has CM1, A2 has CM2, and
so on). The agent's performance is evaluated by the experimental variable AU in
a speci¯c environment de¯ned by CT reward of 10 and a grid size of [5 £ 5] with
the following hypothesis formulation:
H0: the AU obtained by A1 is the same as that obtained by A2, A3, A4 and A5
in a given environment.
CT reward=10 [M £ N]=[5 £ 5]
Hypothesis to evaluate p Outcome
H0: AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4=AUA5 0.000 Rejected
Table 6.3: Example: result of ANOVA.
The result of ANOVA (Table 6.3) shows a signi¯cant e®ect on the AU given
the environment (p value is 0.000 and H0 is rejected). This result means that
the agents' performance does indeed have a statistically signi¯cant e®ect on the
AU obtained. However, apart from knowing that the hypothesis is rejected it is
not possible to know about how the various kinds of agents compare relative to
each other. Thus, Table 6.4 shows the groups formed by the post-analysis test.
Here, three groups were formed and the agents in each group can be regarded
as having broadly the same level of performance. However, each group indicates
that though agents perform more or less the same, the data obtained by each
group has a statistically signi¯cant di®erence from the others. Additionally, by
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a dominant performance 5) are A3 and A1. The second best performing group is
A4 and A5 and the worst performance was obtained by A2. In general, such a
full justi¯cation needs to accompany each hypothesis test. Thus, in this case, it is
necessary to explain why A1 and A3 have similar performance characteristics and
why these lead to them to be more successful than the next group of agents.
Agent AU
1 2 3
A2 3266.3
A5 3337.7
A4 3353.3
A1 3794.3
A3 3800.3
p 1.000 0.8728 0.9959
Table 6.4: Example: post-analysis of ANOVA
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Figure 6.1: Example: Agents' performance.
Although Table 6.4 clari¯es the results obtained with ANOVA, in some exper-
iments in this thesis, ¯gures and graphs are used instead of this post-analysis.
The reason for this is because in these cases the ¯gures more clearly present the
results obtained. For example, Figure 6.1 shows the same information as that of
Table 6.4 (but using a bar graph). It is important to emphasise the fact that
graphs might be used to make conclusions (for example, to locate the agents with
best performance) in a graphical way (as a replacement of the post-analysis) not
5Dominant behaviour in the context of this thesis means that one agent has an AU value that
is higher by a statistically signi¯cant amount than the others.Chapter 6 Evaluation Methodology 94
as a substitute for ANOVA. The problem of using graphs as the only mechanism
to draw conclusions is that it is not straightforward to detect all the details ob-
tained with the post-analysis and, more importantly, it is not obvious whether
the hypothesis might be rejected or accepted. For example, by looking at Figure
6.1, it is not graphically obvious that there are three groups with di®erent levels of
performance (as indicated by Table 6.4). In short, ANOVA evaluates the hypothe-
ses and provides statistical measures with a degree of con¯dence about rejecting
or accepting the hypothesis, and after that a post-analysis or a graph is used to
understand and justify the results.
Moreover, to facilitate the task of testing hypothesis, a statistical software,
SPSS for Windows 6, has been used to undertake all the fundamental explorations
and to draw the conclusions reported in this research. This is particularly im-
portant in the scenario used in this thesis because the number of simulation and
experimental variables represented by environmental factors and the agent's rea-
soning features are large.
6SPSS Inc. Chicago, Illinois (1999). SPSS for Windows release 10.5.5.Chapter 7
Decision Making Evaluation
Having presented the basic formal framework in Chapter 4, this chapter deals
with its evaluation according to the methodology described in Chapter 6. In par-
ticular, this chapter concentrates predominantly on the fundamental hypothesis
underlying this thesis; namely that being able to select the CM at run-time is
bene¯cial. It also explores the impact of the model's main parameters on the
performance of the individual agents. Subsequent chapters (8 and 9 respectively)
deal with the evaluation of extensions to the basic model with respect to °exible
commitments and penalties and with respect to learning. Additional experimen-
tation focusing on several heterogeneous aspects and their impact on the agent's
performance is detailed in Appendix A.
7.1 Experimental setting
The experiments were set-up using the values speci¯ed in Table 6.1. The experi-
mental variables were the size of the grid and the reward for CTs. The variables
that measure the agent's e®ectiveness are: AU and TCT. Moreover, in some ex-
periments it is interesting to observe the reward an agent obtains in each of its
di®erent roles: AiS, AiC and AiCoop (see Table 6.2 to recall the description of the
experimental variables).
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7.2 Selecting di®erent CMs
The ¯rst thing to test is that agents do indeed select di®erent CMs in di®erent
circumstances. To this end, Figure 7.1 shows which CMs were selected in which
grid position. Here, the grid size was [20 £ 20] (the remaining three quadrants
are simply a mirror of the upper left portion shown) and the reward for CTs
is 10. In the centre of the grid, [10;10], the agents choose CMs that minimise
the set up cost (even though they have a signi¯cant chance of failing to ensure
coordination). However, as the agents move further away from the centre, so they
increasingly prefer mechanisms that are more likely to succeed (even though they
have a correspondingly higher set up cost). The explanation for this behaviour
is that as the distance from the centre increases, so does the expected time for
another agent to reach the CT square. Thus, to justify its choice of a CT over its
ST, the AiC needs to ensure that the cooperations it does enter into do succeed.
Whereas, towards the centre of the grid, the time the AiC typically has to wait
for another agent to arrive is much smaller and so it can a®ord to have more
cooperations fail. In between are the points where success and set up time are
traded o®. Figure 7.2 shows the corresponding expected utility for the various CMs
(ave surplus, equation (4.5)). Notice that the CM's surplus expectation decreases
as the agent moves away from the center of the grid.
y 
1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
2 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4
3 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4
4 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 3
5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
6 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2
7 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2
8 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2
9 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1
10 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1
x 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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y #
1 2.20 2.41 2.59 2.74 2.88 2.99 3.08 3.15 3.20 3.22
2 2.41 2.61 2.79 2.95 3.08 3.20 3.29 3.36 3.41 3.43
3 2.59 2.79 2.97 3.13 3.26 3.38 3.48 3.55 3.60 3.63
4 2.74 2.95 3.13 3.29 3.43 3.55 3.65 3.73 3.78 3.81
5 2.88 3.08 3.26 3.43 3.58 3.70 3.81 3.89 3.94 3.97
6 2.99 3.30 3.38 3.55 3.70 3.84 3.94 4.02 4.08 4.11
7 3.08 3.29 3.48 3.65 3.81 3.94 4.05 4.14 4.20 4.23
8 3.15 3.36 3.55 3.73 3.89 4.02 4.14 4.23 4.28 4.31
9 3.20 3.41 3.60 3.78 3.94 4.08 4.20 4.28 4.34 4.38
10 3.22 3.43 3.63 3.81 3.97 4.11 4.23 4.31 4.38 4.41
x ! 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 7.2: CM's expected utility in the terrain map.
7.3 Amount of cooperation
To measure the number of times that coordination is attempted, Figure 7.3 shows
the number of cooperative tasks achieved (TCT) by an agent as a function of the
reward for achieving a CT and the grid size. The ¯gure shows that once the reward
for CTs is su±ciently high (above 4 in this case) then CTs start getting initiated
(i.e. this value is needed before ave surplus becomes positive). At the same time,
the TCT increases as the grid size decreases because in small grids agents simply
have more chance of ¯nding the CT.
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Figure 7.3: TCT achieved per agent
However, it is important to notice that the combination of size of grid and CTChapter 7 Decision Making Evaluation 98
reward does have an implication on the selection of the CM and, consequently, on
the number of CTs achieved. In the [5 £ 5] grid, for example, the TCT declines
when the CT reward is higher than 40. This is because although the agents initiate
coordination in exactly the same circumstances, they select a CM that takes more
time to set up 1. The reason for this behaviour is that since the reward is so high,
the agents select a CM that guarantees success, regardless of the time invested.
As they spend more time establishing coordination, they have less opportunity
to ¯nd CTs and so with a ¯xed time horizon they achieve fewer CTs. Similar
behaviour is observed in the other grid sizes, although the CT reward level at
which coordination starts and the level at which the number of CTs achieved
starts to fall obviously varies. While Figure 7.3 indicates how often the agents
cooperated, Figure 7.4 shows how pro¯table those decisions are. It is clear that
the AU decreases as the grid size increases. Again this is simply because the agents
have less opportunity to engage in CTs. Following the same example of the [5£5]
grid, it is observed that the agent's utility stops increasing when the CT reward
is above 40. Once again, this is explained by the fact that agents do not engage
in coordination as often as they do with smaller values of CT reward.
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1Being precise, agents in this situation selected the ¯ve CMs in the following grid positions:
y 
1 4 3 2 3 4
2 3 1 1 1 3
3 2 1 1 1 2
4 3 1 1 1 3
5 4 3 2 3 4
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Finally, to have a better understanding of the model as a whole it is important
to generalise the results discussed regarding the selection of a CM. To do this,
the best performance of an agent that has only a single CM at its disposal is
compared with that of an agent that has the set of CMs at its disposal. First,
the best performing CM in a given environment needs to be determined. This is
achieved by giving each of the agents in the system a single CM (the same one for
each agent) and measuring the average AU. This is repeated for each CM. Then,
the system is run with each agent having the full set of CM at their disposal. The
arithmetic di®erence between the best performing single CM agent and the agent
with the full set of CMs is then calculated. Here, this di®erence is termed the error
rate. Now in environments where there is a higher error rate (see Figure 7.5 which
shows the error distribution per grid size and CT reward 2) are those in which it is
most likely that there is a single agent with a particular CM which obtains better
AU than that obtained by the agents with the whole set of CMs at their disposal. In
precise terms, an agent with a single CM obtained a better AU in the environments
with higher error rates values. Thus, higher discrepancies are situated in smaller
grids and when there are higher CT rewards. These observations corroborate the
results illustrated in Figures 7.3 and 7.4 where the zones in which AU drastically
declined are the ones with higher error rates. Less marked di®erences in others
zones of the same ¯gures are again validated by the error rates values.
5
x
5
1
0
x
1
0
1
5
x
1
5
2
0
x
2
0
2
5
x
2
5
3
0
x
3
0
3
5
x
3
5
4
0
x
4
0
4
5
x
4
5
5
0
x
5
0
CT=10
CT=20
CT=30
CT=40
CT=50
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
E
r
r
o
r
 
r
a
t
e
Grid size
Cooperative Task 
Reward
0.5-0.6
0.4-0.5
0.3-0.4
0.2-0.3
0.1-0.2
0-0.1
Figure 7.5: Cases in which dynamic selection is more e®ective.
2Given the results obtained, higher error rates are above 0.3 and lower ones are below this
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7.4 Willingness to cooperate
The ¯nal key determinant of the amount of cooperation that occurs in the system
is the WtC factor (experimental variable) 3. To this end, Figure 7.6 shows the
e®ect of this factor (the reward for CTs is here taken to be 10 and the grid size is
[20£20]) on the cooperative tasks accomplished. As expected, the more greedy the
agents become (increasing !), the fewer CTs that get initiated and achieved. The
same ¯gure also illustrates the relation between the TCT achieved and the agent's
reward. In this scenario, the more CTs that are accomplished, the more AU that is
gained. However, this hides the fact that the various constituents that go towards
making AU vary in their relative importance as ! changes. This is because ! a®ects
the amount asked to become an AiCoop (equation (4.6)) and, consequently, the
surplus available for the AiC (equation (4.5)). Thus, for instance, the more sel°ess
an agent becomes, the more reward is gained through the AiC role (the percentage
of reward obtained by the AiC and AiCoop roles with ! = 0:25 was 97% and 3%
respectively). On the other hand, the more greedy the agents become, the higher
the percentage that is obtained by being AiCoop (with ! = 3:0, AiC received
69% of the reward gained through cooperative situations and 31% through being
AiCoop).
3200
3300
3400
3500
3600
3700
3800
3900
4000
4100
0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 2.25 2.5 2.75 3
Willingness factor
A
g
e
n
t
 
U
t
i
l
i
t
y
 
(
A
U
)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
C
T
s
 
a
c
c
o
m
p
l
i
s
h
e
d
 
(
T
C
T
)
AiCoop
AiC
AiS
Figure 7.6: Willingness to Cooperate (!).
3Appendix A explores the e®ect of having agents with di®erent dispositions to cooperation
(varying ! factor) in the same simulation run.Chapter 7 Decision Making Evaluation 101
7.5 E®ectiveness of the agent's decision making
Having analysed the e®ect of the decision making framework's basic parameters,
it is now time to consider the impact of being able to dynamically select a CM
that is deemed to be appropriate to the prevailing circumstances. This time the
performance of an agent that employs a single CM is contrasted with the agent
that has the full range of CMs at its disposal. Note that in this experiment
the key element is that agents with di®erent CMs share the environment in a
given simulation run 4. Thus, A1 only has the CM1(0;0:6) to select from, A2 the
CM2(15;0:7), A4 the CM4(45;0:9), A5 the CM5(60;1:0), and As the whole set of
CMs 5.
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Figure 7.7: Agent Utility: Dynamic versus static selection of CMs.
Figure 7.7 presents the average utility of agents in the environment (AU) and
that obtained by As (AUs) for varying grid sizes and CT's reward. In general, it can
4In the comparison performed at the end of Section 7.3, in a given simulation run, all the
agents had the same CM at their disposal. Thus, for example, all the agents had only CM1 or
only CM2, whereas in this scenario one agent has CM1, another has CM2 and so on.
5Note that CM3(30;0:8) was not associated to any agent. This is because it was decided to
maintain a constant number of agents in the environment (for reasons of comparison) rather
than change the experimental settings. CM3 was omitted because it lies in the middle of the
range. However, the same experimentation as described here was performed with each of the
CMs missing. Although the number of cases rejected were di®erent in each case, the general
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be seen that As obtains higher utility than the corresponding average of the agents.
This improvement is due to the fact that As not only attempts coordination more
frequently, but that it also makes the right decision about which CM to select.
Further support for this conclusion can be obtained by observing Figure 7.8. This
shows the TCT achieved by the agents that have a single CM to select from and
the agent that has the set of CMs (TCTs). Here, in most cases, it can be seen that
TCTs is larger than the corresponding TCT. Moreover, in cases where As obtains
a similar number of CTs to its counterpart (for example, CT reward of 40 and grid
size of [10£10]) the AU is higher (the AUs represented by dotted lines are superior
to the corresponding solid ones). Regarding the total amount of cooperation in
this experiment, the TCT achieved is substantially lower than that reported in
Section 7.3. This is because agents attempt coordination based on their particular
CM and each of them starts coordinating in di®erent places and with a di®erent
reward level for the CT. Thus the coordination activity is simply less frequent.
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Figure 7.8: TCT achieved. Dynamic vs static selection of CMs.
Turning again to the agent's utility presented in Figure 7.7, AUs does not ap-
pear to dominate the corresponding AU. This begs the question, does As's AU have
a statistically signi¯cant dominance over that of the other agents? To answer this,
and to analyse the bene¯ts of As in detail, the evaluation methodology introduced
in Chapter 6 is employed to test hypotheses. This time the evaluation focuses on
the variable AU since this measures how much the agents' performance improvesChapter 7 Decision Making Evaluation 103
depending on a speci¯c environment. Thus, to evaluate the claim about the ben-
e¯ts of dynamically selecting the CM, the following hypothesis (H0) needs to be
tested for each agent, in each environment (de¯ned by a speci¯c CT reward and
a grid size), using ANOVA.
H0: the AU obtained by As in a given environment is the same as that obtained
by A1, A2, A4 and A5.
CT reward=10 [M £ N]=[5 £ 5]
Hypothesis to evaluate p Outcome
H0: AUA1=AUA2=AUAs=AUA4=AUA5 0.000 Rejected
Table 7.1: Agent's performance: result of ANOVA.
To start with, Table 7.1 shows the result of evaluating H0 in an environment
with a CT reward of 10 and a grid size of [5 £ 5]. Intuitively, it is expected that
there will be a di®erent level of performance from the agents that have only one
CM to select from and the agent that has a set to select from. The ANOVA result
is that the hypothesis is rejected (p < 0.05) meaning that the agents' performance
does indeed have a statistically signi¯cant e®ect on the AU obtained. To justify
this result, Table 7.2 shows the groups formed by the post-analysis. The ¯rst thing
to notice is that As and A1 are the agents that perform best (they have the highest
AU values). This is because, in this environment, the less time that is invested in
setting up a CM, the better (because the agents have more opportunity to ¯nd
CTs). Both A1 and As use the CM that takes the least time to set up (thus,
As selects CM1 all of the time).
However a good coordination decision maker has to balance the time invested
in a CT through the CM selected and the ¯nal reward obtained. Thus, to validate
this reasoning, it is important to know the total number of CTs achieved by each
agent. This is shown in Figure 7.9. From this, it can be seen that A1 and As did
accomplish the most CTs and this corresponds with the reward they obtained.
The second best performing group was A4 and A5 which have the CMs with the
longest time to set up. However from Figure 7.9 it can be seen that they did not
accomplish any CTs. Instead, they use their time accomplishing STs. This shows
that the agent's decision making about when to attempt coordination (and when
not to) is as important as selecting the right CM. Thus, A4 and A5 gained more
AU by not attempting coordination than they would have done by attempting it.
Finally, the worst performance was by A2 which attempted coordination some ofChapter 7 Decision Making Evaluation 104
the time and achieved some CTs, but the reward it gained was not signi¯cant
enough to make a di®erence in its AU 6.
Agent AU
1 2 3
A2 3266.3
A5 3337.7
A4 3353.3
A1 3794.3
As 3800.3
p 1.000 0.8728 0.9959
Table 7.2: Agent's performance: post-analysis.
In summary, the post-analysis indicates that the best performance is obtained
by the agents which, on the one hand, gain the reward which justi¯es the time
they invest on the cooperative tasks and, on the other, ensures that this reward is
better than that they could have obtained by achieving STs alone and having no
cooperative attitude.
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Figure 7.9: Dynamic selection of CMs.
Having shown the bene¯ts of dynamically selecting CMs in one speci¯c envi-
ronment, the next step is to evaluate how this generalises to other environments.
6Notice that the agents' reward obtained is in°uenced by the probability of success of the
CM which represents the ¯nal reward the agents obtain as a percentage of the CT reward.
Thus, it can be seen that the number of CTs accomplished gives an indication of the agent's
overall performance, but it does not necessarily follow that agents will be more productive if
they accomplish more CTs.Chapter 7 Decision Making Evaluation 105
In this case, 90 di®erent environments are considered; these have CT rewards in
the range of [10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50] (9 cases) and grid sizes in the range
of [5 £ 5], [10 £ 10], [15 £ 15], [20 £ 20], [25 £ 25], [30 £ 30], [35 £ 35], [40 £ 40],
[45£45], [50£50] (10 cases). To do this, the same statistical test is re-applied to
each di®erent environment. The premise is that the various single CM agents will
perform well in di®erent environments, but As will perform at least as well as (if
not better than) the best of the others in all cases. Being more precise, the aim
is to ¯nd those environments in which H0 is rejected 7 and then check using the
post-analysis test in each environment whether As belongs to the group with the
best performance (called the winner group hereafter).
The results are as follows. Firstly, there were 55 cases in which H0 was rejected
and 35 cases in which it was accepted. This means that 61% of the time dynami-
cally selecting CMs had a signi¯cant e®ect on the AU in a given environment. In
more detail, Figure 7.10 (left section) shows the number of times that each agent
belongs to the winner group. The results are grouped by CT reward (i.e. CT=10
represents the group of 10 environments (of di®erent grid sizes) in which CT was
10). Figure 7.10 (right section) shows the same information in percentage terms.
These results show that As obtained a statistically signi¯cant better performance
than the other agents (61% of the time), A5 did this 44% of the time and so on.
This provides the evidence of the fact that As has the dominant behaviour over
the other agents in most of the environments.
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Figure 7.10: Cases in which the various agents' AU appeared in the winner group.
7Recall that the cases in which H0 was accepted are those environments in which there is no
signi¯cant e®ect of the AU obtained by any agent.Chapter 7 Decision Making Evaluation 106
While previous ¯gures demonstrate As's dominance over the other agents, they
do not show in which environments the di®erent CMs are dominant. Again, taking
the CT reward of 10 as an example, Table 7.3 presents the winner agents on a
per environment basis 8. From this it is clear that the CMs with lower times
to set up (those associated with A1 and A2) are selected in smaller grids, while
the CMs with higher values are selected in bigger grids. From the same table,
it is also possible to observe the grid sizes in which the agents' selections do not
have any e®ect on the AU (those in which H0 was accepted). This ¯gure helps
clearly illustrate (as previously discussed in Section 7.2) that the combination of
CT reward and grid size has an e®ect on the agents' CM selection. Though the
¯gure shows only a few of the environments, the same pattern is followed in the
remaining environments. Thus, there are some environments in which some CMs
are preferred over others and other environments in which there is no signi¯cant
di®erence on the CM selection. However, what is more important is the fact that
even though the situations in which some CMs are preferred over others (given
the current constituent values of the CMs) are recognised, what has been shown
is that As obtains a consistently better performance than the other agents.
CT reward = 10
Grid size A1 A2 As A4 A5
[5 £ 5] 1 1
[10 £ 10] 1 1 1
[15 £ 15] 1 1 1 1
[20 £ 20]
[25 £ 25]
[30 £ 30] 1 1 1 1
[35 £ 35] 1 1 1
[40 £ 40] 1 1 1 1 1
[45 £ 45]
[50 £ 50] 1 1 1 1
Table 7.3: Distribution of cases in which various agents belong to the winner
group.
8Since the post-analysis generates groups with inferior and superior thresholds, it is possible
to have agents belonging to more than one group (i.e. some AU values might belong to two
groups). The results presented here take into account all the members of the winner group
regardless of whether some of their AU values are closer to the superior limit of the subsequent
group.Chapter 7 Decision Making Evaluation 107
7.6 Discussion
The experimentation presented in this chapter con¯rms the motivating hypothesis
of this thesis that agents do indeed perform better if they have the chance to
select their CMs at run-time. However, some of the results show that agents do
not always take the best decision about which CM to select. In Figure 7.3, for
example, the agents' TCT drops when the CT reward is 45 or 50 in a [5 £ 5]
grid. This occurs because in some grid positions the agents chose a CM other
than CM1, which was selected for the lower values of CT reward 9. This could
be seen as the wrong choice because the agents would have achieved a higher
number of CTs (around 1,170) by selecting CM1 in all grid positions and they
could have obtained greater reward (10,500 and 12,000 approximately) than they
actually did. In such circumstances, it is emphasised that the agent's decisions
are based on uncertain and estimated information about the environment and the
other agents. In this particular case, when agents are at the edges of the grid,
they assume that it is going to take a long time for the AiCoops to arrive or for
them to gain enough reward to recover the investment (even though this is not the
case in practice). To improve the e®ectiveness of the decision making framework,
in accordance with the analysis of °exibility of Chapter 2, a number of extensions
are proposed:
Deal more °exibly with commitments. In the basic model, once agents commit
to a task they remain committed until that task has completed. To increase
°exibility agents should be allowed to drop commitments if better oppor-
tunities present themselves and they should be able to deal with di®erent
types of sanctions associated with such decommits.
Endow agents with adaptive decision making abilities. In the basic model, the
agents select the coordination mechanism solely on the basis of the expected
surplus of each CM at its disposal. To enable agents to operate more e®ec-
tively, they should be endowed with the capabilities of learning which CMs
to select given speci¯c environmental situations.
Allow agents to construct simple models of their collaboration context. In the basic
model, agents make decisions based on their assumptions of other agents and
the environment. If these assumptions can be made closer to the actuality of
9Recall the position in which the particular CMs were selected as illustrated in footnote 1 of
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the other agents' behaviour, then the decision making should be improved.
Thus, there is a need to explore the bene¯ts of an agent learning, acquiring
or re¯ning the key factors of their collaborators upon which coordination
decisions are taken.
To this end, Chapter 8 extends the basic model in terms of dealing more °exibly
with commitments and penalties and Chapter 9 deals with making the decision
model adaptive. Both chapters ¯rst outline their extensions to the basic model
and then empirically evaluate their e®ect on the agents' performance.Chapter 8
Flexible Commitments and
Penalties
This chapter discusses the introduction of new decision procedures to deal with
the dropping of contracts in order to better exploit new coordination opportuni-
ties. The motivating hypothesis is that enabling agents to dynamically set and
re-assess both their degree of commitment to one another and the sanctions for
decommitment according to their prevailing circumstances will make the coordina-
tion more e®ective (see the discussions in Sections 2.2.3 and 7.6). This hypothesis
is evaluated, empirically, by considering agents that undertake actions with vary-
ing degrees of commitments and that have varying types of sanctions imposed
whenever they renege.
The ability to renege upon commitments and to claim di®erent types of redress
impacts the decision making behaviour of both the AiCs and the AiCoops. In the
former case, agents need to be able to attend to and recover from the situation
when one of the AiCoops decommits. In the latter case, AiCoops have to assess
opportunities to increase their utility by moving to more pro¯table CTs whenever
they are found. To this end, to give maximum °exibility in coordination, agents
require the ability to make agreements that involve di®erent levels of commitment
and di®erent types of penalties (as motivated in Section 2.2.3). In particular, three
types of commitment are considered 1:
1These types of commitments can be considered to cover the full range of possibilities with
respect to degree of commitment level. Total and Loose are the end points and Partial covers all
possibilities inbetween. In particular, Partial commitment of 0% is equivalent to Total commit-
ment and Partial commitment of 100% is equivalent to Loose commitment
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² Total: Once an agent accepts a contract to achieve a CT, it cannot renege
upon it (as per the basic model outlined in Chapter 4).
² Loose: An agent always drops a commitment if it ¯nds a better option.
² Partial: Agents commit to achieve a CT, but with a percentage of probability
they can drop this commitment if they ¯nd a better CT to pursue. For
example, if an agent has a commitment level of 50%, then half the time it
¯nds a better CT it will cancel and half the time it will continue with its
current agreement.
Associated with the dropping of commitment is the use of a penalty model to
compensate the agents that remain in the CT. Penalty payments are made each
time an agent cancels a commitment and they are paid to the AiC (see Section 8.1
for details). Here the following types of penalty are analysed:
² Fixed: The amount is ¯xed at design time and is unrelated to the current
coordination context. For example, whenever an agent decommits, it pays a
¯xed pre-established amount.
² Partially Sanctioned: The amount is speci¯ed in the contract when it is agreed.
The actual fee depends on the state of the coordination activity and its
participants, and the AiC's estimate of the pro¯t that it will receive. For
example, an agent could establish larger amounts in situations in which
commitments are often dropped, whereas it could use lower values when
agents remain committed most of the time.
² Sunk Cost: The amount is based on the e®ort that has been invested in the
CT to date; thus, if the agents are close to achieving their goal they pay a
higher fee than if the goal is some way o®. This would mean, for example,
that agents that have just started a coordination activity are more likely to
drop commitments than those that have been working on the task for a long
time.
In identifying whether a new CT is more bene¯cial than the current one, it
is rational for AiCoops to include the decommitment penalty from their existing
contract in their deliberations in order to realistically assess the new opportuni-
ties. Thus, a new CT may o®er an intrinsically higher reward than the currentChapter 8 Flexible Commitments and Penalties 111
one, but when the penalty is incorporated the agent may be better o® sticking
with its existing commitment. The protocol the agents follow (Figure 8.1) is an
updated version of the one in Figure 3.1. There are two main di®erences (those
di®erences are underlined in the referred ¯gure). Firstly, AiCoops now reason
about participating in new coordination activities when they ¯nd a CT (step [2]
second part) and when they receive new requests for coordination when they are
already engaged in a cooperative activity (step [3]). Secondly, the AiC now has to
take corrective actions when contracts are dropped (step [4]).
[1] Agents arrive at a square. If AiS arrives at its ST cell, its goal is attained,
it receives the reward and updates its goal. If AiCoop arrives at the CT
cell, it noti¯es the AiC that it has arrived. It might have to wait in the cell
until the remaining AiCoops arrive. If AiC receives con¯rmations from all
AiCoops, the CT is achieved and the rewards are paid to AiCoops.
[2] If AiS ¯nds a CT it must decide if it wants to become AiC and, if so,
which CM= (t;p) it should use. If t > 0 it must wait t time-steps before
broadcasting a request for coordination. If AiCoop finds a new CT, it must
decide if it should become AiC or continue with its present aim. If AiC ¯nds
a new CT, it ignores it.
[3] If AiS or AiCoop receive a request for coordination, they decide whether
and what to bid to participate in the CT. If AiCoop decides to submit a bid,
it factors in the penalty fee (if present) for dropping its current contract.
The AiC then evaluates all bids. If AiS's bid is accepted, it adopts CT as its
new goal. If AiCoop's bid is accepted, it drops its current contract (paying
the associated penalty to the AiC) and becomes AiCoop of the new CT.
AiC does not respond to requests for coordination.
[4] If AiC receives a decommitment message, it tries to find a replacement for
the reneging agent by reproposing the CT. If it does not receive appropri-
ate bids, it cancels the current CT by paying the contracted penalty to the
remaining AiCoops.
[5] Each agent decides on its next move according to its current goal and all
agents move simultaneously.
Figure 8.1: Decommitment protocol followed by agents.
It is now necessary to extend the agents' decision making procedures to deal
with varying commitment levels and penalties. In order to do this, the basic idea
is to use a variable that in some way models the frequency with which decommit-
ments might occur. From the AiC's point of view, if it receives a decommitment
message it has to act to recover the ongoing coordination activity and ask for the
penalty from the decommiter. If no recovery is possible, the worst case, the whole
coordination activity is ruined. This generates loses for the AiC in terms of theChapter 8 Flexible Commitments and Penalties 112
time invested and for the other participants that do not receive the payment they
were promised in their contracts. Thus, the ¯rst consequence of introducing a
level of commitment is that an agent's expected rewards must be factored by this
probability of failure. To this end, as an initial step toward having more re¯ned
methods and a better approximation of this probability of failure, the agent as-
sumes that the others' attitudes to commitment are the same as its own (i.e. an
agent that drops commitments very often will assume the rest do the same and,
correspondingly, the possibility of receiving a reward will be lower) 2.
In what follows, let the current CT be subscripted by k and the potential new
one by j. So, the probability of success (pj given a particular CMj) is a®ected by
degree commit 3. Thus, when AiC decides to attempt coordination, equation (4.3)
needs to be updated with the level of commitment in the following way 4:
ave bidj(x;y) =
r AiCoop £ ave dev(x;y)
pj £ degree commit
(8.1)
Equation (4.4) also needs to be modi¯ed because the agent needs to consider
the total cost of decommitting. This involves the agent estimating the surplus it
expects to obtain from adopting the CT, taking into account the probability of
success of the task, the probability of commitment and discounting the decommit-
ment payment, decommit costk (this includes the current contract value it expects
to receive and the penalty it has to pay), from its existing CTk, if there is one.
Thus equation ave payo® becomes:
ave payo®j(x;y) = pj £ R £ degree commit ¡ decommit costk (8.2)
Following the same reasoning, the formulation employed for deciding how much
to bid (equation (4.6)) and which bids to accept (equation (4.8)) need to be up-
dated by the degree commit and the cost of decommitment. Thus:
bidij =
ri £ deviationi
pj £ degree commit
+ decommit costk (8.3)
2This is a reasonable approximation given no additional information. This situation can
clearly be improved upon by having the agents vary this perception in the light of their actual
experience (see Section 9.2 for more details).
3This is represented as a percentage of probability that agents will renege during the course
of the coordination episode.
4Agents are assumed to be neutral with respect to their willingness to cooperate (i.e. ! = 1).
Thus, to focus only on varying commitment levels and penalties, this factor has been removed
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If the agent is AiS (rather than a AiCoop), bidij does not need to add the
decommit costk.
surplusij = pj £ R £ degree commit ¡ cost bidb ¡ r £ (tj + maxT) (8.4)
In addition to these modi¯cations, the agents now need to make decisions about
two new situations: how to set a penalty fee (Section 8.1) and when to drop a
commitment (Section 8.2).
8.1 Deciding how to set the penalty fee
The penalty fee can be set independently or dependently of the actual state of the
coordination activity. In the former case, the ¯xed penalty is set as a pre-speci¯ed
percentage (percentage penalty) of the goal reward (the CT reward) over which
the coordination activity is taking place (the actual percentage is an experimental
variable that allows penalties to be high, medium or low).
penalty ¯xedj = percentage penalty £ R
In the latter case, there are two possibilities for modelling the current state of
coordination: by considering the surplus agreed in the contract (Partially Sanc-
tioned penalty) and by incorporating a ratio of the time invested in the current
CT (Sunk Cost penalty). For Partially Sanctioned penalties, the fee is based on the
current expected surplus of the CT (again in a proportional manner). In this case,
however, the proportion is set according to the degree of commitment within the
group; if decommitment is likely, then a high penalty is set since the AiC needs
to recoup its costs in setting up and running the group (mutatis mutandis when
decommitment is unlikely).
penalty partially sanctionedj = (100 ¡ degree commit) £ surplusj
With Sunk Cost penalties, the fee is calculated with the percentage time invested
of the CT reward. In contrast to ¯xed penalties, this percentage is calculated as
a ratio of the time spent on the CT and the time that the agent believes needs to
be spent in order to complete the CT.Chapter 8 Flexible Commitments and Penalties 114
penalty sunk costj = time invested £ R
Partially Sanctioned and Sunk Cost penalties are both variable penalty cases
because the sanction changes dynamically based on the state of the coordination
activity, whereas the Fixed penalty represents a static penalty situation that is
independent of current context of the coordination activity 5.
8.2 Deciding when to drop a commitment
The introduction of loose and partial commitments allows agents to consider the
possibility of decommitting. This can occur in two situations:
² the agent may go from an AiCoop to an AiC or
² from an AiCoop on its current contract to an AiCoop on a new one (because
the bidij it proposed was accepted).
Moreover, let expected rewardk represent the reward the agent is expecting to
obtain from its current activity (this is calculated as the reward rate it will receive
from the current goal). An AiCoop will drop its current contract to become an
AiC on a new one if it ¯nds a CT such that its expected average surplus is higher
than the expected reward of its current contract 6:
ave surplusj(x;y) > expected rewardk
Similarly, an AiCoop will drop its current contract in favour of becoming the
AiCoop on a new CT if:
bidij > bidik
It is important to emphasise that ave surplus and bidij were calculated with
equations (8.3) and (8.2) incorporating the decommitment cost.
5Note that for both variable penalties there are other possible ways to use the values of
degree commit and time invested. For example, the ratio could be used to factorise either the CT
Reward, the contract value or the expected surplus. However, since this is not the main aim of
this research, only the selected methods are explored.
6Note that bidij is not used as means of comparison to maintain the same rate units.Chapter 8 Flexible Commitments and Penalties 115
8.3 Experimental evaluation
8.3.1 Experimental setting
The experiments were set-up using a single coordination mechanism CM=(1;1:0),
the reward of the CT was randomly generated in a range of [20, 40, 60], 3 CTs
were in the grid at any one time and the maximum number of agents needed
to achieve a CT was 4. The changes in the environmental set up are such that
the focus is on those aspects that are speci¯cally related to commitments and
penalties; everything else has been stripped out so that the results are not a®ected
by extraneous factors. In particular, this setting does not incorporate a variety
of coordination mechanisms because the aim is to concentrate on the particular
decision making processes related to the commitment and penalties (given that
the e®ectiveness of the dynamic selection has been demonstrated in Chapter 7).
However, to incorporate more dynamic features in the environment, the CT reward
(R) and number of agents needed (m) to achieve a CT are randomly changed
during the execution.
As previously discussed, this new setting introduces new variables in order
to analyse the percentage of commitment (degree commit) and the percentage of
¯xed penalty (Fixed) which were tested in a range of 0, 25, 50, 75 and 100%.
Correspondingly, the new experimental variables were the average penalty fee by
penalty type, the number of contracts dropped (CTs decommitted) and how many
of them were successfully recovered.
8.3.2 Results
The experiments seek to explore the following basic hypothesis: incorporating
various levels of commitment and penalties into the coordination framework will
improve the agent's e®ectiveness. The experiments address two main hypotheses
that must be tested: those that probe the e®ect of the levels of commitment and
those that deal with the e®ect of penalties. The former case is investigated ¯rst:
H1: The AU obtained by any agent role using Total commitment is the same as
that obtained by agents that use Partial or Loose commitment.
H2: The number of CTs achieved (TCT) by agents using Total commitment is
identical to that of agents that use Partial or Loose commitment.Chapter 8 Flexible Commitments and Penalties 116
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Figure 8.2: Reward distribution by agent role varying level of commitments.
Hypothesis to evaluate p Outcome
H1: AUTotal=AUPartial50%=AULoose 0.000 Rejected
H2: TCTTotal=TCTPartial50%=TCTLoose 0.000 Rejected
Table 8.1: Comparing level of commitments: result of ANOVA.
Table 8.1 shows the results for agent utility and TCT achieved for the di®erent
levels of commitment (here the penalty is set as 25% of CT reward). As can be seen,
both of the related hypotheses were rejected, meaning that the means obtained
by the di®erent levels of commitment are di®erent by a statistically signi¯cant
amount. To see how the levels compare, it is necessary to do a further analysis.
Agents with partial commitment obtained the best result with AU of 4,696.83,
while agents with Total and Loose commitments obtained values of 4,293.06 and
4,077.24 respectively. To clarify the results, Figure 8.2 shows the variance in the
reward distribution by agent for the di®erent levels of commitment. Speci¯cally,
the total reward obtained by the agents increases as they have more opportunities
for decommitment. This is because agents can drop commitments to take up
more pro¯table ones as they arise (even accounting for the fact that they have to
pay a penalty). However, looser commitments do not necessarily improve agent
performance; if agents can drop commitments easily, then a greater percentage
of started CTs fail to ¯nish because agents are continually attracted onto newer
more pro¯table activities. Thus having °exibility to drop commitments is good,
but the best performance is achieved by also having some degree of loyalty to
existing contracts. The di®erences between the various levels of commitment areChapter 8 Flexible Commitments and Penalties 117
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Figure 8.3: Contracts dropped by partial commitment grade.
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Figure 8.4: Fixed penalties.
mainly due to the CTs accomplished (H2). Here, as expected, the more CTs
agents accomplish the more reward they obtain. H2 was rejected since agents
with Partial commitment get more reward because they achieve more and more
pro¯table CTs (TCT=92.2). Thus these agents perform better on average. The
number of CTs obtained by agents that were partially committed was statistically
better than the others, TCTTotal got 78.4 and TCTLoose accomplished only 73.9.
Thus the di®erence in AUs is based on the di®erence between TCTs; Partial agents
obtain more reward than Total agents and, in the same way, Total agents gain
more than the Loose ones.Chapter 8 Flexible Commitments and Penalties 118
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Figure 8.5: Partially sanctioned penalties.
As a consequence of introducing the degree of commitment into the agent's de-
cision making procedures, agents with low levels of commitment have few opportu-
nities to ¯nd CTs with high expected surplus rewards (equations (8.1) and (8.2))
and their bids are too high to ever be contracted (equation (8.3)). Correspond-
ingly, agents with a high degree of loyalty to CTs have more chances to attempt
coordination and their bids have a higher probability of being accepted. Addi-
tionally, the degree of commitment a®ects the frequency with which agents drop
contracts, a higher degree means fewer decommitments are performed. Figure 8.3
clearly illustrates this behaviour. The number of CTs dropped by AiCoops varies
with the degree of commitment; AiCoops with a commitment level of 25%, for
example, decommit more often than those with 75%. In contrast, AiCoops with a
commitment level of 0%, decommit much less frequently (even though they have
more opportunities to do so) because their bids to participate in new CTs are too
high (as previously noted).
The second group of experiments deals with the penalty aspect of decommit-
ment decisions. Figures 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 show the e®ects of the number of contracts
decommitted using Fixed, Partially Sanctioned and Sunk Cost penalties, respectively.
With Fixed penalties, Figure 8.4 indicates that the number of contracts dropped
by AiCoops (here AiCoops have a commitment level of 50%) gradually decreases
as the penalty fee increases (because agents cannot a®ord a high penalty fee).
With Partially Sanctioned (Figure 8.5) and Sunk Cost (Figure 8.6) penalties, the
same broad trends can be observed, fewer decommitments occur with low and highChapter 8 Flexible Commitments and Penalties 119
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Figure 8.6: Sunk cost penalties.
degrees of commitments. This is because of the high penalties for decommitment
and as a consequence of the fewer opportunities to decommit that occur when an
agent has a low degree of commitment. However, both ¯gures show similar values
for the average penalty fee (second Y axis) and for the number of decommitments
performed. In short, AiCoops with lower penalties perform more decommitments
independently of the kind of sanction that is in place.
Turning now to the more interesting experiments, H3 tests the degree of im-
provement (AU) in the agents' coordination when various types of sanction are in
place.
H3: The AU obtained by AiC agents (independently of their level of commitment)
that use Sunk Cost is the same as that one obtained by agents that use
Fixed penalty (of 0% and 50%) and Partially Sanctioned penalties.
Hypothesis to evaluate (AiC agents) p Outcome
H3: AUSunkCost=AUFixed0%=AUFixed50%=AUP:Sanctioned 0.047 Rejected
Table 8.2: AiC's AU given various types of sanctions: result of ANOVA.
By observing the ANOVA result (Table 8.2) and its corresponding post-analysis
(Table 8.3), it can be seen that the kind of sanction does have an e®ect on the
AU obtained by AiC agents (H3 is rejected). Moreover, Table 8.3 indicates that the
most successful types of sanctions are the Fixed 50% and Sunk Cost. Nevertheless,
these experiments do not say with which level of commitment the agents obtainChapter 8 Flexible Commitments and Penalties 120
Kind of Sanction AU
1 2
Fixed 0% 2236.41
Partially Sanctioned 2296.68
Fixed 50% 2332.20
Sunk Cost 2391.46
p 0.3472 0.3568
Table 8.3: Type of penalty: post-analysis.
the best results. In order to do this, it is necessary to be more speci¯c and evaluate
the agent's improvement given the kind of sanction in combination with varying
levels of commitment:
H4: The AU obtained by AiC agents with a Partial level of commitment is identical
whatever kind of penalty is employed.
H5: AiCs agents that have Loose commitment with a Fixed penalty obtain the
same AU as those agents that use Sunk Cost and Partially Sanctioned penalties.
Recall that because agents with Total commitment are not a®ected by the kind
of sanction employed, there is no hypothesis associated with this type of agents.
In fact, testing the hypothesis with Total AiC agents ANOVA obtains the following
result:
Hypothesis to evaluate (Total AiC agents) p Outcome
H6: AUFixed0%=AUFixed50%=AUP:Sanctioned=AUSunkCost 1.000 Accepted
Table 8.4: AiC's AU with Total commitment: result of ANOVA.
Table 8.5 shows the result of testing H4 and H5 in terms of the AiC total
reward with respect to commitment level and penalty type. As can be seen, the
type of penalty employed by Loose agents does not a®ect the AiC reward obtained
(meaning H5 is accepted). However, H4 is rejected because there is a signi¯cant
impact on the AiC reward gained by Partial agents (as shown in Figure 8.7). The
best reward is obtained by combining a Sunk Cost penalty with Partial commitment
(50%). With Sunk Cost and Partially Sanctioned penalties, agents decommit less
frequently than they do with a 0% Fixed penalty, but more often than they do
with a 50% Fixed penalty. However the reward obtained by AiCs using a ¯xed
penalty of 50% is better than that of the Partially Sanctioned penalties. From
this, it is noted that using a sanction that changes dynamically with the stateChapter 8 Flexible Commitments and Penalties 121
of the coordination, speci¯cally, sunk cost, seems a good model because it sets a
more appropriate payment for decommitment when compared with the partially
sanctioned penalties.
Hypothesis to evaluate p Outcome
Partial AiC agents
H4: AUFixed0%=AUFixed50%=AUP:Sanctioned=AUSunkCost 0.000 Rejected
Loose AiC agents
H5: AUFixed0%=AUFixed50%=AUP:Sanctioned=AUSunkCost 0.167 Accepted
Table 8.5: Comparing penalties: result of ANOVA.
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Figure 8.7: Comparing ¯xed, partially sanctioned and sunk cost penalties.
To summarise, as was the case with the commitment related experiments, sunk
cost and partial commitment level agents represent the most e®ective combination
between loyalty to the existing situation and °exibility to discover better situations
and to submit better proposals.
8.4 Discussion
The extension of the basic framework with decommitments and penalties was
undertaken with aim of enabling agents to coordinate in a more °exible manner.
In fact, it was believed that this extension would allow autonomous agents to make
more rational choices about coordinating their actions and when to relinquish their
current commitments. To this end, the experiments in this chapter have shownChapter 8 Flexible Commitments and Penalties 122
that adding such features does indeed improve the performance of the agents with
respect to coordination. In particular, it was shown that allowing decommitments
increases the agents' rewards and that high penalties for decommitment discourage
decommitment. Thus, a certain degree of loyalty to existing contracts leads to
better overall performance than continually jumping to new opportunities as they
arise. In contrast, to the previous works in this area (as discussed in Section 2.2.3),
these results advance the state of the art in this ¯eld in several ways. Firstly, a
general decision making framework is introduced that can both dynamically select
CMs and can reason about how and when to relinquish existing commitments
in order to participate in more pro¯table activities. Secondly, through empirical
evaluation, it was demonstrated that the e±ciency of coordination activities could
be improved by this framework.Chapter 9
Learning Extensions
This chapter investigates a number of extensions to the basic framework of Chap-
ter 4 that are centred around the issue of introducing learning capabilities into an
agent so that it can improve its decision making about coordination. The motivat-
ing hypothesis is that to achieve the necessary degree of °exibility in coordination
requires an agent to make decisions about when to coordinate and which coordi-
nation mechanism to use (as argued in Section 2.3). So far, however, the empirical
evaluation has highlighted the importance (as well as the di±culty) of making
good approximations about the behaviour of other agents (see Section 7.6). More-
over, such approximations are especially challenging as the environment becomes
more dynamic and unpredictable.
Against this background, a natural extension of the framework is to enable
the agents to acquire knowledge through run-time adaptation (as argued in Sec-
tion 2.3). Thus, the agents need to be capable of learning to make the right deci-
sions about their coordination problem. In particular, those aspects of the model
where such adaptation could be bene¯cial are that agents can learn the right situ-
ations in which to attempt to coordinate (Section 9.2) and the right method to use
in those situations (Section 9.3).
The agent's decision procedures presented in Section 4 and, among them, the
procedure outlined in Section 4.2, allows agents to take decisions about when and
which coordination mechanism to select in order to achieve a CT. Since this pro-
cedure is the major one with respect to reasoning about coordination mechanisms,
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it is the one which is analysed in terms of evaluating the role of learning 1.
To this end, this chapter is structured in the following way. First, the formal
model of the Q-learning algorithm is introduced (Section 9.1). After this, the
agents' behaviours are extended (and subsequently evaluated) to use the learning
techniques to learn which coordination mechanism is appropriate in which cir-
cumstances (Section 9.2) and the constituent components of the decision making
procedures (Section 9.3).
9.1 Q-learning
In this study, each reinforcement learning agent uses a Q-learning algorithm. In
general terms, an agent's objective is to learn a decision policy that is determined
by the state/action value function. The classical model of Q-learning consists of:
² a ¯nite set S of states s of the world (s 2 S);
² a ¯nite set A of actions a that can be performed (a 2 A);
² a reward function R : S £ A ! r.
An agent's goal consists of learning a policy ¼ : S ! A that maximises the
expected sum of discounted rewards 2 V :
V [rt + °rt+1 + °
2rt+2 + :::] = V
1 X
i=0
°
irt+i
where 0 · ° < 1 is the discount factor 3. Thus, the agent's task is to learn the
optimal policy ¼ (i.e. arg max¼ V ¼(s), 8(s)).
1There are clearly other places where learning could play a role, for example, an agent might
learn the decision about how much to bid to become an AiCoop (equation (4.6)) and which bids
to accept (equation (4.8)). However, this is left as future work (see Section 10.3 for more details).
2Discounting rewards is a function that considers rewards received in future steps to be less
valuable than those received in the current time step. The standard model of discounting rewards
uses a utility function and a discount factor. In the context of Q-learning, this means that an
agent selects actions such that the sum of the discounted rewards it receives over the future is
maximised.
3Formally speaking, the discount factor determines the value of future rewards in the following
way: a reward r received t time steps in the future is worth only °t times what it would be worth
if it were received immediately. As ° approximates 1, the function takes future rewards into
account more strongly.Chapter 9 Learning Extensions 127
Q-learning algorithm (RL) is compared with those that perform no learning (NL).
Here the key di®erence is how the agents select the CM with which they will
attempt coordination (step [2] in the protocol speci¯ed in Figure 3.1). For the
remaining steps of the protocol, both RL and NL agents employ the decision making
procedures outlined in Section 4 to make agreements when surplus (equation (4.8))
is positive given the set of bids (equation (4.6)) it received.
In more detail, and by looking at Figure 9.2, when an agent ¯nds a CT, it
calculates the expected average surplus (equation (4.5)) of each CM at its dis-
posal. With NL the agent simply chooses the one with the best ave surplus. With
RL it exploits-and-explores (equation (9.1)) the set of CMs. When using RL, the
reinforcement is used to measure the bene¯t of having selected a particular CM
which corresponds to the surplus gained by achieving a CT using the CM chosen 5
after paying the AiCoops. Thus, the idea is that with Q-learning the agents will
eventually learn the policy (after exploring su±cient situations) that allows them
to know which CM to choose given a speci¯c situation/state.
It is clear that the reinforcement is a central element in the process of learning
because it is the mechanism to praise or blame if a good or bad action is performed.
Thus, it was decided to consider alternative values and moments to provide the
reinforcement. Generally speaking, the role of the reinforcement is to assess the
evaluation performed on the choice of CM. To this end, the ave surplus corresponds
to the predicted value that an AiC expects to obtain by selecting a particular CM.
When the evaluation phase is ¯nished, the AiC receives ¯rm information from
the other agents and it is in position to evaluate this prediction. Thus, the AiC
compares its predicted ave surplus with the ¯rm value negotiated (i.e. the surplus,
equation (4.8)). If the prediction is close enough (§ 25%) to the real information,
a strong reinforcement is made; but if it is not that close, a negative reinforcement
is made 6.
In addition to this basic reinforcement method, it was deemed interesting to see
whether the coordination decision making could be improved if the AiC builds a
model of the other agents in the environment. That is, can RL agents improve their
prediction of ave surplus if they have a model of the other agents? To evaluate
this, a simple representation of the other agents was constructed; namely, the
5Actually, accomplishing CTs is the only case considered. Even though agents achieve ST
tasks, this information is not considered as reinforcement since it is not relevant to the agent's
decisions about CMs.
6The absolute value of ave surplus is used to provide the reinforcement in either the positive
or the negative direction.Chapter 9 Learning Extensions 128
key variables that are crucial to coordination decisions were simply recorded. In
particular, it was decided to explore r AiCoop in equation (4.3) and so, AiC could
calculate the value of r AiCoop by averaging the bids it receives from the other
agents (in contrast to using the AiC's own average reward as per Chapter 4).
In summary, the agents' performance will be analysed using the following algo-
rithms:
RL1 agents learn to select a particular CM according to the pro¯t gained by
accomplishing CTs with a particular CM.
RL2 agents learn to select a particular CM according to the accuracy with which
they predict the ave surplus (which is based on the tailoring of r AiCoop to
their prevailing circumstances).
NL agents do not engage in learning activities.
To ¯nish the discussion on the role of learning in the model, it is necessary
to specify the features of the environment in which the algorithms will be tested.
Two scenarios have been designed: scenario1 in which all AiSs in the environment
become AiCoop by submitting a bid that is calculated by equation (4.6) and
scenario2 in which AiSs calculate their bids in the same way but they vary the result
by a random factor. The reason for this change is that in the general case AiCs
face a great deal of uncertainty in predicting this value. Thus the random element
mirrors environments in which predictions are less accurate. Together, these two
scenarios constitute a reasonably static environment in which good predictions can
be made and a more dynamic one in which predictions are inherently less accurate.
9.2.1 Experimental evaluation
The main hypotheses to evaluate is whether agents coordinate more e®ectively in
the scenario using the reinforcement based algorithms. The experimental evalu-
ation is conducted as per previous experiments, namely, testing hypothesis using
the methodology introduced in Chapter 6. The following simulation variables wereChapter 9 Learning Extensions 129
¯xed for all learning experiments: duration (50,000 time units) 7 and the rest of
variables are the ones introduced in Table 6.2. The experiments reported here
take into account the agent's protocol and decision making procedures discussed
in Figure 3.1. Note these do not include the introduction of commitment and
penalties, either in the protocol or the formulation. Again this is to ensure that
di®erences in the results are related solely to the e®ect of the di®erent approaches
to learning.
Following the same procedure as before, to accept the main hypothesis, the
hypotheses presented below must be rejected and the values of the experimental
variables of a particular learning algorithm should produce signi¯cantly better
results than those obtained with NL. Therefore, the following hypotheses must be
tested in scenario1 and scenario2:
H1: The agent utility obtained by performing a reinforcement based algorithm
is the same as that obtained by agents which use the NL algorithm.
H2: The number of CTs achieved by agents by means of either of the reinforce-
ment learning algorithms is identical to that of agents using NL.
H3: The agent utility obtained by RL1 is the same as that of RL2 (evaluated in
the case where H1 rejected).
H4: The number of CTs accomplished by RL1 is identical to that of RL2 (evalu-
ated in the case where H2 is rejected).
To this end, Table 9.1 presents a summary of the results obtained by performing
ANOVA on the data collected by each of the algorithms in scenario1. Considering
the agent utility hypothesis ¯rst. H1 is rejected, meaning that the performance
of the algorithms does have a signi¯cant e®ect on the AU obtained. To under-
stand this result, a post-analysis of the AU values obtained by each algorithm
was necessary. Here, the interesting conclusion is that the performance of NL is
better by a statistically signi¯cant amount (AUNL = 10;138:30) than RL1 and RL2
7On this occasion the duration was increased to allow the learning algorithms to converge.
This was necessary because this type of learning algorithm needs su±cient time to approximate
to optimal values. The convergence time for the RLs is a combination of the learning rate,
the exploration and exploitation function, the state representations and so on. However, it
was not the objective to hand tune all these parameters to reduce the convergence time in
particular cases. Rather, the values of all parameters were ¯xed and kept constant in both
Q-learning implementations.Chapter 9 Learning Extensions 130
(AURL1 = 9;413:58, AURL2 = 9;399:00). Furthermore, comparing the performance
of RL1 and RL2 in H3 (Accepted), it is concluded that the value and the moment
of praising or blaming agents does not have any e®ect on the AU obtained.
Hypothesis to evaluate p Outcome
H1: AURL1=AURL2=AUNL 0.000 Rejected
H2: TCTRL1=TCTRL2=TCTNL 0.876 Accepted
H3: AURL1=AURL2 0.590 Accepted
H4: Not evaluated
Table 9.1: Contrasting RL versus NL agent's abilities in scenario1: result of
ANOVA.
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Figure 9.3: Contrasting RL versus NL agent's abilities. Reward obtained by agent
role.
Contrary to what was expected, the two versions of Q-learning (RL1, RL2) do
not have any e®ect on the agent's performance. Analysing in detail, it was found
that this is because there is no change of information between the time agents make
agreements and the time when they achieve the task. That is, no events occur
that allow agents to change the reinforcement. Examples of events that could
make a di®erence are if there are any decommitments or delays from AiCoops.
The behaviour of the RLs is exploring and exploiting the actions and receiving a
reinforcement that praises or blames the actions performed. Thus the two versions
of RL are simply reinforcing the same actions but with di®erent values.
Turning now to the more dynamic environment of scenario2. The same set
of hypotheses were tested and the results are summarised in Table 9.2. First,
the hypotheses related with AU (H1, H3) are analysed. In common with theChapter 9 Learning Extensions 131
results obtained in Table 9.1, the conclusion is that applying RL and NL produces
distinctive results (H1 is rejected). But, conversely to Table 9.1, in this point RL1
and RL2 get signi¯cantly better results (AURL1 = 8;063:30 and AURL2 = 8;067:98)
than NL (AUNL = 7;151:12). Additionally, observing the ANOVA result of both
RL algorithms, the same conclusion as that in scenario1 is made; namely, giving
the reinforcement before and after the evaluation phase makes no di®erence to the
¯nal reward obtained by agents (H3 is accepted).
Hypothesis to evaluate p Outcome
H1: AURL1=AURL2=AUNL 0.000 Rejected
H2: TCTRL1=TCTRL2=TCTNL 0.000 Rejected
H3: AURL1=AURL2 0.835 Accepted
H4: TCTRL1=TCTRL2 0.940 Accepted
Table 9.2: Contrasting RL versus NL agent's abilities in scenario2: result of
ANOVA.
With reference to the values of TCT (H2 and H4), the hypothesis of equal
means of H2 is rejected and H4 is accepted. Thus, there is a signi¯cant impact on
the TCT achieved when performing RLs or NL, where the results are 65 to RLs and
84 to NL. The relevant aspect to discuss now, though, is why NL obtains a lower
AU despite achieving more CTs? Being consistent with the previous explanation,
and observing Figure 9.3 (right section), it can be seen that the reward gained
by achieving CTs for NL-AiCs is bigger than that gained by RL-AiCs because
they achieve more CTs. However, the time invested on them was not su±cient
to recover the reward that was being gained by RL-AiSs (RL-AiSs obtained in
total approximately 84% of the total reward by accomplishing STs and NL-AiSs
achieved 76%). The reason for this result is that agents invest a signi¯cant amount
of time to set up the CM and, in the end, the AiCoops often request higher bids
than those in scenario1 (meaning the AiCs' pro¯t is reduced). Thus, RLs perform
better because they are more certain about when to invest time in a CT and, more
importantly, when not to do it (because it is not worth it). They then use this
time to take advantage of pursuing STs.
Before making a general conclusion about the irrelevance of the di®erent options
of reinforcement and modelling other agents, Figure 9.4 shows the performance of
the algorithms from a di®erent perspective. Here, the performance of agents by
evaluating the average surplus reward expected (equation 4.5) is analysed. This
analysis is undertaken because it is important to know if it really worthwhile
having adaptive agents instead of just hand tuning the agents' decision makingChapter 9 Learning Extensions 132
procedures about which CM to select. To be precise, NL agents select the CM
based on ave surplus, but RLs agents do not (RL2 uses the result of this evaluation
just as a reinforcement). Thus, the idea is to count the number of cases in which
the action selected by either RL algorithm coincides with the outcome indicated
by equation 4.5. In other words, given a speci¯c situation, RL agents exploit the
CMs and evaluate this formulation, then they analyse the ave surplus of that CM.
If it is positive, then a case of TT is encountered (because the CM was exploited
and it coincided with the decision based on ave surplus). On the other hand, if it
is negative, the CM was exploited but this did not correspond with the evaluation
of equation 4.5 (case TF). Additionally, there are the cases in which the CM was
not exploited and this corresponds (FF) or not (FT) with the decision based on
ave surplus. It is clear that with NL all the cases have to be consistent because
they attempt coordination based on this evaluation. As for the RLs, it will depend
on how this equation is calculated. Both NL and RL1 agents employ equation 4.5
using their own r values for r AiCoop, whereas RL2 uses the value that it has
learnt based on previous encounters.
To this end, Figure 9.4 shows only the TT and FF cases since the others (TF
and FT) are not relevant in this discussion. The ¯rst thing to notice is the clear
di®erence between RLs, which is due to the di®erent ways in which the ave surplus is
calculated. The second observation is that RL2 has more FF cases, meaning that
most of the time the action it performs is to not attempt coordination and in these
cases this decision is consistent with that based on the ave surplus. The reason
for this result is that RL2 is modelling others using r AiCoop which helps it to
make a good prediction of the other agents. Given this, the obvious question to
ask is could NL perfom better by modelling others in the same way as RL2? Here,
the answer is no. The system utility obtained by NL agents in scenario1 degrades
considerably when agents use r AiCoop (AUNL = 7;575:28) and in scenario2 it
raises slightly (AUNL = 7;578:42). Despite the improvement in scenario2, it is not
su±cient to have H1 accepted. If the NL agents' predictions of ave surplus are
too low (being optimistic about the possible future cooperative agents), they will
always initiate coordination even in situations where it is not the best decision
to make. However, if their predictions are too high (being pessimistic) they will
never attempt coordination. Thus, the conclusion is that having learning agents
that explore and exploit actions is the best thing to do in dynamic environments
because agents cannot be certain about others' actions.Chapter 9 Learning Extensions 133
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Figure 9.4: RL and ave surplus action selection
9.3 Learning the decisions' constituent factors
This extension investigates whether the agents can learn about the key factors
that in°uence their decisions about when to attempt coordination. To do this,
agents need to be in a situation in which they cannot correctly predict the others'
behaviour. Thus, scenario2 of Section 9.2 is considered. In this environment, the
hypothesis is evaluated empirically using reinforcement based algorithms as per
Section 9.2.
To test the learning hypothesis, the performance of agents that use a Q-learning
algorithm (RL) is compared with those that do not (NL). Here the key di®erence
is how agents estimate the ave bid (this variable represents the prediction of other
agents' bids) when selecting the CM with which they will attempt coordination
(step [2] in the protocol speci¯ed in Figure 3.1). In previous experiments (Sec-
tion 9.2), agents explored and exploited the CMs (which represent the agent's
actions) given a speci¯c situation (which corresponds to the agent's states) and
they learnt to choose the most pro¯table CM. Here, the concern is with learning
about the constituent factors that are involved in this decision and, to be more
speci¯c, about the decision of when to coordinate. For the remaining steps of the
protocol, both RL and NL agents employ the decision making procedures outlined
in Section 4 to make agreements when there is a positive surplus (equation (4.8))
given the set of bids (equation (4.6)) received. To this end, Figure 9.5 provides
a graphical representation of this situation in terms of the Q-learning algorithm's
components.Chapter 9 Learning Extensions 135
when it faces a coordination problem it exploits-and-explores (equation 9.1) one
of the possible actions open to it. It then increases, decreases or maintains the
ave bid according to the reinforcement received about the success of the action.
The agent then uses this updated value of ave bid to evaluate the ave surplus of all
CMs. Thus, in this scenario, the agent-state corresponds to the abstraction of the
particular situation that agents experience when a CT is found (for example, the
agent role, position in the grid and the value of ave bid used 9); the agent-action
consists of the operation to perform on ave bid; and the reinforcement is a positive
or negative value based on the result of the evaluation phase. For example, one
agent might learn a policy that says, if it is an AiS with an ave bid higher than
5.0, it should decrease this value by 0.2 to ¯nd a CM that maximises the reward.
In summary, the agents' performance will be analysed in scenario2 using the
following algorithms:
RL: agents learn the ave bid value to evaluate the set of CMs.
NL: agents do not engage in learning activities.
9.3.1 Experimental evaluation
In this case, the hypothesis to evaluate is whether learning about the bidding
behaviour of the other agents improves the e®ectiveness of an agent's reasoning
about coordination. To measure the bene¯ts of introducing this extension to
the framework the same experiments as those conducted in Section 9.2.1 were
designed and, similarly, the same experimental and hypotheses variables were used.
To substantiate the claim, the hypotheses presented below must be rejected and
agents using RL should produce signi¯cantly better results than those obtained
with NL.
H5: The AU obtained by performing the RL algorithm is the same as that ob-
tained by agents which use the NL algorithm.
H6: The TCT achieved by agents using the RL algorithm is identical to that of
agents using NL.
9To simplify the state representation, ave bid is in fact associated with a range of values.
In this scenario the ranges are the following: ave bid< 1, 1 <ave bid< 3, 3 <ave bid< 5 and
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Table 9.3 presents a summary of the results. Considering the agent utility
hypothesis ¯rst. H5 is rejected meaning that the performance of the algorithms
does indeed have a signi¯cant e®ect on the AU obtained. To understand this
result, a post-analysis of the AU values obtained by each algorithm was necessary.
Here, the conclusion is that the performance of RL is better by a statistically
signi¯cant amount (AURL = 8;822:36) than NL (AUNL = 7;151:12). This leads to
the conclusion that the RL agents take more pro¯table decisions about coordination
than the NL agents. However to understand the origin of the agents' reward it is
necessary to analyse H6 in more detail.
Hypothesis to evaluate p Outcome
H5: AURL=AUNL 0.000 Rejected
H6: TCTRL=TCTNL 0.000 Rejected
Table 9.3: Contrasting NL versus RL agents: result of ANOVA.
H6 evaluates the e®ectiveness of achieving CTs. Again, this hypothesis is re-
jected; meaning that the total number of CTs achieved does depend on the algo-
rithm executed. There is a signi¯cant impact on the TCT achieved by performing
RL and NL, where the results are 84.0 to NL and 71.76 to RL (Figure 9.6 shows
on its Y axis the total CTs accomplished by agent type). Contrary to what was
expected, agents that achieve higher numbers of CTs are not always those with a
better AU. To explain this result Figure 9.6 shows the total reward obtained by
agent role (X axis). Here notice that the reward gained by achieving ST tasks is
the biggest part of the total reward and NL accomplishes fewer ST tasks than RL.
Another point to note, is that in this scenario it is expensive (due to the set-up
cost of the CMs) to invest in a CT when there is some uncertainty about achiev-
ing it. With NL, it seems that the AiCs cannot make good enough predictions
of ave bid. Therefore they attempt coordination (or the AiC might even fail after
the evaluation phase) even though the pro¯t obtained after achieving the CT was
not as high as the reward that was being gained by RL-AiSs (RL-AiSs obtained in
total approximately 84% of the total reward by accomplishing STs and NL-AiSs
achieved 77%). By not predicting ave bid accurately enough, the NL-AiC is faced
with the situation where the AiCoops request higher bids than it expected mean-
ing its pro¯t is reduced. It is important to observe that the solution is not to avoid
the CTs tasks and only persue STs. Rather, the answer is to ¯nd the right balance
between the two because in this scenario CTs always provide better rewards than
STs.Chapter 9 Learning Extensions 137
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Figure 9.6: NL versus RL agents. Reward obtained by agent role.
In summary, in dynamic and unpredictable environments RL agents perform
better than NL agents because they are more certain about when to invest time in a
CT and, more importantly, when not to do it (because it is not worth it). RL agents
then use this time to take advantage of persuing STs. Learning about ave bid helps
RL agents to have a more precise model of this value and, consequently, their
predictions are closer to actuality. This, in turn, means the agents are more
e®ective at maximising their pro¯ts.
9.4 Discussion
This chapter showed that reinforcement learning techniques, and in particular Q-
learning, are useful when agents cannot correctly predict the behaviour of others
(as occurs in open, unpredictable and dynamic settings). Speci¯cally, the experi-
mental evaluation showed that agents improve their decision making about when
and how to coordinate. However, the experiments also highlighted the fact that
learning is not a panacea. In particular, it was ine®ective when agents operate
in more static environments in which they can make reasonable predictions about
their environment and other agents.
There are, however, a number of aspects that still need to be explored regarding
the introduction of learning in this model. Firstly, learning could be introduced
in areas other than learning to make decisions and learning about the constituent
factors of the decisions themselves. For example, agents could learn the meta-dataChapter 9 Learning Extensions 138
parameters of the CM (i.e. they could re¯ne the CM's parameters given the ef-
¯ciency of its actual execution). However, this aspect was not addressed in this
chapter because it is directly related with the speci¯cs of how the di®erent CMs
operate to achieve coordination, which is outside the scope of this thesis. Secondly,
the comparison between algorithms in this chapter followed the experimental eval-
uation methodology outlined in Chapter 6 rather than the more classical way of re-
porting a learning algorithm's performance. In the ML literature, the performance
of a learning algorithm typically focuses on its converge time, and the parameter
settings associated with the various levels of performance (Claus & Boutilier, 1998;
Tan, 1993; Nagayuki et al., 2000). Here, however, the purpose was not to focus
on the learning details, nor to reduce the convergence time but rather to ¯x all
the parameters and then contrast the various agents' performances. This is be-
cause the main aim was to allow fair comparisons to be undertaken. However, this
decision has certain consequences. For example, intuitively, it was believed that
learning algorithms RL1 and RL2 in Section 9.2 should obtain a better performance
than NL in scenario1. However, recall that the results were taken considering the
exploration and exploitation phase, not once the learning converges to the optimal
action. Thus, it is now believed that by not taking into account the time invested
in the exploration and making the comparison with the results once the algorithms
reach the optimal policy, RL agents might indeed obtain a better performance than
the NL. However, this claim needs corroboration (see Section 10.3).Chapter 10
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter summarises the ¯ndings of this thesis towards sustaining the claim
stated in Chapter 1 that autonomous agents which have the °exibility to select
at run-time the most appropriate mechanism to coordinate their activities exhibit
better performance than those which do not possess such °exibility. In order to
support such a claim, a novel line of research was identi¯ed in which agents reason
at a high level of abstraction about the coordination problem and take decisions
at the time when the selection of coordination mechanisms is required. Although
several researchers have attempted to introduce °exibility into coordination solu-
tions, their attention has generally focused on di®erent aspects of the problem and
thus this thesis can be seen as a opening up a new direction of study.
More speci¯cally, this thesis presents and evaluates a decision making frame-
work that agents can use to make choices about coordination options according
to their prevailing context. By using this framework, agents are able to deal with
coordination decisions in a more e®ective and e±cient manner. This is possi-
ble because the framework possesses several important characteristics. First, it
clearly distinguishes the concepts of coordination and cooperation in the sense
that agents deliberate about whether to coordinate over cooperative actions and
with which coordination mechanism to do so. Second, it incorporates meta-data
about coordinating mechanisms into the agent's decision procedures. This meta-
data identi¯es the fundamental issues for characterising coordination techniques;
what is needed to apply the coordination technique and what is obtained as a re-
sult of its application but it is not concerned with how the interactions between
agents are managed. Such a representation enables agents to discriminate between
coordination mechanisms and to recognise the particular situations in which each
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technique can be applied without being concerned with the details of the resulting
interactions. Third, it incorporates information into its run-time reasoning about
the possible collaborators an agent might encounter, the environmental features
and the coordination mechanisms. Such information has been shown to be the key
elements of the coordination problem. Finally, it integrates a model of commit-
ments into the agent's decision making procedures. In this extended framework,
agents have the possibility of reconsidering agreements based on the ongoing coor-
dination activity if more productive cooperative situations appear. This model
of commitment takes into account three levels of commitments (total, partial and
loose) and three kinds of sanctions (¯xed, partially sanctioned and sunk cost).
When taken together, these features of the framework allow agents to accom-
plish °exibility with respect to coordination decisions in scenarios that are open
and dynamic. Particularly, in the more dynamic settings it was shown that lear-
ning was an important requirement in order to achieve the necessary degree of
°exibility. In particular, learning agents were designed that could tailor the pro-
cess of selecting the CM to their experiences and that could re¯ne the components
of the decision procedure according to previous interaction. However, it was also
shown that learning agents are not e®ective in all situations. The results demon-
strated that when an agent's prediction about the other agents in the environment
is approximately correct, learning does not provide any real advantage. The in-
troduction of learning in the way described in this research is a contribution to
the state of the art in itself because this work has demonstrated that agents can
learn to cooperate using a perspective that has not been addressed in the current
learning literature.
In what follows, the remainder of this chapter discusses in greater detail the
results of the investigation carried out focusing on the following aspects:
² the decision making framework introduced in Chapter 4 (Section 10.1)
² the extension to the framework to deal with °exible commitments and penal-
ties introduced in Chapter 8 (Section 10.2)
² the inclusion of learning abilities to the agents as detailed in Chapter 9
(Section 10.3)
Each of these sections draws out the main conclusions and then details the work
that still needs to be investigated in the future. Now, each section is dealt with in
turn.Chapter 10 Conclusions and Future Work 141
10.1 About the Decision Making framework
This thesis argued that autonomous agents need to be given the °exibility to
dynamically select the mechanism they use for coordinating their actions during
problem solving. Thus, a decision making framework to make decisions about
when to coordinate (and when not to do it), which coordination mechanism to use
and with which agents to cooperate was introduced in Chapter 4. This framework
enables agents to make informed choices about their coordination actions because
it abstractly characterises coordination mechanisms in terms of their cost and their
expected bene¯ts. This decision is clearly separated from the enactment of the
mechanism which is how the task is actually achieved and how the actions of the
various agents are actually coordinated. Moreover, it was shown that in the grid
world scenario the agents are more successful by having the ability to select the
coordination mechanism dynamically.
Although the speci¯cs of the decision procedures are clearly related to the
particular grid world scenario, the basic processes and structures developed are
suitable for reasoning about coordination mechanisms in more general domains.
For example, several of the agent's decisions relate to the proximity of potential
collaborators. This conception of distance in the grid can easily and naturally be
mapped into a range of analogous concepts that have more general application.
The ¯rst of these is the notion of trust in social relationships (as represented, for
example, by the degree of connectivity in social network theory (Burt, 1982)).
Thus, cases in which agents are more certain of receiving help, because there is a
high degree of trust between them, are similar to the cases in the scenario where
potential collaborators are close to hand. In such situations, the results indicate
that agents are more likely to attempt coordination using mechanisms that have
relatively low times to set up. On the other hand, when collaboration is more
di±cult to establish, because there is a low degree of trust (equivalent to the
agent being far away), the agents are more likely to opt for mechanisms that are
more likely to succeed. The second relates to the dynamism in the environment. In
more static environments, there is a greater chance of more accurately predicting
the behaviour of the various agents present in the system. This corresponds to the
case of the agent being near the centre of the grid as this situation involves much
less uncertainty. In more dynamic environments, on the other hand, predicting
the behaviour of others is more di±cult and so corresponds to decision making
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This research work also demonstrated that a successful agent is one that takes
the right decision about the bene¯ts it will accrue for the time invested in the
coordination mechanism versus what the agent would gain by achieving its indi-
vidual tasks. The importance of this result is that it corroborates the fact that
in some environments an agent that can dynamically select its CM according to
its circumstances is able to take more pro¯table coordination decisions. However,
this thesis does not claim that the agents always select the best CM. For example,
when agents are at the edges of the grid, they assume it will take a long time for
the AiCoops to arrive to the CT cell and consequently they select the CM that
has the highest probability of success regardless of the high cost of setting up.
This is true even though this is not always the case in practice. Thus, an agent
that makes a good decision needs to balance the coordination mechanism set up
cost and its likelihood of success with the information predicted. However, in the
experimentation reported here good performance is measured simply by the total
reward obtained at the end and not by how well this trade-o® was performed.
Thus, a potential conclusion from this could be that the constituent factors of the
framework need to be re¯ned to more precisely model the environment. However,
the process of environment modelling has the drawback that unless the problem
deals with static environments (which is not the case), this task can imply a great
e®ort and cost (Durfee, 1999b). Thus, the research position taken in this work is
that the e®ort must be directed to, on one hand, having a reasonable model of
those aspects on which agents base their coordinating decisions and, on the other
hand, exploring the \right" level of approximation in modelling in order to ensure
the agent can coordinate e®ectively in practice (Durfee, 1999b). The framework
as outlined here can be viewed as a mature point of departure because it pro-
vides a good approximation about how the key factors that need to be taken into
consideration should be combined. However, more work is needed to re¯ne the
modelling problem and to systematically evaluate the alternatives.
Another area of future work involves systematically classifying coordination
mechanisms according to the meta-data dimension. Although some work was per-
formed toward this direction in Chapter 2 more comparative analysis is needed
with respect to related classi¯cations. This is necessary in order to use in the
context of practical applications and may result in a more re¯ned set of charac-
teristics of the coordination mechanisms themselves. In the same order of ideas,
it is believed that the factors taken into consideration in the CM abstraction are
those that are necessary as a starting point for modelling CMs. However, it isChapter 10 Conclusions and Future Work 143
also believed that this abstraction may need to incorporate more aspects into the
CM themselves and, consequently, in the decision making procedures. Examples
of such aspects might be quality of coordination, robustness, overhead limitations
and so on.
Additional work is also necessary to incorporate greater heterogeneity both in
the agent population and in the coordination mechanisms available. In particular,
to model other basic coordination mechanisms, which will allow the assumptions
related to the Contract-Net-like protocol that has been implemented to be relaxed.
This strand of work will also enable a clear separation to be made between the
decision-making procedure and the coordination protocols. Moreover, although
the grid world scenario incorporates a reasonable degree of dynamism and uncer-
tainty, it is important to take the model into real applications. Focusing on such
applications could also raise new problems that have not been addressed in the
present scenario. Although comparatively little work addresses the run-time selec-
tion of particular coordination protocols (as detailed in Chapter 2), the research
undertaken in the area of dynamic selection of problem-solving techniques deals
with the run-time selection of algorithms and, under this perspective, the research
of this thesis is somewhat related. Generally speaking, the work on dynamically
selecting problem-solving techniques has developed several solutions that operate
under di®erent assumptions; these include design-to-time algorithms (Garvey &
Lesser, 1993) and anytime algorithms (Zilberstein, 1996). The former assume that
algorithms use all the available time in a given situation to generate the best so-
lution possible. The latter improve their output quality as more time is invested
and can be interrupted at any time. In contrast, the decision making framework
of this thesis has no such mechanism for controlling its reasoning with varying
time and resources availabilities (it simply consumes a constant amount of time).
However, in complex and dynamic environments it might be appropriate to give
this reasoner a time and resource related °avour and so it would be interesting to
determine how these techniques could be applied to this end.
10.2 About Flexible Commitments and Penal-
ties
In order to incorporate greater °exibility in the agents' decision making, the ba-
sic framework was extended to focus on the issues of variable commitment levels
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empirical results highlighted the fact that °exibility with respect to commitment
levels can indeed improve the e®ectiveness of coordination. It was shown that a
certain degree of loyalty to existing contracts leads to better overall performance
than continually jumping to new opportunities as they arise. For penalty sanc-
tions, it was shown that setting them based on the prevailing context also improves
an agent's performance.
In general terms, the importance of introducing variable levels of commitment
and penalties rests on the fact that it was possible to construct an integrated
decision making framework that involves the following decisions:
² which CM to select to coordinate (or not to coordinate)
² how much to bid to participate in coordination
² which bids to select
² when to decommit
² how to set the penalty fee
For the future, it is necessary to incorporate the empirical ¯ndings into an
agent's decision procedures so it can select the level of commitment and penalty
sanction for itself according to its prevailing circumstances. Further work is also
needed in order to investigate additional sanctions mechanisms. Finally, to ac-
count for more heterogeneous agent populations, it is also necessary to evaluate
communities of agents with di®erent levels of commitments in the same environ-
ment. To this end, the idea would be to conduct the same exploration as that
of Appendix A but considering levels of commitments and variable penalties. In
addition, it would be also important to compare the performance of agents in
communities in which some agents use the basic framework and some employ the
framework with the enhanced commitment properties.
10.3 About Learning Extensions
This thesis showed that agents bene¯t from being more °exible when taking deci-
sions about coordinating problems. One way of achieving such °exibility it through
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agents learning about making decisions about when and how to coordinate. In
particular, it was shown that learning improves the decision making when agents
are uncertain about the other agents' actions. This improvement occurs because
agents learn to recognise the situations where the most pro¯table actions must be
selected. However, it was also shown that learning was ine®ective when agents op-
erate in more static environments in which they can make reasonable predictions
about their environment and other agents.
Against this background, a broader investigation is needed with respect to the
issues of when and how to exploit learning techniques in allowing agents to take
decisions based on their experience. To this end, the results presented here can be
viewed as a ¯rst step in that direction. For the future, the aim is to extend the use
of learning to cover other aspects of the agent's decision framework. In particular,
agents might learn to take the decision about how much to bid in a request for
coordination, when to become an AiCoop (equation 4.6) and which bids to accept
(equation 4.8). It is also intended to allow agents to construct more sophisticated
models of one another and to have the ability to vary the details of this modelling
according to the agent's coordination context.
Despite the e®ectiveness achieved by introducing learning techniques into the
model, to incorporate additional aspects requires a further investigation because
the literature in this area highlights the complexity of introducing learning aspects
in MAS problems. Speci¯cally, formal studies of Q-learning (Kaelbling et al., 1996;
Littmann, 1994; Mitchel, 1997b; Sutton & Barto, 1998) in single agent environ-
ments indicate the e®ective way this algorithm converges. However, convergence in
MAS environments has not yet been demonstrated. This is because the premises
of Q-learning in environments where all agents learn concurrently violate the basic
assumptions of the simple case. Consequently, developing agents that learn how
to improve their behaviour in a MAS is a very di±cult task. The work presented
here showed that the learning process is highly in°uenced by how agents in the
environment model one another. Though this thesis explored a comparatively
simple case, it is believed that in order to accomplish more e®ective learning ob-
jectives, agents should model the others as 1-level agents by explicitly representing
knowledge about others. This is because most of the agent's decisions take into
consideration predictions about the other agents and to re¯ne these predictions
an agent needs to represent in a more precise way the behaviour of the others in
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In a broader context, a ¯nal aspect to discuss is that learning can also be
employed to re¯ne the values associated to the CM meta-data based on an agent's
individual experiences in a given context. In order to do this, the main aspect to
work on is in developing several real CMs whose corresponding performance can
be evaluated. In the model presented here, the likelihood of the outcome being
achieved was represented simply as a percentage. However this is clearly not the
only way of doing it. Thus, if agents measure and update the consequences of
the selected CM's execution, they could update the meta-data information. For
example, if an agent at run-time selects planning as a CM (it did so because it
has an associated x as cost to set-up and y as the probability of success), the idea
is to execute the planning coordinating algorithm and then update the meta-data
based on this experience. Thus, over time the meta-data could be re¯ned to re°ect
the agent's individual experiences.Appendix A
Coordination in Heterogeneous
Settings
In order to make meaningful comparisons, most the experiments reported in
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 take place in broadly the same coordination environment
(here termed a homogeneous setting) 1. Thus, agents assign the same values to
the simulation variables in the same simulation run and, as a consequence, agents
possess analogous reasoning in their decision making processes. For example, all
agents have the same set of CMs at their disposal, the same willingness factor
(!), and so on. However, it is also important to understand the impact on the
performance of the decision making framework in more heterogeneous settings.
To this end, the simplest level of heterogeneity is when agents associate di®erent
values to the simulation variables at the same execution time. Another, perhaps
stronger, form of heterogeneity is when agents possess alternative techniques to
take similar decisions.
Against this background, to ensure that the results of the main empirical chap-
ters are not speci¯c to the chosen con¯guration, this appendix explores a variety of
heterogeneous settings. In particular, here the focus is on communities of agents
that show alternative decision making behaviour. In more detail, the speci¯c
aspects of heterogeneity considered are:
² Agents with di®erent dispositions to cooperate (Section A.2),
² Agents with alternative values for the constituent factors of their decision
procedures (Section A.3), and
1The only case in which this was not the case was in the evaluation of the decision making
framework in Section 7.5.
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² Agents with di®erent reasoning capabilities with respect to taking coordi-
nating decisions (Section A.4).
These types of heterogeneity were chosen because they best represent the main
aspects discussed in this thesis. More precisely, one important element discussed
in Section 7.4 was the di®erent social attitudes agents possessed regarding their
willingness to cooperate (!). Thus Section A.2 explores whether the conclusions
of Section 7.4 still hold when agents possess varying ! settings in the same simula-
tion run. Turning to the second point, it has been strongly suggested throughout
this thesis that the constituent factors of the agent's decision making process are
a determinant factor of its behaviour. However, the main body of this research 2
did not explore to what extent an agent's behaviour is e®ected by varying one fun-
damental and common component of the decision procedures. Thus, Section A.3
explores this by varying the agent's reward rate (r). Finally, perhaps strongest
form of heterogeneity is having agents that have totally di®erent mechanisms to
that outlined in Chapter 4 in order to take decisions about coordination problems.
To this end, Section A.4 explores environments that are populated by agents that
follow the learning abilities speci¯ed in Chapter 9 (in particular Section 9.2) and
those that follow the basic decision making process of Chapter 4. In other words,
the environment is composed of agents that learn about which CM to select and
agents that do not have such abilities.
Naturally, these experiments do not deal with all aspects of heterogeneity that
could arise in the context of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is believed that some min-
imal evaluation of the heterogeneous cases is important for at least the following
reasons. First, to start to be able to generalise the applicability of this framework
to more realistic scenarios in which heterogeneity is found. Second, \heterogeneity
is desirable because it increases the systemwide capabilities, allowing agents with
complementary attributes to combine their objectives beyond what they they can
achieve individually." (Durfee, 2001, pp. 42). Third, and more speci¯cally, it is
important to fully analyse to what extent an agent's performance is the result of its
interactions with others and whether the conclusions drawn in previous chapters
can be extended to these new settings.
2The experimental evaluation of Section 9.3 explores a related attempt, namely, agents learn
the ave bid that is employed in the decision procedure about which CM to select.Appendix A Coordination in Heterogeneous Settings 149
A.1 The Experimental Setting
The experimental evaluation in this chapter follows the methodology of Chap-
ter 6 and the experimental and simulation variables are as de¯ned in Tables 6.1
and 6.2. Being consistent with the previous experiments, the main hypotheses
seek to evaluate whether a particular aspect of heterogeneity produces any bene¯t
to the agents (meaning the main focus is on AU and TCT).
To explore these issues, it should be noted that the environment might be
inhabited by di®erent agents (called agent types) depending on the speci¯c class
of heterogeneity being evaluated. And, consequently, a number of communities
(groups of agents (group) 3) might be formed and need to be explored separately.
Thus, as a result of having a number of groups composed of di®erent agent types
the hypotheses are evaluated at three levels of detail 4:
Level i. Here the analysis is concerned with determining if some groups of agents
exhibit behaviour that dominates that of the others groups. For example, if
groups whose agents have more social attitudes obtain a better performance
than those whose agents are less social. Thus, the hypothesis are of the form:
H1 : AUgroup 1=...=AUgroup n
H2 : TCTgroup 1=...=TCTgroup n
where n indicates the total number of groups composed.
Level ii. Here the analysis is concerned with the performance of individual agents
within particular groups. For example, how does an altruistic agent perform
in a group composed of greedy and neutral agents?. These hypotheses are
evaluated with ANOVA and have the following form:
H1.1 : AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4
H1.2 : AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4
...
H1.n : AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA0=3=AUA4
3Even in the case of 5 agents in the environment, as indicated in Table 6.1, the number of
groups will depend on the number of types of agent being considered.
4Recall from Chapter 6 that H0 is formulated with the equality of means of the variables to
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where the subindex in the hypothesis number is associated with the group
being tested. For example: H1.2 tests the AU (because H1 tests AU) in group
2 and H1.n tests the agent types in group n.
Level iii. Here the analysis is concerned with the overall performance of the agent
types in all groups. For example, there will be tests to determine whether al-
truistic agents perform better than greedy ones regardless of the composition
of the groups.
H3 : AUAgent type 1=...=AUAgent type m
where m refers to the total number of agent types being considered.
A.2 Di®erent dispositions to cooperate
Section 7.3 (and in particular Figure 7.6) showed the relevance of the willingness
to cooperate factor (!) as a key element in the agents' decision making processes.
However, it is clearly unrealistic in most settings to assume that all agents have
the same degree of willingness to cooperate. Thus, this section explores the con-
sequences of having communities of agents with di®erent attitudes to cooperation
(i.e. the agents have di®erent values for !).
Recalling the relevant de¯nitions, a Greedy agent is one with ! > 1:0, a Neu-
tral agent is one with ! = 1:0, and an Altruistic agent is one with ! < 1:0. From
this, a number of groups of agents can be modelled; those in which all members
are of a speci¯c type (as per Section 7.4), those in which the majority are of a
particular type and those where no one type dominates. Against this background,
a number of di®erent agents communities were established (see Table A.1). Here
the columns of the table indicate: the group reference number, the group label (or
group description) and the details of the individual agents in the group 5.
To begin with, the following hypotheses of level i test the performance of the
di®erent groups:
H1: A mixed group of agents obtain the same AU as Altruistic, majority Altruistic,
Greedy, majority Greedy, Neutral and majority Neutral groups. In shorter
terms: H1 test if groups 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 group obtain the same AU.
5The results are not a®ected by the ordering of the group. Thus, for example, in a given
experiment it does not matter whether A0 or A4 is the Greedy one.Appendix A Coordination in Heterogeneous Settings 151
Group Group label Agent distribution
1 Neutral All agents Neutral
2 Altruistic All agents Altruistic
3 Greedy All agents Greedy
4 Majority Neutral A0,A1,A3 Neutral, A2 Altruistic, A4 Greedy
5 Majority Altruistic A0,A2,A3 Altruistic, A1 Greedy, A4 Neutral
6 Majority Greedy A0 Altruistic, A1 Neutral, A2,A3,A4 Greedy
7 Mixed A0,A3 Greedy, A1, A2 Altruistic, A4 Neutral
Table A.1: Constituent agent groups (given !).
Hypothesis to evaluate (level i) p Outcome
H1: AU1=AU2=AU3=AU4=AU5=AU6=AU7 0.000 Rejected
H2: TCT1=TCT2=TCT3=TCT4=TCT5=TCT6=TCT7 0.000 Rejected
Note: The subindex associated with AU and TCT refers to the group's num-
ber as described in Table A.1.
Table A.2: Agents' performance per group (given !): result of ANOVA.
H2: The number of CTs accomplished by a mixed group of agents is the same as
Altruistic, majority Altruistic, Greedy, majority Greedy, Neutral and majority
Neutral groups. In other words, this hypothesis tests whether groups 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6 and 7 accomplish the same number of CTs.
The result of ANOVA (Table A.2) shows a signi¯cant e®ect on the AU and
TCT given the type of group (p value is 0.000 and H1 and H2 are rejected). A
detailed analysis of this result is presented in Figure A.1. From this, it is possible
to observe a correspondence between TCT and AU; the more TCTs, the better the
AU. Focusing on the total AU obtained by group, the best performance is obtained
with the Altruistic groups (2 and 5) and the worst with the Greedy ones (3 and
6). This result can be explained by the fact that agents' bids are highly a®ected
by their ! factor (equation 4.6). Thus, the greedier an agent is, the higher the
bids it submits, and the more di±cult it is for them to be accepted. In contrast,
the more altruistic an agent is, the greater its opportunity to get bids accepted.
So, the Greedy group gets the lowest AU and the Altruistic one gets the highest.
This observation is consistent with the ¯ndings of Section 7.4. However, these
results do not show anything about the performance of the individual agents in the
speci¯c communities. For example, one important question to answer is whether
Altruistic agents always perform better than Greedy ones?. To answer this, it is
necessary to test ANOVA for each kind of agent in each group (level ii of detail).
Thus, Table A.3 describes the level of willingness associated to each agent byAppendix A Coordination in Heterogeneous Settings 152
group and Table A.4 presents the hypothesis tested for each group regarding an
individual agent's AU.
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Neutral Altrustic Greedy Majority
Neutral
Majority
Altruistic
Majority
Greedy
Mixed
A
g
e
n
t
 
U
t
i
l
i
t
y
 
(
A
U
)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
C
T
s
 
a
c
c
o
m
p
l
i
s
h
e
d
AiCoop
AiC
AiS
Figure A.1: Agents' role performance per group (given !).
Group Agent distribution
1 All agents ! = 1:00
2 A0 ! = 0:90, A1 ! = 0:40, A2 ! = 0:10, A3 ! = 0:60, A4 ! = 0:20
3 A0 ! = 2:50, A1 ! = 2:75, A2 ! = 1:25, A3 ! = 3:25, A4 ! = 1:50
4 A0 ! = 1:00, A1 ! = 1:00, A2 ! = 0:80, A3 ! = 1:00, A4 ! = 1:25
5 A0 ! = 0:75, A1 ! = 2:25, A2 ! = 0:25, A3 ! = 0:50, A4 ! = 1:00
6 A0 ! = 0:25, A1 ! = 1:00, A2 ! = 1:75, A3 ! = 2:50, A4 ! = 3:25
7 A0 ! = 1:75, A1 ! = 0:50, A2 ! = 0:30, A3 ! = 2:25, A4 ! = 1:00
Table A.3: ! factor per agent and group.
Not surprisingly, most of the hypotheses of Table A.4 show that an agent's
willingness factor has a signi¯cant e®ect on the AU obtained. The hypotheses
accepted by ANOVA are for groups 1, 3 and 4 because agents in these groups
obtain (statistically speaking) the same AU. In other words, it does not matter
what type of members are in the community, the reward obtained by agents in
groups Neutral, Majority Neutral and Greedy are broadly the same. In contrast, in
groups 2, 5, 6 and 7 the hypotheses were rejected because some agents perform
signi¯cantly better than others.
Form this, it is important to verify whether certain types of agent have real
advantages over others regardless of the group. To this end, the fourth column in
Table A.4 indicates the winner agent in each community; that is, the agent thatAppendix A Coordination in Heterogeneous Settings 153
Hypothesis to evaluate (level ii) p Outcome Winner
H1.1: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.535 Accepted
H1.2: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.000 Rejected A1 (Altruistic)
H1.3: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.188 Accepted
H1.4: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.064 Accepted
H1.5: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.000 Rejected A0 (Altruistic)
H1.6: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.000 Rejected A2 (Greedy), A1
(Neutral)
H1.7: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.000 Rejected A4 (Neutral)
Note. Recall that the subindex in the hypothesis number is associated with
the group tested, for example: H1.5 tests the AU in the group with majority
Altruistic members (group 5).
Table A.4: Agents' type performance within groups (given !): result of ANOVA.
gained the most AU (i.e. a statistically superior AU than the others). This result
highlights several interesting points. First, contrary to expectation, groups with
the same type of agents (or with a majority of the same type) have dominant
behaviour. For instance, hypotheses H1.2 and H1.5 were rejected by ANOVA.
One reason for this result is that agents have associated ranges of ! values to be a
particular type of agent and this factor has a direct e®ect on their decision making.
Thus, though agents belong to the same type, their bids can have a signi¯cant
di®erence in their values and, consequently, this can a®ect their performance (see
the ! value per agent and group in Table A.3). So, this shows that ! does
indeed a®ect the agents' cooperative attitudes. Second, Altruistic agents do not
always perform the best. This is because their behaviour is highly dependent
on the other members of the community. For example, in group 6 (with mainly
Greedy agents) the Altruistic agent (A0) performs the worst (table A.5). Once again,
the justi¯cation for this is because agents are highly dependent on the others'
cooperative attitudes. Thus, an Altruistic agent has a good performance when
the other agents in the environment are Altruistic as well. Third, Greedy agents
perform the worst unless the community is composed mainly of other Greedy agents
(in which case the total gain is similarly distributed between the members (H1.3
was accepted)). Thus, Greedy A2 obtained the best performance in group 6. The
explanation, which in addition justi¯es the results discussed in previous points,
is that the winner agents in the groups with rejected hypothesis (groups 2, 5, 6
and 7) are those with an ! value in the mid-point of the limits (i.e. those that
balance the social attitude in the community). A1, for example, has exactly the !
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same pattern is followed by groups 5, 6 and 7 where the winners are also in the
middle of the limits. Thus, independently of the type of agents that make up the
communities, the agent that balances its group and individual tendencies is the
one with the best performance.
Agent AU
1 2 3
A0 1493.98
A4 1584.97
A3 1591.30 1591.30
A2 1631.18 1631.18
A1 1641.27
p 1.000 0.151 0.102
Table A.5: Group 6 (Majority Greedy): post-analysis.
The above analysis explained how the ! factor a®ected individual agent types
in di®erent types of groups. However, this next experiment seeks to evaluate if a
more general dominant behaviour can be established between the agents' attitudes
(level iii of detail). Being speci¯c, hypothesis H3 evaluates whether there is a
dominant behaviour with respect to an agent's ! factor:
H3: The AU gained by Altruistic agents is the same as that obtained by Greedy or
Neutral agents in all groups.
Hypothesis to evaluate (level iii) p Outcome
H3: AUAltruistic=AUGreedy=AUNeutral 0.000 Rejected
Table A.6: Agents' type performance in all groups (given !): result of ANOVA.
ANOVA in Table A.6 rejects the hypothesis and the post-analysis (Table A.7)
built three groups. Table A.7 indicates that Altruistic agents perform, in general,
better than Neutral and Greedy ones. H3 does not contradict H1 and H2, it rather
claims di®erent things. The previous discussion (related to H1 and H2) outlined
the agents' performance given the particular group they belonged to. This anal-
ysis was important because it is the only way of ¯nding any relation between
the AU obtained given the community. H3, in contrast, takes into consideration
the whole sample (the 7 groups) and this is the basis on which the evaluation is
performed. Thus, H3 demonstrates that because Altruistic agents perform better
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participate in several communities, they have a greater probability of obtaining a
better performance on average than the other types. However, this result must
be taken with caution because it takes into account the 7 groups used to evaluate
the hypothesis. An alternative subset of groups may well lead to other results.
This thesis has claimed that dynamism and openness are key determining factors
in a multiagent setting. Thus, the number of groups to be taken into account can-
not be determined in advance, neither can the type of members of each group be
predetermined. But, when analysing particular groups with particular members,
the probability of reproducing the results and obtaining the same agents' dom-
inant behaviour presented by speci¯c groups (for example those obtained with
Altruistic agent in H1.5) is more likely to be obtained.
Agent type AU
1 2 3
Greedy 1556.36
Neutral 1624.89
Altruistic 1776.26
p 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table A.7: Agents' type performance in all groups (given !): post-analysis.
To summarise the analysis of heterogeneity regarding willingness to cooperate,
the experimentation performed here explains the e®ect of ! on the agent's individ-
ual behaviour and on that of the group as a whole. It is clear that the agents' bids
are e®ected by their social attitude (set by this factor) and this determines whether
they expect to receive more, less or the same average reward for social activities as
they do for non-social ones. Some types of agents perform better than others, but
this is very much determined by the constituency of the remaining agents. Thus,
there is no universally best willingness to cooperate factor. The same conclusion
was also reached by the analysis performed in Section 7.4, however the results of
this subsection extend this claim to more heterogeneous settings.
In more general terms, this analysis also shows one of the key problems in this
MAS setting, the di±culty of obtaining optimal agent behaviour without having a
mechanism to precisely model the degree of cooperativeness of the other agents. In
this framework, the performance of the agents are highly based on their capacity
to take decisions based on the proposed decision making framework, which, in
part, is based on their ability to predict the others' attitudes. This analysis also
shows that regarding !, the better an agent can predict the others' attitudes, the
more it can adapt its own behaviour in order to obtain a better performance.Appendix A Coordination in Heterogeneous Settings 156
A.3 Alternative values for decision procedures
factor
One of the key elements in the decision making framework is the reward rate (r)
that agents seeks to improve (recall that this considers the ST reward they would
obtain assuming all agents have to move an average distance with equation (4.1)).
Now, this is not the only way of taking this decision. Therefore, this subsection
explores a range of alternatives. Thus, instead of using a ¯xed reward rate in all
decision making procedures, the idea is to update this rate each time agents face
a decision problem. In particular, the following means of calculating this reward
rate were explored:
² Short reward rate. This is approximated based on the current goal and the
expected time to achieve the goal. Note that this rate is calculated di®erently
depending on the speci¯c role the agent is playing. For AiC it is based on
the particular CM it has selected, for AiCoop it is based on the contract
it has agreed and for the AiS's it is based on the ST goal it is pursuing.
For example, assume that AiS2 received a request for cooperation in the
particular situation illustrated in Figure 4.1. The Average reward rate used
in that example is 0.625 (from equation (4.1)), while, the Short reward is
calculated with S = 2 and the time it expects to reach ST2 (which in this
case is 4). Thus, the Short reward in this example is 2=4 = 0:5.
² Long reward rate. This is the accumulated reward at the moment of the de-
cision. In other words, this rate is calculated with the total reward achieved
by STs and CTs and the timed invested on them. For example, assume that
an agent has accomplished an AU of 100 in 120 times steps, the Long reward
has a value of: 100=120 = 0:833.
² Average reward rate. This is the case used in all the previous experiments
(equation (4.1)). For example, in Figure 4.1 the Average reward value is
0.625.
Once again, the hypotheses are evaluated at the three levels of detail. The
group reference, group label, and the agent's characteristics in each group are
detailed in Table A.8. Starting with level i, the following hypotheses compare the
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Group Group label Agent distribution
1 Short group All agents with Short rate
2 Long group All agents with Long rate
3 Average group All agents with Average rate
4 Majority Short A0,A1,A2 Short, A3 Average, A4
5 Majority Long A0 Average, A1,A3,A4 Long, A2 Short
6 Majority Average A0,A1,A3 Average, A2 Long, A4 Short
7 Mixed A0,A3 Average, A1 Short, A2,A4 Long
Table A.8: Constituent agent groups (given r).
H1: Groups of agents using Short and majority Short reward rate obtain the
same AU as groups using Long and majority Long, Average and majority
Average and the same as groups with mixed agents.
H2: The number of CTs accomplished by groups of agents employing Short and
majority Short reward rate is the same as those obtained by groups of agents
using Long and majority Long, Average and majority Average and the same
as groups with mixed reward rates.
Hypothesis to evaluate (level i) p Outcome
H1: AU1=AU2=AU3=AU4=AU5=AU6=AU7 0.000 Rejected
H2: TCT1=TCT2=TCT3=TCT4=TCT5=TCT6=TCT7 0.000 Rejected
Note: The subindex associated with AU and TCT refers to the group's num-
ber as described in Table A.8.
Table A.9: Agents' performance per group (given r): result of ANOVA.
As shown in Table A.9, the reward rate used by agents does indeed have impli-
cations on the AU and the number of CTs accomplished (H4 and H5 are rejected
with ANOVA). This result can be explained by considering the nature of the
agents' decision making processes. The reward rate is used by agents when they
submit bids (equation (4.6)), when they evaluate the CM by measuring the cost of
setting it up (equation (4.2)), and when they estimate how much the other agents
are likely to ask for work in cooperation (equation (4.3)). In the case of submitting
bids, when agents use Short reward they will propose higher or smaller bids than
when they use Average or Long rewards depending on whether they are closer or
further away from their goals (respectively). In the former situation, their bids are
more di±cult to get accepted because with Short reward agents seek to improve
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gain a very good reward. On the other hand, when they are closer (below the ave-
rage distance) their bids often get accepted. Thus, with Short reward agents are
not consistent in getting their bids accepted and, consequently, they accomplish
fewer CTs than the other rates. To this end, Average and Long agents achieve
more CTs because it is more likely they will have their bids accepted (at least
most of the time) and hence they obtain more reward in total. The di®erence
between the use of Long and Average rates is mainly that the former tends to be
more precise about what is occurring because it is updated as time passes. This
contrasts with Average which never updates its approximation no matter whether
this joint action is successful or not (because it is based on a ¯xed calculation).
Consistent with the previous explanation, Table A.10 presents two conclusions:
the Long rate group (group 2) perform the best and the Short rate ones (groups 1
and 4) perform the worst. With respect to the other communities, it is not possible
to conclude anything because the results are highly contingent on the composition
of the communities. For example, although the groups of majority Long (group 5)
perform the second best, its dominance is not statistically signi¯cant over groups
of mixed agents and Average.
Group AU
1 2 3 4
1 1469.80
4 1479.40
6 1519.48
7 1529.16 1529.16
3 1530.04 1530.04
5 1545.58
2 1579.28
p 0.923 0.883 0 472 1.000
Table A.10: Agents' performance per group (given r): post-analysis.
To support the conclusion that, in general, Long agents dominate over the other
two types, H3 tests the same hypothesis but, this time, consideres the AU obtained
by an agent regardless of the groups to which it belongs (level iii):
H3: The AU gained by agents which use Short reward is the same as that obtained
by agents which use Long or Average rewards in all groups.
Tables A.11 and A.12 con¯rm the above discussion; agents that take Long term
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Hypothesis to evaluate (level iii) p Outcome
H3: AUShort=AULong=AUAverage 0.000 Rejected
Table A.11: Agents' type performance in all groups (given r): result of ANOVA.
Agent type AU
1 2 3
Short 1482.97
Average 1524.64
Long 1554.60
p 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table A.12: Agents' type performance in all groups (given r): post-analysis.
drawback as hypothesis H3 of Section A.2; namely, it is partial. ANOVA does
not take the whole population into account, rather it considers only a sample of 7
groups (though this sample represents a good range of the possible combinations
of groups it is not the whole population). Thus, the ANOVA result regarding H3
cannot be generalised.
Despite the dominance achieved by Long agents in Table A.10, it is necessary
to investigate whether they show the same winner performance by focusing in on
how the groups are constituted. To deal with this issue, Table A.13 shows the ex-
perimental evaluation for each type of agent in each type of group of agent (level
ii). The ANOVA results indicates that no matter what the agent's community
is, there is no truly dominant behaviour. This is somewhat surprising. It was
expected that Long reward agents would obtain a better AU than Short and Ave-
rage agents because it had shown a dominant behaviour in the previous analysis at
the various di®erent levels of detail. The explanation is that the reward rates are
used in all the decision making procedures and some of these decisions bene¯t spe-
ci¯c roles and some bene¯t others. For example, with Short reward, AiC performs
poorly because it assumes that others (equation (4.3)) will require a signi¯cant
reward and hence it does not go for CTs very often. This shows that some roles
perform better than others based on the particular reward rate. In the end, the
use of di®erent ways of calculating this reward means that di®erent member types
in the various communities do not really have a distinctive performance pattern.
In other words, no matter how each group is integrated and which reward rate
is used, there is not a signi¯cant di®erence in the individual performance. Thus,
for example, in group 7 all type of agents obtain (statistical) the same amount of
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Hypothesis to evaluate (level ii) p Outcome
H1.1: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.816 Accepted
H1.2: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.630 Accepted
H1.3: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.655 Accepted
H1.4: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.276 Accepted
H1.5: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.122 Accepted
H1.6: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.378 Accepted
H1.7: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.080 Accepted
Note. Recall that the subindex in the hypothesis number is associ-
ated with the group tested. For example: H1.3 tests the AU in the
group with only Average agents (group 3).
Table A.13: Agents' type performance within groups (given r): result of ANOVA.
The above discussion demonstrates that regardless of the fact that Long dom-
inantes in some experiments, agents using the Long reward rate do not obtain
signi¯cantly better long term rewards. Although Long reward agents represent
more precisely the real reward they are gaining, this does not make a di®erence in
the ¯nal AU obtained. Thus, the bene¯ts of using the reward rate types explored
here are only signi¯cant from the group's points of view, not from the individual's
perspective.
One potential problem with the experimentation performed here is that the
same reward rate is used in all the agent's decision procedures; namely how to
bid, which CM to select and so on. However, it does not need to be this way.
Thus, based on the nature of each type of decision, agents could use di®erent
reward rates. For example, when deciding which CM to select, agents could use
Long reward, but when bidding they might use Short reward. However, this is left
as future work.
To sum up, the main conclusion related to the matter of reward rate is that
the decision of using Average reward rate as de¯ned in equation (4.1) in all the
experiments in the main body of the thesis was correct. Thus, unless the aim is to
evaluate the particulars of agent behaviours given the whole range of communities,
the reward rate does not a®ect the conclusions already drawn.
A.4 Di®erent reasoning capabilities
The last scenario to consider is what happens when learning agents share the
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contrast the agents' behaviour by only changing some aspects of the decision ma-
king process, here the comparison tests heterogeneity in more fundamental way.
The question is whether agents that learn about the CM to select have a dominant
behaviour over those that do not.
As before, the experiments in this section were conducted as per Section A.1.
However, the main distinction is that it only describes the dynamic setting (envi-
ronment scenario2 in Chapter 9) because it is in this context that more interesting
conclusions are likely. In particular, here some agents posses the learning ability
(as detailed in Section 9.2). These are called RL agents. The agents that do not
learn are called NL agents (they use the decision making framework as indicated in
Chapter 4). Thus, Table A.14 introduces the groups' reference number, the group
label and the members of each group used in this experiment.
Group Group label Agent distribution
1 NLs All members are non learning agents
2 RLs All members are learning agents
3 Majority NLs A0 RL, A1 NL, A2 NL, A3 NL, A4 NL
4 Majority RLs A0 NL, A1 RL, A2 RL, A3 RL, A4 RL
5 Mixed RLs A0 RL, A1 NL, A2 RL, A3 NL, A4 RL
6 Mixed NLs A0 NL, A1 RL, A2 NL, A3 RL, A4 NL
Table A.14: Constituent agent groups (given RL and NL agents).
Following the experimental setting of Section A.1, the ¯rst hypotheses to test
are whether the groups of Table A.14 perform the same (level i of detail):
H1: Groups of RLs and majority RLs agents obtain the same AU as groups of
NLs and majority NLs agents and the same as groups of mixed RLs and NLs
agents.
H2: The number of CTs accomplished by groups of RLs and majority RLs agents
is the same as groups of NLs, majority NLs, and as the mixed RL and
NL agents.
Tables A.15 and A.16 present the ANOVA results and the post analysis per-
formed on the data collected in these experiments. As expected, H1 and H2 were
rejected with ANOVA. Group 2 (with all learning agents) performs the best and
group 1 (with non learning agents) performs the worst. This result corroborates
the fact that agents that learn the situation in which the CM should be appliedAppendix A Coordination in Heterogeneous Settings 162
Hypothesis to evaluate (level i) p Outcome
H1: AU1=AU2=AU3=AU4=AU5=AU6 0.000 Rejected
H2: TCT1=TCT2=TCT3=TCT4=TCT5=TCT6 0.000 Rejected
Note: The subindex associated with AU and TCT refers to the group's
number as described in Table A.14.
Table A.15: Agents' performance per group (given RL and NL agents): result of
ANOVA.
are more e®ective (Section 9.2). However, note that in both groups the members
are similar and it is necessary to check the group's performance when there are a
mixed set of members. Here the interesting result is that the more learning agents
are in a group, the better the overall performance (Table A.16).
Group AU
1 2 3
1 7151.12
3 7151.28
6 7285.08 7285.08
5 7436.36 7436.36 7436.36
4 7562.44 7562.44
2 7696.78
p 0.170 0.196 0.259
Table A.16: Agents' performance per group (given RL and NL agents): post-
analysis.
Hypothesis to evaluate (level ii) p Outcome Winner
H1.1: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.476 Accepted
H1.2: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.209 Accepted
H1.3: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.000 Rejected A0 (RL)
H1.4: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.000 Rejected A2, A4, A3, A1
(RLs)
H1.5: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.000 Rejected A0,A2,A4 (RLs)
H1.6: AUA0=AUA1=AUA2=AUA3=AUA4 0.000 Rejected A1, A3 (RLs)
Note. Recall that the subindex in the hypothesis number is associated with the
group tested, for example: H1.2 tests the AU in the group with RLs members
(group 2).
Table A.17: Agents' type performance within groups: result of ANOVA (given
RL and NL agents).
Turning to the agents' type performance within groups (level ii), the hypothesis
now validates RL agents' performance per group. To this end, Table A.17 clearlyAppendix A Coordination in Heterogeneous Settings 163
indicates that those groups that are composed of the same agent type (groups 1
and 2) do not have a particular distinctive performance (ANOVA was accepted
in H1.1 and H1.2). However, the interesting point is that ANOVA rejects the
AU signi¯cance in groups 3, 4, 5 and 6. This is because in these groups there
is a mix of member types. The results indicate that the groups composed of the
RL agents are those that perform best. However, now it is interesting to verify if the
hypothesis is rejected because RL agents do have a signi¯cantly better performance
than NL ones. For this purpose, the post-analysis of hypotheses H1.3, H1.4, H1.5
and H1.6 are shown in Tables A.18 and A.19. The results are conclusive; regardless
of the group, RL agents invariably obtain more AU than NL agents.
Post analysis H1.3
Agent AU
1 2
A4 6678.81
A3 6936.20
A2 7034.06
A1 7139.00
A0 7968.31
p 0.264 1.000
Post analysis H1.4
Agent AU
1 2
A0 6691.27
A2 7750.99
A4 7752.50
A3 7764.69
A1 7852.73
p 1.000 0.950
Table A.18: Agents' type performance within groups 3 and 4: post-analysis.
Post analysis H1.5
Agent AU
1 2
A3 6769.96
A1 6955.69
A2 7805.74
A4 7812.48
A0 7837.90
p 0.909 1.000
Post analysis H1.6
Agent AU
1 2
A2 6761.54
A0 6776.75
A4 7002.84
A3 7917.54
A1 7966.70
p 0.757 0.999
Table A.19: Agents' type performance within groups 5 and 6: post-analysis.
Given these results, it is expected that the level iii of analysis would corrobo-
rate the signi¯cantly better performance of RL agents with the following hypoth-
esis:
H3 : The AU gained by RL agents is the same as that obtained by NL agent in
all communities.Appendix A Coordination in Heterogeneous Settings 164
Hypothesis to evaluate (level iii) p Outcome
H3: AURL=AUNL 0.001 Rejected
Table A.20: Agents' performance in all groups (given RL and NL agents): result
of ANOVA.
Table A.20 shows that RL agent do have a (statistically signi¯cant) better
AU than agents that do not learn at all. The same conclusion can be drawn in
Figure A.2 in which the AU obtained by the RL agent was approximately 7260.82
whereas the value of the NL agent was 7500.20.
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Figure A.2: Agents' type performance in all groups (given RL and NL agents).
A.5 Discussion
The experimental evaluation of this Appendix has further evaluated the perfor-
mance of the agents when various forms of heterogeneity are introduced. In general
terms, a fundamental exploration at three levels of study was carried out focusing
on i) di®erent dispositions to cooperate, ii) alternative values for calculating the
reward rate (r) factor and iii) di®erent reasoning capabilities (namely; learning
and non learning agents). To this end, the results obtained here support, in gen-
eral, the conclusions drawn in the main body of this thesis. In particular, the
willingness to cooperate experiments show that the ! factor does indeed e®ect
the agent's individual disposition to cooperate and consequently on the group as
a whole. Moreover, it was also shown that there is no universal ! factor that isAppendix A Coordination in Heterogeneous Settings 165
e®ective in all settings. How well or badly an agent performs is highly based on
the attitudes of the other agents. Regarding the di®erent methods for calculating
r, it was demonstrated that no matter how this factor is calculated, there is no
signi¯cant di®erence in the long term performance of the agents. Finally, the most
clear out results related to the agent's e®ectiveness was when comparing learning
and non learning agents. Undoubtedly, agents that take advantage of learning by
experience perform better than those that do not do so. Once again, this result
corroborates the conclusions of Chapter 9.References
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